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Introduction
Understanding Vilém Flusser

When Vilém Flusser (1920-1991) crossed the ocean between Europe and South
America, his ties to the Old World were already broken. Leaving behind the Nazi
occupation and virtually no surviving friends or family members, the Czech-German Jew
and his wife Edith abandoned Prague for the urban jungles of Brazil, where all they had
left was the future. Starting afresh in his New World, Flusser assembled his experiences,
observations and truncated university education into a philosophical edifice that defies
categories and disciplines even to this day. His reexamination of some of the most basic
elements of human existence both mundane and terrifying offers his readers a glimpse of
the world as if for the first time. Forcibly uprooted geographically, socially and
culturally, Flusser developed a theoretical distance that stayed with him as he consistently
attempted to unlearn his own previous knowledge and prejudices about things in order to
perceive new information, establish new roots and constructively face the future. Flusser
studied Brazil’s nature and culture for years before making a deliberate choice to settle
into foreign ground and forge new ties again from the beginning in an attempt to span the
abyss of a life he perceived to be absurd. This constant awareness of a pervading
Bodenlosigkeit allowed Flusser to remain always an outsider, and thus able to view the
world’s dramas through a detached eye, sensitive less to the emotional content and more
to the dynamic organizational structures. Even his autobiography is to a large extent
written in the third person; here he describes his perception of the war’s destruction from
his new Brazilian refuge:
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War man aber, wie jetzt, aus der Ordnung gerissen, dann konnte man die Welt aus
weiter Sicht überblicken. Was man da erblickte, war keine Ordnung, sondern ein
Chaos, auf das sich verschiedene, lächerliche und einander überschneidende
Ordnungen drückten. Es war ein Vergnügen, zu beobachten, wie diese Ordnungen
gleich Amöben in der chaotischen Nährsuppe herumschwammen, einander fraßen,
sich teilten, und jede davon überzeugt zu sein schien, das Wesen der Suppe
vorzustellen. (Bodenlos 36)
Flusser’s self-described structural understanding of the world comes from a profound
Gleichgültigkeit (Bodenlos 36), and yet it opens up to him an almost unlimited freedom
to disentangle the parts and construct from them something new. This potential to create
new relationships between things is for Flusser the only way to bridge the abyss of
absurdity; we must first understand the structure of our world in order to make of its parts
something meaningful. For Flusser, human freedom is this ability to create our own
meaning.
The above excerpt by Flusser is representative of his writing style and of the
object of this study. When Flusser’s theoretical analyses break up human culture into its
structural components, the result is often a metaphor linking the cultural phenomena with
natural ones. This is strange because his philosophy to some extent begins from the
perceived sense of alienation humans experience in relation to nature. Flusser’s
definition of culture, in fact, could be summarized as the technological engagement
against nature for survival. The developmental progress of technology then increasingly
abstracts humans from a direct experience of nature. Nature, on the other hand, is for
Flusser the inevitability of death and the cycle of renewal that keeps all information in
flux. Human cultural engagements, absurd as they are in Flusser’s eyes, are for him
failed attempts to attain immortality by preserving information after its creator’s death in
the form of artifacts that eventually crumble and fade. Although human bodies are
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natural in that they succumb to death, Flusser believes humans’ technology and “antinatural” culture are also products of “natural” neuronal circuits in human brains, and thus
culture is ultimately also “natural.” In so mixing the concepts, Flusser explains that the
distinction between nature and culture must be erased completely before humans can
creatively rearrange the structural components of their environment. While Flusser holds
technology responsible for the gap experienced between nature and culture, he sees in the
transition to the digital an expanded creative potential that could very well bridge this
gap—digital technology may be able to assist in creating more “natural” or “real”
relationships between things. The following chapters will elucidate Flusser’s writings to
show that the incremental process whereby humans were distanced from their natural
environment through the use of tools is the same process that developed technology to the
point where it can finally connect humans more closely to their environment through
unprecedented creative restructuring. This is only one of Flusser’s many contributions,
but one of the most important for understanding the potential applications of his work in
the so-called digital age.
Given the increasing relevance and diversity of implications of Flusser’s theories
on the relationship of technology to the environment, it is surprising that previous
scholarship has not yet treated in particular the looming presence of nature in Flusser’s
expansive collection of texts. Just in the published works alone, it is a rare text indeed
that does not draw important conclusions for the manipulation of environments. This
study will attempt to make explicit Flusser’s thoughts on the connections between nature
and culture that are directly and indirectly present throughout his work. Many of these
connections have been overlooked because of Flusser’s unusual writing style, the absence
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of explicit citation of other thinkers who influenced him, and the fundamental
interdisciplinary nature of his texts. Although essential to understanding Flusser’s
perspective, many of the connections exist only in his purposefully chosen metaphors and
experimental thought-models that can easily be taken for granted when reading him
solely for his more popular (equally groundbreaking) theories of language or media.
Because few of his works were originally published in English, his work is only
beginning to be recognized in scholarship outside of Germany and Brazil, where he is
known as a media theorist and language philosopher, respectively. Flusser did tailor his
writings to his audience, and in general published most of his early theories of language
in Portuguese beginning in the 1960s, his media theory in German in the following
decades, and turned to the United States in the later years to publish his theories
concerning digital art and genetic manipulation, among others. This is an approximation;
in all of these periods Flusser’s nature metaphors are present and numerous, and still the
entire discussion of nature in his philosophy of technology and art remains relatively
untouched until now.
A large part of Flusser’s conceptualization of nature in the digital age is indirectly
evidenced in his predilection for metaphorical and allegorical writing. While this
technique in his writing deserves to be explored in its own right, Flusser’s unique way of
picturing philosophy is even more intriguing for its subject matter, as the majority of
images he uses to explain his concepts are taken from the natural world, as the above
excerpt demonstrates. What is exciting about this is the fact that these plants, animals,
rocks, water and body parts are used in Flusser’s media philosophy to illustrate the
function of digital technology in human society. The more one reads Flusser, the more
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nature, humans and machines fuse into a mosaic of interrelated parts in a very mysterious
yet purposeful way. As a form of translation between worlds, these nature metaphors are
to be used as models for experience in a culture where nature has disappeared. Society’s
transition to a digital code Flusser shows to effect a crisis of science and of values in a
time when the boundaries between philosophical critique, artistic practice and hard
science can and should no longer be distinguished. Flusser’s metaphorical philosophy
illustrates this crisis in its performance of the new style of writing he envisions: no more
claims to truth or to scientific accuracy than to creativity and varying degrees of
improbability. The confusion of art, science and metaphorical creatures in Flusser’s
philosophy is a crucial part of the present examination of the vanishing nature-culture
divide.
Flusser’s metaphors require a somewhat unconventional approach in the writing
of this dissertation for a number of reasons. Because his essayistic style of writing is
always meant as a direct address toward his readers to provoke them and initiate a
dialogue, my engagement with his writings is performative in the sense that it plays with
this essayistic style, to some extent thinking with and along the lines of Flusser’s work to
create a deliberate encounter between subjective and objective viewpoints in the text. I
not only dissect his metaphors and explain their implications, but then also answer in the
form of a synthesis, exploring possible ways the metaphors can fit together and in so
doing open up new directions for future dialogues. I stitch together these diverse and
colorful metaphors in ways different than Flusser does in order to construct a larger
picture of the universe they depict and the manner in which they do so. I deliberately
overlap seemingly unrelated metaphors that actually refer to the same phenomenon upon
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closer consideration, juxtaposing disparate terms in the same sentence to uncover their
similarities—terms, for example, like “ocean of possibilities,” “boiling soup of creation,”
“abyss of the inarticulable” and so on, all of which refer to the same concept of a chaotic
flux of particles that have not yet congealed into meaningful information. These
metaphors are always used in Flusser’s sense and are not chosen arbitrarily for the sake
of dramatic flair. The result is the development of a conclusion unforeseen at the
beginning of this project: Flusser explicitly asserts his ideal of free human agency in
world creation, while his metaphors implicitly assert the opposite. Because our second
nature is both nature and culture, to recreate from its parts something new we must not
only insert our deliberate intention into the process, but we must also work together with
the chaos, chance and entropy of nature’s methods. We really can only half-predict the
outcome of our creative efforts, Flusser’s metaphors show us, purposely creating spaces
for order to spontaneously emerge.
This investigation began with the following questions: Why do the majority of
Flusser’s metaphors for digital technology come from nature? What relationship between
nature and digital technology is implied by this literary device in his philosophy? It is my
understanding that the use of these metaphors in Flusser’s texts both illuminate crucial
connections in the content of his philosophy as well as perform an important function
exemplifying the possibilities he sees available to creative artists, philosophers and
scientists once they understand their new relationship to their natural/cultural
environment. They perform this new style of writing, and they also describe Flusser’s
theoretical vision of realities in which metaphors themselves act as tools or media in the
formation of these second-nature realities. As each main metaphor is examined over the
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course of this study, a structural diagram of this natural-digital relationship is filled in
piece by piece, leading to further questions to be addressed such as: What is the role of
metaphor in our perception of the environment, and in our culture of technology? What
conclusions must be drawn for future creative responses to this understanding of the
natural-digital connection? How might we re-imagine or even re-create our world?
The answers to these questions are revealed as the structure of Flusser’s universe
of ideas is outlined and unfolded into its web of interconnections. Flusser’s worldview is
so dependent on his use of metaphor that a thorough study of his theories can only
develop simultaneously alongside an analysis of his metaphors. After all, Flusser does
not clearly delineate anywhere a simple logical progression of ideas or summarize his
ideas into a coherent whole. As Louis Bec once described his thought process, Flusser
thinks in images, that is, structurally instead of linearly. “Vilém Flusser was convinced
that philosophy no longer happened in writing, but in the image” (Bec “Institut” 4).1 If
Bec refers to Flusser’s philosophy as the action of a map-maker surveying a terrain, the
thought models that form along the way are mental images that orient the explorer. The
contradiction is obvious, in that Flusser drew his images almost entirely in words, with
almost no help from any diagrams, illustrations or nonverbal explanations of his own. If
his texts really are cartographic tapestries interwoven with uncountable linear threads,
then they act as examples of Flusser’s own theories as explained in the following
chapters. Reading Flusser is like walking a labyrinth: he writes so that we experience the
journey, not that we may climb above and observe the whole blueprint all at once. The

1 My translation from the French.
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present exploration of his theoretical universe, however, will attempt to take this
impossible view.
Another difficulty in organizing Flusser’s theoretical structures is the sheer
amount of written material. His book-length works number around thirty and his essays
well over 2,500 before taking into account the countless translations into multiple
languages that, when translated by Flusser himself, as was often the case, suddenly
became new works with slightly or even substantially different content.2 The Flusser
Archiv Berlin has most of these works available for viewing, along with Flusser’s prolific
written correspondence and his travel library where one can see, for example, the
encyclopedia entry on octopi he consulted while writing the Vampyroteuthis. The essays,
most written for art journals or newspapers like the Suplemento Literário do Estado de
São Paulo in which Flusser kept a regular column for decades, are quite often
substantially redundant. That is to say, while they are all unique, they usually repeat at
least a portion of Flusser’s main ideas in different contexts and with different emphases,
adding to the pleasure of the researcher who might happen to discover in some particular
permutation an unexpected connection between concepts. In the present study, only a
selected representation of the materials supporting the views here have been cited to
avoid redundancy, and an attempt was made to choose published works where possible
for the convenience of the reader. There were many more to choose from.
Flusser’s scattered ideas are synthesized here in pursuit of his vision of creative
freedom. The first chapter begins with a deeper discussion of Flusser’s concepts of

2 For more on Flusser‘s practice of translation and back-translation in text production, see Rainer Guldin’s
Philosophieren zwischen den Sprachen. Vilém Flussers Werk. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2005.
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nature and culture, reading from his metaphors a new kind of nature incorporating human
culture into what he terms a “second nature.” Following this overview, the second
chapter focuses on the most ambitious of Flusser’s extended metaphors, the
Vampyroteuthis infernalis, what he terms a work of philosophical fiction that confuses art
and science with its parallels between chromatophores and pixels, ink clouds and
advertising. The third chapter looks at the function of metaphor in Flusser’s theories of
human perception and concept formation, and its role in an age of high technology where
literary metaphors and deterministic machines combine for a new kind of artistic creation
that utilizes emergent order in chaos. The fourth and final chapter supports the artistic
application of emergent principles by connecting Flusser’s concepts of nature, digital and
non-digital technology at the level of the atom, detailing the metaphors linking digital
information bits to piles of dirt and stones. This leads to an extension of Flusser’s
theories to selected artworks by Franz Ackermann, Joan Fontcuberta and even living
artworks by bio artists like Eduardo Kac, Louis Bec, Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr and
others. Once nature can be manipulated at the level of the gene, Flusser believes, it is
material for art just like pixels, numbers and metaphors. A combination of nature and
culture, art and science, the future of alternative world creation draws nearer every day;
Flusser’s response to groundlessness is to create one’s own ground out of thin air,
modeled by oceans, squids, spider webs and sand.
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I: Oceans
Connecting Nature, Culture and the Telematic Universe to Build Worlds

Mapping Flusser’s scattered musings onto his larger theoretical framework is
indeed a challenging task, despite his many bold statements on the most fundamental
topics of human birth, life, death, and everything in between. Each of his works contains
multiple theoretical layers, different linguistic contexts and various references to his other
works, and each fits into his broader worldview as a separate layer which must be
translated and meshed with all the others in order to present the entire picture. Flusser’s
universe as a whole is present in none of his works, and in all of them. Beginning to
crudely filter the information, however, first reveals that Flusser’s vision of present and
future human culture in large part seems to depend upon humans’ relationship to the
natural environment. In particular this vision emphasizes the dissolving of conceptual
and physical boundaries between nature and culture.
A Second Nature
Flusser blurs the line between the two spheres based not only on the equation of
nature and culture as simply one and the same environment, but also on the juxtaposition
of the two as completely opposed worlds. Because Flusser’s examinations are always
unapologetically anthropocentric, nature and culture are always defined in relation to
people, and humans as creators of culture are to be understood in this sense as both
natural and anti-natural beings. It is this contradiction that only gradually reveals itself to
explain humans’ relationship with digital technology and therefore their task for a digital
future. Humans are natural, so to speak, in that they are well-connected parts of the
“united world memory” (explained below), an interrelated web-like ecosystem containing
10

the biosphere, human beings, their tools and the rest of the universe all made up of the
same basic elements. This is important because if the same particles make up all things,
then they can be rearranged at will to create new hybrids as far as technology allows.
Therefore, Flusser urges, humans must acknowledge their place in nature’s network of
relations so that they can manipulate it more competently. Human beings are at the same
time also very much unnatural, Flusser adds, as creators of a culture meant to deny the
basic conditions of the natural mortal world, an attempt to avoid death and
meaninglessness by preserving and circulating information in purposeful ways. To do
this, and always by means of technology, humans create a distance between themselves
and nature which they then continually struggle to overcome, eventually creating a new
kind of nature to replace the old. The result is a kind of “second nature” that is
simultaneously both nature and culture. To direct our culture’s technology toward the
best possible future, Flusser implores that we first understand how our second nature is
structured so that we may change it freely according to our wishes.
The urgency in his writing comes mainly during the 1970s and 1980s when digital
technology was just starting to explode cultural horizons and the potential for
emancipation as well as the ethical implications were hardly yet fathomed. Personal
computers were just starting to appear on the market, and photo-editing programs and the
internet were only just available to the public around 1990, a year before Flusser’s death.
While his almost prescient foresight of a networked society and image manipulation were
indeed visionary at the time, they are perhaps all the more relevant a few decades later,
when the dangers and promises of digital culture are even more real and our relationship
to the environment even more controversial. In the twenty-first century, the importance
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of nature in all its forms can no longer be overlooked in these considerations on the place
of technology in society.
Defining nature and culture as they are used in Flusser’s texts proves the first
challenge. Most of Flusser’s writing places human culture in the foreground, negatively
defined against the mere backdrop or shadow of nature, and even his studied observations
of nature as nature in the end reveal to him again only the products of human culture.
Taking from his perspective a negative image, though, it is possible to outline at this
point a working definition of nature, not disregarding the fact that such an undertaking
may well never break free of its cultural dimensions entirely. Nature, the reader may
gather, was always around, present on earth before humans existed. As such, it provides
the most basic conditions for our existence and limits our growth and thus our actions and
even our thoughts. Both characteristics of nature are of course already defined in relation
to the human. More definitively, nature is to be seen as a randomly organized system, a
web of multiple non-symbolic games whose rules are governed by chance. The playing
pieces in this game of chance are particles, atomic, subatomic or otherwise, that
constantly circulate throughout the physical world. Now more densely packed together,
now more loosely packed, the particles create information by clumping together
temporarily, only to dissipate again as the information is lost. In the end, the basic
characteristic of nature is that these particles will eventually drift so far away from each
other that no more information can be created, that is, nature is entropy and death.
Human culture in general, then, can be defined as the struggle against this nature,
against oblivion, meaninglessness and death—but it is never only unnatural. The key to a
comprehensive view of his understanding of nature and culture in the digital age for the
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purposes of this study I believe can be found in his 1990 Leonardo essay, “On Memory
(Electronic or Otherwise),” in the juncture of two seemingly contradictory statements:
one describing human cultural production as specifically “anti-natural” followed
immediately by a proclamation that nothing human is “opposed to nature”:
Humans are different from all other known beings in that they acquire
information, store it, process it and transmit it to future generations. This is antinatural in that it is against the entropy of nature. This unique human ability has
been covered up during history by a dense ideological fog that has prevented
people from making full use of it. The most pernicious ideology was the one that
led us to believe that we have (or are) something opposed to nature. The invention
of electronic memories has given us a critical distance from this ability; we may
now expect a more conscious use of it. (“On Memory” 399)
Humans are both natural and anti-natural beings. This apparent contradiction arises from
his definition of memory as anti-entropic. Flusser sees similar types of memories in both
human beings and the natural environment, defining them both as processes—not
places—of information storage. Imagining memories found in nature as islands
temporarily forming in a stream of the natural flux of change allows him to define things
like atoms and galaxies as natural memories, and even the entire biomass of Earth as a
process of genetic memory. These memories, in his sense of the term, are “negatively
entropic epicycles that sit upon the linear entropic tendency of nature” (“On Memory”
397). That is to say, things in nature tend to fall apart, and new things are created from
the leftover pieces of old things, and eventually these new things too fall apart, and the
cycle repeats indefinitely. Things, molecules, galaxies and organisms arise for a time,
but in the end everything dies, all heat dissipates, and disorganization will increase until
every bit of matter or energy separates from all others in space and things disintegrate
into non-things. Living organisms, including humans, are themselves memories that
temporarily contradict the entropic tendency toward loss of information and decay
13

because they preserve structural information in genes to be passed on to future
generations.
The second principle of thermodynamics that states that the entropy or uniformity
of a closed system always increases is central to Flusser’s understanding of humans’
relationship to nature. In his definition, the law simply “states that information contained
in nature tends to be forgotten” (“On Memory” 397). Because the fundamental
characteristic of nature is its tendency toward entropy, he says, human culture must
therefore be seen as an anti-entropic activity, “negentropy:” the attempt to store and pass
on information acquired by previous generations to future ones just like the process of
genetic inheritance. Culture is the struggle against nature. Humans’ cultural memory,
the much-debated inheritance of acquired information believed impossible in the rest of
nature, is less reliable than genetic memory, however, because the objects used by
humans to store the information are themselves subject to entropy (and thus part of nature
even when in the form of steel or concrete). Whether airwaves between two speakers or
harder materials like paper, wood, metal and stone, all are prone to interference from
outside noise, understood both in the common auditory sense of the term, as well as in the
sense of chaos that disrupts the message in information science. The storage of
information in objects is a process of developing increasingly better means to slow or
prevent the entropic loss of information in objects, that is to say, it is the process of
developing technological media and codes for communication.
Flusser’s information theory of human culture takes on dramatic proportions. As
one stage in the cultural engagement towards information preservation and
communication, the use of the written alphabet Flusser equates with the evolution of a
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sense of individuality, self or spirit in human culture. Libraries, existing as a sort of
“transhuman” or “superhuman” memory, Flusser writes, became for us humans a
transcendental realm of eternal forms and knowledge not subject to entropy (“On
Memory” 398). Transcendental in their capacity for information storage far beyond that
of the human mind, and in their existence outside of the human mind, the body of
knowledge contained in libraries, in the mass of printed material, was at the same time
partially contained inside of us; we thus (partially) joined this transcendental realm and
became subjects in an objective world, minds separated from bodies. The advance of
technology to the digital code centuries later, Flusser deduces, allowed for simulations of
these subjective human minds built from inanimate objects (electronic computers).
According to Flusser, as we observe and program these artificial memories, we may
emancipate ourselves from the necessity of storing information in order to focus more on
creatively processing it. Altogether, this will lead us to define memory as a process
instead of a thing, equally functional in silicon chips as in neuronal synapses. This
definition dissolves the conceptual and material boundaries between humans and the
world of objects so that we may consider ourselves part of what could be called a united
world memory. The human ‘self,’ Flusser continues, as well as all other objects, will
then be seen simply as a knot of relationships between other selves-objects in the
interconnected web of the natural-cultural ecosystem, the process of information
acquisition, storage and transmission that flows through all living and non-living
relational ‘knots’ in the web of life. Animate and inanimate objects alike are just knots of
relations, physical objects just points of overlap between force fields, and living
organisms “provisional protuberances from the mass of genetic information” (“On
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Memory” 399). As the world can be seen to function more like a giant human brain than
a group of individuals, humans may be considered interdependent parts of nature’s global
memory: naturally-occurring organisms pursuing negentropic, anti-natural ends.
Only after an acquaintance with the majority of Flusser’s body of work may his
reader recognize this conclusion as the foundation of his philosophy of the human-nature
relationship. While Flusser believes this natural, anti-natural tendency will remain
nevertheless mysterious, an understanding of humans’ place in this universal ecosystem
is crucial for perceiving the implications of digital technology in society and the
environment. Flusser’s visualization of the structure of society in the digital age, what he
calls the “telematic” universe, can be understood in this sense. Flusser’s concept of
information flow structures the material world as much as it does interpersonal
relationships and even our experience of space-time. Fundamental to this new relational
structure is the proliferation of technology that has translated much of the world into the
digital realm. The way information flows digitally is radically new, Flusser
acknowledges, and has reached the point where it is widespread enough to drastically
transform the everyday experience of life for the majority of people on the planet. It is
also unimaginably old, at least partially present in prehistoric, even seemingly eternal
biological and physical processes. This, at least, is what Flusser’s metaphors say. Our
world was digital ever since we understood “daß alle Wellen aus Tropfen bestehen,” he
writes, referring to a Democritean atomism he only explicitly mentions in other essays
(Die Schrift 132). It is this definition of digital structures in terms of the most primordial
building blocks of life on earth which suggests that the digital turn was not just a
completely new revolution in thought and action, but also a memory of something
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forgotten, something that was always around—something present in nature just as much
as in computers. To see the digital future of humanity, Flusser’s reader learns, we must
take to the microscope: through this metaphor we must see the world, the ocean of life, as
so many tiny droplets, not just a smooth empty space through which fish swim, through
which we travel on our course through time and space. Living in the telematic age will
build on this understanding and consist of rearranging the ocean’s droplets to build our
own waves, and our own fish.
Humans’ natural and anti-natural existence and the metaphors that illustrate this
can be further understood through a closer examination of the structure of the atomic or
synaptic circulation of information. The universe according to Flusser looks something
like a mass of cobwebs, a neural network or an ocean of floating plankton, where the
borders—conceptual as well as material—between the natural world and objects of
human construction have completely dissolved. People and their environment have
changed each other in a symbiotic process that has completely transformed the
relationships between people as well as their collective relationship with nature. Indeed,
Flusser goes so far as to define a living organism as no less than a combination of both
organism and environment (Vampyroteuthis 33).
Human, Abstracted
Writing on this topic mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, Flusser saw already in the
configuration of humans, technology and the biosphere surrounding him the beginnings
of his telematic society. By means of a technological revolution currently underway, he
believed the immediate future would be characterized by its network structure of
information flow. It must be remembered, however, that Flusser was writing before the
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internet played any kind of significant role in society. He merely envisioned in abstract
terms a means of communication that would take place in the form of an interpersonal
dialogue in multiple directions simultaneously, woven into a fabric of interconnected
relations that intersect at the knots, or nodes, which are both human and artificial subjects
(brains and computers). In reaction to Habermas and the importance the Frankfurt school
placed on the autonomous subject, Flusser’s telematic subject exists only as the
insubstantial intersection of multiple threads of communication or fields of relations, an
onion with layers of identities (“masks”) that form only in relationships with other nodes,
possessing no concrete “self” at its core (Gochenour 321).
[Human subjects] are hollow like onions.… An image of humanity of this type is
obvious not only thanks to psychoanalysis and existential analysis but
corresponds also to the concepts of other areas, for example, ecology (organisms
are knottings together of ecosystems); molecular biology (phenotypes are
knottings together of genetic information); or atomic physics (bodies are the
knottings together of the four field strengths). (“The City” 325)
Human beings must be seen, he believes, as dependent upon their connections with other
living and nonliving entities for their essence, possessing no substance unique to
themselves outside of the communicational network. Only the relations are concrete.
Individuals and objects are only immaterial nodes, therefore, and the world can be
viewed as a conglomeration of equal parts, a mosaic of particles of matter, energy or
information of equal size. Divisions between bodies and independent conscious minds
disappear in this new way of being-in-the-world, a term Flusser uses many times without
explicitly citing Heidegger, a way of being that owes its transformation to the increasing
dominance of digital technology in the sphere of human communication. The reason is
that with the digital revolution, Flusser explains, information can now be separated from
the objects that once embodied it—from tools, utensils, buildings, books, artworks and
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other cultural artifacts. The informing of cultural products was always a struggle against
nature, he believes, and specifically against the natural tendency of things to disorganize,
to lose their information. Continuously returning to the second law of thermodynamics,
Flusser explains that humans encode information into objects in order to preserve it as
long as possible from entropy, that movement of all nature toward dissolution and decay
and of all memories toward oblivion. As Flusser sees it, information in digital form can
be circulated throughout the intersubjective network without having to be stored in
intermediary objects that decompose over time. It travels from one memory to the next,
where it is stored, processed, manipulated and passed on again directly to others. These
may be human or natural memories, but they may also be artificial memories like
computers, robots and the like.
The circulation of information in the webs of the relational network is continuous,
Flusser emphasizes, so that it is only temporarily stored in individual memories, to
eventually be altered in some way through creative manipulation in order to then be
retransmitted to others. Flusser's communication structure produces a relational
intersubjectivity where individuals address each other—indeed, cooperatively constitute
each other—in a secularization of Martin Buber’s dialogue.3 Where Buber’s Ich
becomes an Ich in the direct address of a Du, Flusser’s “self,” “node” or “organism”
exists only in its relationship to other selves (including other objects) in its environment.
The interpersonal dialogue of collaborative creative play Flusser envisions consists of
synthesizing and re-synthesizing bits of information to be remembered and retransmitted.

3 Martin Buber’s Ich und Du (1919). Stuttgart: Reclam, 2008. A copy of Buber’s text exists in Flusser’s
travel library at the Flusser Archiv Berlin.
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This continuous process is exactly that struggle against entropy; it is combining remnants
of old information into new informative constructions aimed at other selves to protect
against the abyss of oblivion and disinformation. This abyss is exactly what drives the
purposeful creation of meaning in the face of a world acknowledged as bodenlos.
Remarkably, it is only as natural parts of an interconnected whole ecosystem that
humans’ negentropic, anti-natural engagement can take form.
The world became bodenlos after humans removed themselves from nature in an
attempt to deny the naturalness of death, oblivion and absurdity. Flusser delineates a
process of progressive abstraction as the phenomenon of human culture, the natural
tendency of humans to act against nature. Developing technological means to bridge this
gap between themselves and nature, humans succeeded only in further removing
themselves from their goal, eventually arriving at a digitized relationship to the
environment. The culmination of a series of abstractions from nature, Flusser explains
the transition to the digital code as the last in a series of successive revolutions in human
thought structured by their corresponding codes of communication. Although he will
eventually proclaim the end of history for humankind, he orders these revolutions into a
temporal progression, resulting in a total of five different stages of human culture which
can be found in countless permutations throughout Flusser’s oeuvre. Roughly, the first
stage of so-called prehistory took place in a mythical realm of human thought where time
was cyclical, eternally repeating, circulating through a static space full of values, as in
magic. Because forms were fixed ideas, they could be good or evil and possess magical
properties just like in orally-transmitted myths. Eventually, handworkers struggled to
inform objects by attempting to mold them into these fixed, ideal forms which were the
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measure of the object’s worth according to its degree of similarity to the unattainable
forms. This struggle marked what Flusser describes as the separation of humans as
subjects from the objects of their actions. In this way humans’ four-dimensional bodily
experience of and interaction with nature was reduced to a three-dimensional code with
the development of stone tools which in time led to concern for sculpture and handicrafts.
The world was thus something to manipulate on a scale of three dimensions so that the
information would seem to persist in the stone much after the sculptor’s death, resisting
the entropy obvious in four-dimensional nature and storing the information for
transmission to all observers regardless of the absented dimension of time (although stone
does imperceptibly decay). Now there were sculptor and observer and the birth of
subjectivity, and the beginning of an abstraction from the natural world.
Later with the emergence of cave-painting, Flusser’s history continues, humans
created a two-dimensional image code that allowed them to “imagine” the world, to step
back further from the world of immediate experience and retreat further into the self, into
subjectivity. Images, like sculptures, were copies of facts about the world, maps to help
humans orient themselves in the world, models for future behavior: like a symbolic
representation drawn by a scout to a group of hunters on a cave wall of the location of a
herd of animals targeted for an upcoming hunting expedition. This reduction of
dimensions in their communicational codes meant humans became further and further
removed from an immediate experience of the world. The paradigm shift experienced
here can be explained by the structure of the code, Flusser explains: The relations
between parts of the image are reciprocal, reversible; they can be viewed repeatedly,
scanned back and forth by the eye from different directions, and therefore humans began
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to imagine the world as also formed of reciprocal, reversible relations between objects
and subjects. The image in this traditional sense was a result of a second degree of
abstraction from nature, the third of the five stages in humans’ relationship to nature.
According to Flusser, the next major revolution in human thought occurred with
the invention of the written alphabet. Only with the further abstraction to a onedimensional row of alphabet letters lined up in front of the other in a single direction,
Flusser believes, did humans begin to form a concept of history as we now know it. In
this historical age, time became linear in human consciousness, and thought in general
could be considered linear with the conception of historical progression and causality. In
historical time, actions and events caused reactions and other events which caused others
in turn—giving human beings a feeling of freedom in the ability to alter the irreversible
course of history, to engage in world changes, to act from within the linear progression of
time to cause an effect on the future. The culmination of this age of thought was the
period of the Enlightenment with its peaks in the development of science, philosophy,
religion and politics, as well as history. All these disciplines depend on the thinker’s
ability to conceptualize or theorize about the world, ordering it in terms of causality and
human responsibility.
Although it removed humans yet another degree away from a direct experience of
the immanent world, writing was not created to alienate, but to help humans explain the
images that had become insufficient as models for human behavior. Eventually images
became too hard to read, Flusser explains—they ceased to function as useful
representations, instead turning into simulacra or idols to be worshiped, or becoming
merely connotative instead of denotative. Replacing the image code with the alphabet
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code in the bulk of human communication, that is, rolling out images into onedimensional lines, as Flusser describes it, turned images into concepts. Humans were
permitted to conceptualize the world in further efforts to understand and use it.
Images themselves were still present during the fourth age of history—as all ages
are not fully abolished but remain in some form simultaneously with all subsequent
ones—but images were now reduced to illustrating texts—even stained-glass windows in
churches, for example—which fought against texts but ended up subordinate to them.
Culminating in the Enlightenment, so Flusser, theory as science separated itself from and
dominated art. Modern historical science was an active modeling of the natural world, an
attempt to describe it with the most parsimonious models—for example, Newton’s laws
of physics, Einstein’s relativity, or quantum mechanics. Newer models replaced older
ones; ‘truer’ ones replaced the falsified. Forms, ideas were no longer fixed, they were
changeable.
Now Flusser sees humanity again in the midst of experiencing a crisis of faith in
the ability of logical, analytical science to give absolute meaning to the world. Linear,
irreversible history becomes only one way of ordering experience and now might also be
broken up and rearranged with new codes and new technologies. We will approach the
end of time and history, Flusser believes, with the entropic advance toward an even
distribution of particles, a process that can even now be simulated on a computer screen
(“On the End” 146). As the existing dominant code of communication again grows
insufficient, a new code becomes necessary to satisfy humans’ requirements for
successful communication. Texts have grown more difficult to read, Flusser observes,
even to the point of becoming meaningless and opaque; their validity is doubted as we

23

are beginning to realize that the laws we discover in nature and scientifically prove are
only what we have ourselves invented. In our age of doubt, approaching the posthistorical because post-linear, the dichotomy between science and art dissolves into the
distinction between formulation and projection—we simply formulate (discover) theories
about the world that we have actually already projected onto the world before our
discoveries. All of a sudden, Flusser notes, the true/false opposition shifts to the
difference simply between probable and improbable. The ground of linear rationality has
given way and Bodenlosigkeit is revealed underneath what stood for trusted, grounded
reality.
The invention of what he calls a zero-dimensional digital code, Flusser argues,
then took place as part of an attempt to explain the texts that had become opaque, to
recover meaning in an age of scientific doubt and a growing awareness of absurdity, a
new way of orienting humans in the world. Theoretically, information broken up into
points has lost all dimensions, he explains, because points really do not exist except in
relation to other points. Information, in Flusser’s view, is practically immaterial in digital
form, and will thus be able to bypass material media completely, a view that will be
described in more detail later in this study. Suffice it to say for the moment that this fifth
and current age brings about an entirely new way of thinking, communicating and
structuring society. Eventually, Flusser believes, it will inaugurate an age when the
process of abstraction from the natural world may be reversed—because dimensions
cannot be reduced beyond zero. This will involve the computation of digital bits of
information to create experiences for humans in one, two, three and perhaps someday
even four dimensions. Flusser admits only that although present technologies can easily
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create new phenomena like hypertexts and digital images, holography technology and
others have yet to be developed sufficiently. The process of reversing the five-steps of
abstraction from nature is unfinished but already underway, he claims, and is aimed at
returning to human life an experience of meaningfulness. This is not a simple return to
four-dimensional nature, however, but rather the formation of an entirely new cultural
environment in the form of a second nature. Working with the relational patterns of
information flow of the old nature, Flusser envisions how humans’ natural and antinatural electronic endeavors seamlessly join to create a completely new world or worlds
out of old bits and pieces and high-tech energy redirection. Understanding exactly how
this should come about is the ultimate goal of this study.
Projected Discoveries
Flusser’s theory of a second nature goes beyond Marxist categories and is neither
identical to Lukács’ concept of a “second nature” (which refers to humans’ culturally
produced surroundings that have become alienated from them and simply mask their
unnaturalness), nor to that of the “new nature” posited by Susan Buck-Morss to be found
in Benjamin, that synthesis of technology and the technologically-altered material world
which has become completely foreign to humans (Buck-Morss 70). Flusser does believe
culture has already completely taken over the old nature to become what he also calls a
second nature for us, an environment that surrounds us, conditions and limits us in similar
ways that the unaltered physical world once did, but this second nature can and should be
acknowledged with deliberate intention to manipulate it. The awareness of its
constructed form opens up the potential for creative adjustment and poetic license. Once
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the fusing of the natural and cultural spheres is acknowledged, meaning can be created
where none could be found.
Instead of striving to retrieve a long-lost nature like the Romantics did, for
example, an awareness of Flusser’s second nature requires simply that the “illusion” of
ground or reality must be recognized as a human creation. That is to say, what we
experience now as nature must be acknowledged to be projections of our culture instead.
After this awareness, Flusser believes the real hope for humanity is opened up: the
freedom to purposefully construct multiple realities and multiple meanings for life. This
new purpose to human culture will make the communication of information more aware
and potentially freer from ideology and oppression, Flusser hopes. The communication of
information, the substance of culture and thus what separates humans from animals, he
believes, must first be recognized as the human denial of death, and therefore of nature—
culture is first and foremost against nature, it is artificial. Flusser bases his whole
philosophy of human culture on this definition of communication:
Dieses Wissen um den Tod (soweit ‘Wissen’ hier das richtige Wort ist) ist ja
schon das Spezifische, eben Gegennatürliche, negativ Entropische am Menschen,
denn es zwingt ihn dazu, ‘politisch’ zu werden, das heißt zu kommunizieren. Die
menschliche Kommunikation ist symbolisch, unnatürlich, widernatürlich, weil der
Mensch um seinen ‘natürlichen’ Tod weiß und versucht, ihn symbolisch,
unnatürlich zu leugnen. (Kommunikologie 260)
Human communication is in this way a natural phenomenon with anti-natural,
negentropic tendencies. If one aims at a complete definition of the concept of human
culture used in Flusser’s writing, however, this criterion alone is not enough to separate
humans from the rest of the natural world, because negentropic epicycles within the
greater entropic progression make up the rest of the physical environment as well.
Flusser illustrates the random (non-human) creation of information in nature with the
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example of Maxwell’s demon, the famous thought experiment by the physicist James
Clerk Maxwell in the nineteenth century that poses a hypothetical mediator between two
lukewarm air compartments in a box, decreasing the entropy in the box as a whole by
only allowing the randomly-moving hot (fast-moving) air particles into the left side and
the cold (slow-moving) air particles into the right side, thereby creating a less probable
situation: creating information. This negentropic process, while misappropriated
somewhat by Flusser, is in his view still natural because it relies partially on statistically
necessary chance, just like biological processes, and in fact its impossibility reaffirms in
the end the original principle of entropy. The difference is that human communication
continues to increase its stores of information, while natural memories cyclically lose,
rebuild, and again lose their information. Even more important, though, the
communication of information is a human one because it also involves intention. It is
purposeful, and therefore valuable, because it may oppose the blind, “stupid” randomness
of nature (Kommunikologie 252). Therefore Flusser’s study of communication, his
Kommunikologie, is an examination of a wholly artificial phenomenon: communication is
artificial because it is both negentropic and intentional, and recognized as such it can be
tailored to our demands.
The result of Flusser’s examinations reveals the fact that humans tend to forget
that communication is artificial, creating a second nature to replace the first, so to speak,
to forget death and strive for the immortal. Human culture based on communication in
the form of symbolic gestures, languages, images and other codes weaves an increasingly
dense fabric out of art, science, philosophy and religion that surrounds humans and veils
the Bodenlosigkeit of our loneliness and death and the death of our loved ones, so Flusser
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(Kommunikologie 10). We live in a “codified” time, he explains, in which the numerous
codes that make up human culture function as symbolic games for determining the best
strategies for communication. Culture, in Flusser’s description, exists as layers of
superimposed symbolic games arising out of nature, but completely different from
nature’s layers of superimposed non-symbolic games (genetic mutation, for example).
“Demnach wäre die Natur jener Ozean der Geräusche, in dem das Archipel der
symbolischen Spiele, die Kultur, schwimmt” (Kommunikologie 332). Nature as an ocean
of noise, entropy or non-information, and culture as dense clusters of dirt and sand
particles condensed out of the swirling mass of droplets is a thought-model that Flusser
believes can only really be visualized on a computer screen. Two things are important in
this metaphorical formulation, the first showing that digital technology is required in
order to visualize this structure of humans’ cultural sphere, and the second revealing the
connections between cultural constructions and the natural environment. Culture can
thus be defined in Flusser’s sense as an intentional condensation of raw materials or
energy that takes the place of randomly condensed natural forms: culture as a second
nature, arising out of nature, simulating and replacing it, yet completely opposed to it.
Only when humans remember that this second nature is their own creation are they truly
free to create new and perhaps even better natures.
One can see here the influence of Nietzsche on Flusser’s ideas, a source Flusser
was well acquainted with and even referred to occasionally in his work, which is
uncommon in his practice of brazen non-citation. Of particular interest in this context is
Nietzsche’s 1873 essay “Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne,”
regarding the human intellect as a fleeting and pitifully insignificant bubble in the grand
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scheme of the universe, closing human experience off from the reality or truth of nature.
Through a process of abstraction Nietzsche defines as metaphorical, humans by their very
nature are removed from concrete experience of the environment already in their sensory
perceptions, then also in their formation of concepts. Just as perception translates a nerve
stimulus into an image or sound, these images are translated by language into generalized
concepts, and human culture can thus be seen as a progression of translations,
abstractions or metaphors. Since nature itself is responsible for this tendency in closing
itself off as inaccessible to us, humans are therefore still natural beings even though their
entire conceptual and perceptual universe is a web they have spun around themselves
with self-produced materials. Since Nietzsche asserts that humans have forgotten that
their perceptual metaphors are metaphors and not things, they forget that nature can only
be subjective for them, experienced only in relation to other relations and to themselves.
Science, which took over the construction of the conceptual edifice after language,
Nietzsche explains, forgets that it produces those “laws of number” that it “discovers”
just like a spider spins its own web. What is considered objective reality really is an
imitation of relations, a petrification or coagulation of metaphorical images rising like
steam from the imagination: humans forget that they are artistically creating subjects.
Nur durch das Vergessen jener primitiven Metapherwelt, nur durch das Hart- und
Starr-Werden einer ursprünglich in hitziger Flüssigkeit aus dem Urvermögen
menschlicher Phantasie hervorströmenden Bildermasse, nur durch den
unbesiegbaren Glauben, diese Sonne, dieses Fenster, dieser Tisch sei eine
Wahrheit an sich, kurz nur dadurch, dass der Mensch sich als Subjekt und zwar
als künstlerisch schaffendes Subjekt vergisst, lebt er mit einiger Ruhe, Sicherheit
und Consequenz; wenn er einen Augenblick nur aus den Gefängnisswänden
dieses Glaubens heraus könnte, so wäre es sofort mit seinem “Selbstbewusstsein”
vorbei. (Nietzsche 1)
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Thus, if the human intellect at least acknowledges its metaphorical distance, humans may
then choose to use intuition to rearrange the conceptual edifice and alter it as freely as if
it were simply a toy, so Nietzsche. Not only does the dissolution of individual subjects
also find its echo in Flusser’s telematic universe, even the image of world-condensation
out of steam from the “hitzige Flüssigkeit” of human imagination is remarkably close to
the fogs and boiling broths of some of Flusser’s most creative metaphors discussed
below, even if the context and conclusions are very often not at all the same.4
Defining Flusser’s concepts of nature and culture reveals the complementary
function of his imaginative metaphors together with his logical arguments. After the work
of defining, a combined analysis of argument and metaphor is just as important in
understanding Flusser’s vision of humans’ potential for creating new environments and
actualizing latent possibilities. His model of human natural/anti-natural world-creation is
developed extensively in the metaphor of the soup ladle. In Dinge und Undinge, a
collection of essays devoted entirely to cultural artifacts like empty champagne bottles,
streetlamps and chess boards, Flusser re-imagines human culture emerging from chaos as
a ladle dipped into a bubbling soup. In this extended metaphor, the important fact is that
soup is being ladled out of soup: culture is created out of the frothing broth of nature by
means of nature itself, by human brains. Flusser explains with the usual poetic flair how
previous myths of religion and science relied upon a deity to ladle out the soup (create the
world) or upon empty ladles to be filled with liquid soup (eternal forms separated from
formless matter). In the telematic age, then, the ladle emerges spontaneously from the

4 A more substantial treatment of Nietzsche’s essay in the context of Flusser’s work follows in chapter
three of this study.
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soup itself, he writes, when the ladle is the human brain and the soup is the swirling,
foaming ocean of possibilities. No longer a thick stew of tangible materials, he
emphasizes, this is a thin, watery broth made up out of the four fundamental forces in
physics that together create all matter and energy: electromagnetism, gravity, strong and
weak forces. Because these are both energy and matter, the foaming broth of possibilities
cannot be categorized as either Stoff or Geist. Mind and matter alike condense within the
soup. “Betrachtet man die Brühe als Stoff, dann kocht man daraus zum Beispiel
überschwere künstliche chemische Elemente, und betrachtet man sie als Geist, dann stellt
man daraus künstliche Intelligenzen her, die mindestens ebensogut wie die natürlichen
schöpfen” (Dinge 136). Referring to the human creative process, Flusser sees both
physical objects and artificial intelligences formed from the same building blocks of
nature, just like nature, but with human intention. Culture using nature to create a second
nature entails a recycling of matter and energy both natural and anti-natural.
The ladle, the creative and purposeful human brain, is not analyzed by Flusser
scientifically, but metaphorically, “wie die Denker des Barock vom Uhrwerk und die
Aufklärer von Maschinen sprachen…Das Gehirn ist das Kulturmodell der Gegenwart”
(Dinge 137). Flusser further describes the ladle-brain cybernetically, in that its input is in
the form of droplets of broth: particles approaching either from the environment or from
within the body. The output from the brain then is our actions. Inside the brain, Flusser
explains, the broth boils: particles jump “quantally” across the gaps between nerve
synapses in the processing of data. As the broth begins to calculate, conduct logical
operations and make decisions, it also creates other machines to assist the calculations,
and “[d]er unbelebte Stoff ist zu einem tüchtigen Schöpflöffel geworden” (Dinge 137).
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Playing on the double meaning of schöpfen, ladling means creating worlds from a
turbulent ocean of droplets: brains spontaneously emerge from the boiling chaos and then
the turbulent droplets inside their synapses eventually create other brains through
decision operations. These new brains are living, non-living and even semi-living
organisms—“wet” artificial brains composed of living neurons connected to
semiconductors and other hardware. These types of creations are discussed in the
following chapters here; the important thing is that humans, naturally-arising creatures,
have just happened to develop the capacity to create other animate and inanimate beings.
Their natural brains interacting with their natural environment randomly (that is,
naturally) developed the technology to use the randomness of nature’s laws in purposeful
ways. The brain is a soup ladle.
Ein Schöpflöffel, der aus Suppe gemacht ist und der die Suppe desto besser
schöpft, je suppiger er selbst wird (ich gebe zu: ein etwas schiefes Gleichnis).
Und dabei entsteht eine seltsame Sache: Das zufällig emporgetauchte Gehirn mit
seiner zufälligen Fähigkeit, sein eigenes Emportauchen einzusehen, beginnt
absichtlich zu löffeln…bis schließlich das Schöpfen darin besteht, absichtlich den
Zufall in Absicht umzustülpen. (Dinge 139)
Human creativity is thus to use nature’s laws against herself, employing random natural
processes for purposeful ends, even when the purpose is creative play or a curious
experimentation with possible outcomes. Playing chance against chance is for Flusser
the essential defining characteristic of the immaterial information culture.
Using the physical laws of nature to work against nature results in human culture.
Culture can nevertheless appear to be nature, as Flusser carefully demonstrates in his
contemplation of gardens as Dinge. Remembering it as one of the earliest examples of
humans manipulating nature, Flusser defines the garden as the attempt to re-form nature
into an ideal environment for humans. Seen historically, he muses, gardens realize the
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values and goals of culture, first categorizing valueless nature into useful and poisonous
things, later selecting and judging living organisms according to aesthetic criteria. Both
practices turn nature into culture, into anti-nature. Now, though, gardens have evolved to
possess a deceitful function in human culture, Flusser cautions, representing the attempt
to free humans from the cultural apparatus in which they are only “functionaries” and
wrongly lead them back to a now-forgotten original nature. From nature to anti-nature,
and from culture to anti-culture, gardens are now a second nature and a “bewußt
verlogener Versuch” to codify our present environment through cultural conventions into
a nature in which we might escape the machinations of mass culture (Dinge 48). Gardens
are deceptive according to Flusser because they only serve the cultural apparatus while
appearing to provide an escape: they refresh the exhausted functionaries so that they may
continue to function. Humans rape natural plants to produce cultural ones, in Flusser’s
view, the naturalness of plants being three-fold: their structure is not made by humans,
they are not the result of processes initiated by humans, and they were already in
existence before the first humans, the “hypothetische Urmenschen” (Dinge 49). Defining
nature as simply anti-human, although humans are themselves natural beings, reveals the
nature of our second nature—it is very far removed from nature indeed.
Concrete Fog
Parallel to his contemplation of cultural objects, Flusser reflects on natural objects
in a collection of essays entitled Vogelflüge, written separately as articles for Brazilian,
American, French and German newspapers, describing them as explorations of concrete
experiences that were rigorously tested by his cultural prejudices. He believes the results
of his attempts to negate natural objects by their cultural opposites were in the end
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inconclusive, as they showed themselves to be neither wholly natural objects nor purely
cultural phenomena. Describing his essayistic writing style as exploratory, the end goal
is for Flusser not nearly as important as the process of discovery, and what came out of
these thought experiments was the invalidity of the nature/culture distinction itself.
While culture alienates human beings from nature in order to free them from nature’s
physical constraints, it takes the place of nature, conditioning and limiting humans in
exactly the same way that nature once did: “Ich versuche, die Kultur nicht als etwas
Erzeugtes, sondern als das Gegebene, folglich als Natur darzustellen” (Vogelflüge 120).
Culture as a second nature is thus not a simple dialectical opposition, as much as Flusser
admits wanting to find one, but rather a dissolving of the boundary between culture and
nature to the point where the word “nature” has become meaningless.
This is revealed in Vogelflüge, the German version of the Portuguese
Natural.mente. Flusser himself looked back upon his writing to exclaim how his linear
arguments veered toward the chaotic, the closer the philosopher was able to approach a
concrete experience of his environment. Although linear, scientific reasoning is a
necessary step toward understanding our surroundings, for Flusser it only serves to
remove the veil of ideology that distances us from concrete experience, after which
intuition must take over. Defining both the “reality” of nature and the constructs of
culture as a type of fog, Flusser means to emphasize the opacity inherent to both.
Removing the cultural fog of religion, myth and other ideologies does not reveal a
fundamental reality, that is, but rather it reveals the “concrete” fog, the natural
phenomenon made of tiny water droplets suspended in the air. This natural fog is just as
mysterious and ungraspable, Flusser determines, as the idea of some underlying reality
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obscured by natural objects or our perceptions of them. In using careful reason to dispel
ideology that explains nature, what must be revealed by scientific logic is simply this
mystery, the fact that nature or reality cannot be explained at all. For Flusser, the only
way to concretely experience the fog is to absorb it through his pores. Inhaling and
absorbing the natural fog is for him a concrete experience of “religiosity,” only possible
after the cultural fog of established religions is burned up in the light of reason (Flusser
references Bloch’s claim for a real religiosity only possible after the erasure of
established religion, his Prinzip Hoffnung). Reality is dark, but it is not the darkness of
anti-rational obscurantism. Reason must first evaporate the metaphorical fog of
obscurantism in order to allow the mystery of nature into one’s pores, in order to immerse
oneself through intuition into the true irrational darkness of nature.
Flusser’s contemplation of natural things always comes up against layers of
cultural constructions, the removal of which is a necessary part of the process of
completely and openly observing nature. In the contemplation of a winter landscape, for
example, although Flusser admits that a direct, completely unmediated perception is
impossible (itself a cultural prejudice), he also urges that the layers of cultural
knowledge, assumptions and prejudices must be recognized as our own projections.
Criticizing these layers serves to recognize the “programmed” nature of humans, that we
are historically programmed. In so doing we learn that “die Beobachtung der Natur eine
Kritik der Kulturgeschichte ist” (Vogelflüge 101). Inspired by a childhood memory of
baiting worms on a fishing hook, Flusser analyzes three kinds of cultural layers to be
dissected, summarized as follows: Aesthetic layers filter the landscape so that the scene
becomes expressionistic, impressionistic, romantic, classical, hyper-realistic or otherwise.

35

Ethical layers present models for human behavior upon the scene, one model in which
nature is not as it should be and needs to be changed, another in which it desires our
submission, and yet another model in which it becomes the mere backdrop for the
theatrical stage of our actions. There are explanatory levels as well which also exist
simultaneously, overlapping with one another, even though they appear to historically
follow and falsify each other. Examples of these are explanations of life as a product of
divine creation alongside evolutionary models of the origin of life. Religious and
mythical explanations are more difficult to falsify, Flusser maintains, since they do not
explicate the exact steps involved in the game of creation, but the scientific models break
down the rules of the game, the physical laws of nature, very precisely. The more
detailed the rules are explained, the faster the landscape seems to disappear until only the
game rules remain. Thus, Flusser believes both types of models are necessary: the
religious one in order to see nature as a whole, and the scientific one to understand how it
really works.
Auf diese total verwirrte, epistemologische, ethische und ästhetische Weise trete
ich der Natur entgegen und versuche den Abgrund, der uns trennt, zu überholen.
Ist das nicht wunderbar? Ja, die Natur ist wunderbar: Sie besteht aus
aufgespießten Regenwürmern, in denen ich den Schöpfer bewundere, der nichts
als eine Projektion einer verblödeten Dialektik zwischen Zufall und
Notwendigkeit ist. (Vogelflüge 104)
The layers of culture projected onto nature are all that nature is, then, like the proverbial
onion.
After Flusser denudes the cultural onion he starts again from the other side to pick
apart the layers of multiple natures grown into one another beyond the window through
which he views the landscape. All the different ways of looking at the world produce
different views of the same landscape when observed through the window, that is, when
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contemplated from the human perspective. We don’t live in one nature, Flusser decides,
we live in many natures all at once, and one or the other may rise to the foreground
depending on context. We live in the nature categorized by our natural sciences, in that
of Aristotelian categories of justice and order (everything in its right place), in the nature
full of mythical deities, in the nature created by God (Vogelflüge 84). All present
simultaneously, the layers intermesh both outside the window and inside as human
projections paint the environment onto the window of contemplation, and culture is
mixed with nature inseparably.
The traditional anthropology that defines human beings as individual bodies and
minds distinct from others, advancing towards the outside world and retreating back into
the inner self, also implicates the traditional notion of house as a “point of departure
toward adventure and of return toward selfishness,” Flusser explains (“About a house” 1).
Walls, roofs, doors and windows negotiate the architectural relationships between public,
private and transcendent spaces—inside, outside and above—and preserve the integrity
of selves. However, once organisms and other physical objects can be divided into
quanta, motions into “actomes,” minds into stimuli or “decidemes” and calculations
themselves into algorithms, there are no more indivisible individuals and no more houses,
Flusser reasons. Identity is constituted solely in the relationships to other things,
reminiscent of Buber’s philosophy of dialogue: “Under analysis ‘I’ is shown to be a pole
of a dialogical relation with a ‘you’, that relation is shown to be reversible, and thus ‘I’
and ‘you’ are shown to be abstract extrapolations from that concrete reversible relation”
(“About a house” 2). What are real, Flusser continues, are the intersubjective relations
consisting of information flow, and the new house of the telematic age will be not a
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structure, but a function: a tool enabling the reception, storage, processing and
transmission of data. Following Flusser’s formulations, this house would be more a fold
in the force field of intersubjective relations, a “wave-trough” (curve in a line
representing oscillations of relations) attracting these intersubjective relations which
gravitate in to be condensed, to be packed more tightly together (“The City” 326). This
process would be the actualization of intersubjective virtualities taking place not in a
geographical location, but in a topological pattern of loosely and densely packed
relationships.
The process of actualization Flusser explains to be possible only after humans
have alienated themselves from the natural world through the five-step process of
codification described above. Stepping back from four dimensions to three, where
subjects were distinct from objects, and from three to two, where objects were codified
into images, then from two to one in the age of linear writing and finally from one to zero
dimensions of information bits, there is no further abstraction possible from zero
dimensions. The next step in Flusser’s view is then to reverse the process and begin
calculating the zero-dimensional bits back into words, into images, even into objects
through holography and other technologies yet undeveloped, eventually arriving at some
point in the indefinite future at a full experience of four-dimensions. Clearly, this is not a
return to oil painting, calligraphy or woodcarving, but rather an advance into a
foreseeable future in which worlds really can be created at will by information
processing. Flusser bases his argument on the fact that physical objects can now be
understood as clusters of densely packed molecules surrounded by similarly-constructed
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but more loosely packed air molecules, which allows him to define the concreteness of
objects as “a function of packing” particles within fields of relations (“About a house” 3).
We [our creative technologies] have not yet achieved the same degree of
compactness as is achieved by our nervous system. This is why we may still
distinguish between a given world and synthetized simulations. But the density
(“definition”) of our projections is improving, and soon a point will be reached
where any distinction between the “given” and the “simulated” will no longer be
useful. The alternative projected universes will become just as concrete as is the
world we perceive with our senses, or inversely: “nature” will be seen as just one
of a number of synthetized universes. (“About a house” 3)
It is clear that for Flusser, the creation of a new nature out of information bits will require
the collaboration of the artistic, scientific and philosophical realms of human culture.
From abstraction to actualization, this new creative relationship between humans and
their second nature will need to be aesthetically and ethically evaluated in addition to its
scientific rigor.
Flusser’s creative interdisciplinary process of actualizing new natures, because it
is based on a fundamental abstraction from an older nature, will congeal islands out of
oceans slowly, gradually packing sand and shells tighter and tighter as holography,
virtual reality and other technologies develop in sophistication. Digital information
storage as a process of liberation from material objects will render data easily erasable
while still seemingly eternally retrievable. As synthetic objects lose their materiality in
the traditional sense of the word, they can be formed and reformed without the resistance
of solid materials. Scientists-artists will ladle out only temporary clumps of energy
particles in a progressively thinning soup, Flusser envisions, because the clumps are only
intermediate steps in the entropic expansion of the universe on its way towards so-called
heat-death: as nature’s broth boils up into steam. The form of things will evaporate out
into a mist of “undingliche Informationen,” into images on computer and television
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screens, digitally preserved data, film reels, holograms and into what makes software soft
(Dinge 81). The environment will be coded into bits and bytes and dispersed out into a
fog of information. “Die Umwelt wird immer weicher, nebelhafter, gespenstischer, und
wer sich in ihr orientieren will, muß von diesem ihrem spektralen Charakter ausgehen”
(Dinge 82). Experience will become, is becoming more important than possessions,
Flusser observes, the environment perceived directly into the skin instead of hitting up
against it, the fog of condensation absorbed through the pores to the nerve endings.
Flusser’s vision of the telematic world reveals a kind of invisibility that has
parallels to the newest thinking of Mark Hansen. As part of the keynote conversation of
the 2011 Transmediale festival in Berlin, Hansen described the cultural environment as a
surround of “atmospheric media” in which digital devices connect with human bodies at
the neurological level and thus share with them a joint subjectivity. As ubiquitous
phenomena always “on” and acting partially on their own, Hansen suggests, the devices
create a change in the environment outside of human conscious experience, interacting
with nerve cells, for example, below the level of awareness. Sensibility is mediated prior
to conscious perception by the five senses at both macro and micro levels, affecting the
environment before or below the human scale. Specifically contradicting his earlier
body-centric theories and advancing from Alfred North Whitehead’s non-perceptual
sensation as prehensions, Hansen describes an “expanded environmental embodiment”
which no longer requires the human body to filter or frame experience. His picture of the
connectedness of humans, nature and technology at nonhuman scales is not visible, but
perhaps visualizable with computer technology or by means of Flusser’s frothing,
steaming metaphors of oceans, broth, fog and neural synapses evaporating to an
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immaterial or at least ungraspable and invisible swirl of energy and information at the
service of our fingertips but not our hands.
In the digital age of immaterial Undinge, Flusser explains that the hands of the
homo faber of the industrial revolution have been replaced by the mere fingertips of the
homo ludens (Dinge 84). As all handiwork is left to robots and other artificial
intelligences, he believes, only the fingertips are required of humans to manipulate the
buttons on computer keyboards, to write and enjoy programs (Dinge 86). Pressing
buttons is then the expression of freedom, of decision-making. However, Flusser
cautions that the digital play with creating alternative worlds out of data streams is no
utopia, although places and distances have become merely topological: there will always
be a limited number of buttons at our disposal, and we will only ever be able to choose
from the possibilities within a given program (Dinge 88). The process of critique
uncovering the cultural fog of ideological blindness revealing the fog of direct experience
is always required alongside an engagement in the science and the art of soup-ladling.
Only following the detailed explication of the terms and functions of nature and
culture in Flusser’s body of writing was it then possible to sketch out his telematic
universe as the basis for putting into context the complex relationship between digital
technology, art and the environment. Examining the synthesis of nature and culture in
Flusser’s concept of a second nature layered with multiple “natures” and cultural
implications revealed his perceived disintegration of selves and objects into a chaotic
ocean of possibilities out of which new second natures might be created. Later chapters
investigate more deeply what it means to create these alternative worlds from the bottom
up, actualizing unimaginable possibilities responsibly and playfully. Tracing Flusser’s
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concept of re-structuring culture through perceptual, conceptual, linguistic, scientific,
artistic and technological levels, it will be shown that his ideal creative process could
involve humans’ cultural use of the unpredictable emergent properties of nature itself.
First, however, a direct examination of Flusser’s use of metaphor in his science of
communication will prove essential to understanding just what kind of art and science
may be possible in the telematic future, and how it is demonstrated in Flusser’s own
writing. Both an example of Flusser’s use of metaphor to paint an image of his theories,
and a detailed treatment of human culture’s natural connections, the Vampyroteuthis
infernalis expands on the preceding overview and sets the stage for the conclusions in
chapters three and four regarding emergent creation. This most ambitious of Flusser’s
metaphorical projects models human communication in the telematic age after spineless
creatures lurking in the ocean’s abyssal darkness. Chapter two answers the question of
how that ocean of absurdity separating Flusser from a once meaningful world also
promises him a new world of meaning in creative dialogue, modeled after the vampire
squid.
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II: Squids
The Model of the Vampyroteuthis as Mirror to the Telematic Human

It turns out that animals living in oceans communicate like humans, that is, like
future humans. That frothing ocean of intersubjective information communication
envisioned by Flusser in the digital age is nowhere so completely and strikingly modeled
as by a soft-bodied tentacled creature living in the deepest recesses of Earth’s blackest
seas. Molluscan biology serves both fact and fiction in this most developed of Flusser’s
metaphors for the telematic condition. First science, then fable, Flusser’s text is unique
among his works, at once a conflict-ridden metaphorical journey into the dark side of
human nature while also a performance of his vision of post-scientific discovery. The
only way we can effectively contemplate our own existence, our own culture in its
trajectory into the telematic, Flusser believes, is to be tricked into thinking it is something
else. By scientifically analyzing a non-human completely foreign to us, in many ways
our opposite, Flusser's goal is that we are better able to consider the creature objectively,
understanding it from a fresh, unbiased perspective. However, his strategy is complex:
the ocean dweller is somehow similar to us as well, and as we read Flusser’s report we
nevertheless identify with the monster as if we were looking into a mirror. Thus his
treatment of the squishy mollusc becomes an exploration of the possibilities for human
culture that are not yet fully realized but may soon be. Flusser perceives the need for a
system of ethical and aesthetic checks and balances on our culture’s technological
explosion, the need for a fresh, new perspective as well as the need to overcome scientific
objectivity. So science and not-science are presented in the Vampyroteuthis infernalis
(VI) as a lens or mirror through which to discover something about a creature like and
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unlike us, that is us, and the biology of the squidly body becomes a philosophy of the
human mind.
Adopting the creature known to science as the vampire squid set as a metaphor for
something darkly innate in the human character, Flusser took advantage of the mystery
surrounding the animal at the time of writing, as marine science in the 1980s had barely
explored those deepest recesses of the ocean. Filling in the information gaps with other
sources such as encyclopedic entries on octopi as well as a good deal of imagination,
Flusser took the “quasi-unknown” status of the animal “to embody the concept of a
paradoxical absolute 'Otherness' that is not exterior or ulterior, but which emanates from
within us, or by his own description: the Devil inside all of us and within our culture”
(Novaes 12). Introducing the unpublished Portuguese version of the text, portions of
which are significantly different from the published German version, translator Rodrigo
Novaes wrote that Flusser's task in writing was to provide hope that humans could
overcome “our vampyroteuthian, devilish nature” that Flusser himself witnessed in the
“irrational irruption of the masses” during WWII (Novaes 12-13). While Flusser
definitely proceeds from this motivation, I believe he also is inspired to highlight a more
positive potential in humanity, showing that we must not only overcome our animal
nature, but must also embrace the possibilities for new kinds of communication and
artistic creation. Understood more clearly from one of his earliest Brazilian works, A
História do Diabo (1965), Flusser's conception of the devil is based on the linear
structure of humans' spatio-temporal universe that allows for language, science and
technological progress, that can lead unchecked to inhumane proportions, and that now
cracks apart in places where a fragmented, digital structure may now take root. As “a

44

metaphor for the inexplicable drive towards self-organization,” Flusser's devil is “the
human drive to assert language and meaning” in an otherwise silent, absurd world
(Cardoso 6). To be exorcised as well as encountered, the Vampyroteuthis is both the dark
underbelly of humanity and the soft promise of genuine intersubjective encounter: a
model of our future.
A large part of Flusser's prognostication takes place not in what he writes, but
how he writes it. The original German version of the text presented here was developed
over much of the 1980s while Flusser was publishing some of his most influential
theoretical works on media philosophy. A product of this prolific period, his writing
style here is completely different from the customary theoretical arguments of his other
book-length works in the sense that Flusser only indirectly presents his thoughts on
human culture by letting certain impressions rise to the surface of the text after its
scientific jargon and sweeping poetic statements have been more or less digested. That is
to say that Flusser presents his own epistemological model by way of example, showing
instead of explaining a way to combine science and art in order to understand on a deeper
level human experience in the telematic age. For Flusser, science is as absurd as it is
rigorous, a myth just as any other aspect of human culture, and the deadliest sin,
according to Flusser's “history of the devil,” is pride: the critical reflection through
human reason of an inherently senseless world. We forget “that it is we who are the
authors of the laws of nature”—science is our devil, one that Flusser reveals to be merely
the sense of awe not at nature but at the products of our own creation, “a song, a hymn in
praise of human will” (Diabo 170, 157). 5 Playing on the expectations of readers familiar

5 Translations from the Portuguese are mine unless otherwise noted.
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with scientific treatises and creative fiction alike, Flusser's efforts to transcend scientific
objectivity can be criticized as unrigorous by traditional disciplinary standards, or
alternatively praised as “the spark of a new method of philosophical thought” (Moles 20).
As with most of Flusser’s writings, it is safe to say that almost all of the
Vampyroteuthis was born long before it emerged from his typewriter ink. Despite the
thousands of permutations of his thoughts on paper, Flusser's main method of
communicating his ideas was always through interpersonal dialogue, something that also
heavily influenced his general writing style as well as his vision of telematic,
vampyroteuthian communication. Conversations with other critically engaged thinkers
through discussion and letter exchange allowed Flusser's monster to take its nuanced
shape. Published with the translation from the Portuguese, portions of Flusser's written
correspondence provide insight into his thought process while composing the treatise. In
a letter to his friend Dora Ferreira da Silva, Flusser hints at the scientific, philosophical,
artistic and “intuitive” origins of his “expedition towards the abyss:”
I have in this entire journey three 'models': Plato's Symposium, with the myth of
the perfect man as an eight-armed sphere, Bosch, and Kafka's Metamorphosis. …
I read biology, neurophysiology, psychology and the Encyclopedia Britannica. …
I visit aquariums … I seek to intuit the vertebrate, mammalian and primate
foundation of my own behaviour, and I seek to read the newspapers as if I were a
mollusk. (“Correspondence” 142)
Louis Bec, self-proclaimed “zoosystematician,” illustrator and collaborator on some of
the ideas for the text, told how the Vampyroteuthis was presented to him in a French
translation and discussed over the course of weekly conversations in France, the resulting
text “the cephalopodic concretion of a dialogue” (“Vilém” 10).6 Reminiscing that
“Vilém Flusser was convinced that the practice of philosophy no longer happened in

6 Translations from the French are my own unless otherwise noted.
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writing, but in the image,” Bec appreciated the richness of the image's “polysemia” in
Flusser's colorful descriptions, secretly taking inspiration for the illustrations from
Flusser's own character traits (“Vilém” 4, “Postscriptum” 1). The corresponding
drawings by Bec appended to the German publication are as richly detailed, scientifically
plausible and wildly imaginative as Flusser's writing. Together, they form an example as
well as a depiction of knowledge creation in an interdisciplinary and collaborative spirit.
The experience of reading Flusser’s boldest experiment is of utmost significance
to his purposes, because the contradictions and confusion it creates for the reader
highlight his engagement with a kind of writing he calls the philosophical fable or
philosophical fiction, an endeavor that promises to transcend pure rational objectivity
toward a fuller understanding of the human situation. Although bold in a time of strict
disciplinary divisions, the strategy is traced by Erick Felinto back to 17th-Century
Baroque natural history or physica sacra, where nature always had a mythical history and
correspondences with the human spirit that could be deciphered (1-2). Continued in the
Romantic and pre-Romantic Naturphilosophie inflected by “a desperate thirst for unity:
between religion, science, art and nature,” the strategy picks up again later in Walter
Benjamin's Naturgeschichte, mixing human history and natural history to read modern
culture's artifacts as fossils and other signs from the book of nature, so Felinto (2).
Likewise, Siegfried Zielinski mentions Flusser in his “anarchaeology” of media
technology, comparing Flusser's scientific imagination with 16th-Century works like
Giovan Battista della Porta's Magia naturalis:
In his lectures, Flusser often jumped back and forth between the reality of
facticity and fecund speculation, or sketched the identity of thought that operates
within the strong tension of curiositas and necessitas (curiosity and necessity) as
Porta defined the two most important motivations for the work of the researcher.
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Flusser charismatically embodied this identity. ... For established academe, his
thinking, characterized by its mental leaps between the disciplines, is
unacceptable even today.” (97)
Flusser's Vampyroteuthis, still quite obscured from general readership, is very slowly
beginning to awaken a new appreciation for its contemplation and fabrication that so
exquisitely exemplify Flusser's vision of human knowledge creation.
Following the evolution of the text in a roughly chronological order will bring to
light particular strategies employed by Flusser to effect a slow process of discovery in the
reader, a sort of trickery that is uncovered by the end. Simply put, an unprepared reader
expects upon opening the book some facts about an animal that lives in the sea. A
scientific treatise on the vampire squid, a rare species of ocean-dwelling mollusc, is
plainly titled with its Latin classification and opens with a basic anatomical description
and taxonomical context. A contrast to human proportions is offered in order to impress
upon the reader the immense stature and utterly foreign habitat of the creature, and the
encyclopedic examination continues for another seventy pages. It begins thus:
I. Octopoda
A genus represented by over 170 species. (The genus Homo is represented by a
single species—all others have died out.) A few octopodal species are familiar
and are commonly eaten (Octopus vulgaris). Others (Octopus appolyon) grow to
an average size of ten meters and are rightly feared—their powerful pincers, sharp
teeth, muscular arms equipped with suction organs and a ravenous expression give
them a diabolical appearance. Still other species are practically unknown—they
inhabit the oceans’ abysses. Their body size exceeds 20 meters, their skull
capacity that of our own. Such a species so difficult to classify was recently
fished out of the Pacific: Vampyroteuthis infernalis. (VI 9)7

7 Unless otherwise noted, all excerpts from the Vampyroteuthis quoted here are my own translations from
the German original, a portion of which can be found in Flusser Studies 9, Nov 2009. flusserstudies.net.
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An objective, fact-oriented tone pervades the entire report. However, now and again the
facts do not seem to add up, the taxonomy is outdated and some of the description waxes
poetic. Only gradually does the reader get a strange feeling that the science may be less
than objective and rather exaggerated or even false. Later, maybe halfway through the
report, the science has somehow transformed into a make-believe world of invented facts
and then finally it becomes a disturbing philosophy of human culture from some kind of
biological point of view. Or maybe the whole time it was all of these things at once:
truth, lies, social critique and a bit of mystery.
Mythical Evolution
The first third of the report describes in detail the phylogenetic history of the
vampire squid referred to only by its Latin name Vampyroteuthis infernalis, explaining its
precise location on the evolutionary tree along with an organized list of its animal
ancestors, the earliest of which are also common to humans. The human path is
described along the way in just as much detail, ostensibly as a means of comparison for
us to understand this alien life form in relation to ourselves. Indeed, as early as the first
two pages the reader is learning just as much about human evolution as about the
vampyroteuthian. Squids and humans both evolved, one reads, from a common wormlike ancestor called the eucoelomate whose three layers of cellular tissue correspond to
particular ways of interacting with the world, protecting the organism from it, digesting it
and acting upon it. This is a physiological structure both humans and vampyroteuthes
share, Flusser continues, and the differences between the two species in their protective,
digestive and manipulative functions become the basis for cultural considerations much
later into the text. How we and the vampyroteuthes differently “ingest” the world and
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orient ourselves in it, for instance, provides a biological basis for explaining our
processes of perception, communication and thought patterns in later sections of the text.
Upon first reading, however, the opening passages seem to be purely objective science
taken straight from the encyclopedia, or from first-hand research notes from deep-sea
expeditions or laboratory examinations.
Nonetheless, what is really happening in this text is evident to the careful reader
already in the first paragraphs, and after a while it is clear that the entire commentary on
human culture is always rooted in vampyroteuthian taxonomy, physiology and habitat.
Flusser’s phenomenological bent persuades him to ground all of his understanding of
human behavior on the structure of human and vampyroteuthian bodies and
environments. Because the vampyroteuthian body is so different from the human, and its
habitat so difficult for the human investigator to experience, the animal is to act as a foil
to human behavior, our opposite. “It is not easy to approach him taxonomically. And not
just taxonomically. Humans and the vampyroteuthis live separate from one another. We
are crushed in the extreme pressure of his abyss and he suffocates on the air we breathe”
(VI 9). The animal is mysterious and unreachable, that is, until a few specimens are
purportedly fished out of the deep Pacific, and the strange monstrous thing becomes after
all a living being that shares part of its physical structure and function with humans.
And yet the vampyroteuthis is no stranger to us. ... The same basic structure
informs both our bodies. His metabolism is the same as ours. We are both pawns
in the same game of the building blocks of genetic information. And we occupy
opposite branches of the same phylogenetic tree. Our common ancestors ruled the
primordial beaches of the earth for millions of years and only relatively late in the
history of life did our paths diverge—when life “decided” to advance onto solid
ground on the one hand, and into the oceans’ depths on the other. We both harbor
the same deep-level memories and we can therefore recognize in the animal a part
of ourselves. (VI 9-10)
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If our bodies have evolved in opposite directions, this was nevertheless on one and the
same tree of life, from some supposed ancestral cell, and thus the vampyroteuthian body
is both the same and completely opposite the human, our mirror image. Because it is
about the body, the responsibility falls to biology to make sense of the beast. And
Flusser’s science examines the fearsome monster only to draw conclusions about his
unsuspecting human readers.
Our evolutionary paths mirror each other. As the human path toward vertebrates
centered on the development of a complex digestive tract, Flusser the scientist writes, the
invertebrate vampyroteuthian path toward molluscs relied more on developing the
nervous system. Along the way, insects branched off from this latter path, going on to
develop highly cerebralized super-organisms like anthills and beehives. This explains
how even though the vampyroteuthian soft molluscan body “resembles that of bees even
less than ours do...entrenched in his memory is the recollection of segmentation and the
tendency toward anthills, a recollection we cannot share” (VI 13). This evolutionary path
will later decide the animal’s social life in contrast to that of the human. However, while
Flusser stresses the development of the vampyroteuthis as a genetic drift progressing in
the exact opposite direction away from human evolution, the animal’s developmental
history is also to be seen in parallel to the human, with the same kind of branching
patterns diverging off from it in similar ways. Where birds branched off from future
mammals, bees diverged from future molluscs. The vampyroteuthis’ parallel history in
the opposite direction and its characteristics so similar yet completely foreign to the
human ones create an animal that just might not exist—not, that is, without human
beings.
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The vampyroteuthian organism is always like and unlike the human animal,
always in relation to the human. Although Flusser declares the purpose of the text to be
“to grasp the biological framework of vampyroteuthian existence (VI 13),” the
philosopher’s true target is the human being. Through an exploration of the minutest
details of the vampyroteuthis’ biology, Flusser is really delving deep into the nature of
the human animal:
In this particular framework a few characteristics of human existence become
evident. Others reappear fully transformed. Thus a game can be constructed out
of curved mirrors with which we can recognize the framework of our own
existence, distorted and from a distance. Such a “reflective” game should allow
us to attain an admittedly very distant, yet not “transcendent,” view of ourselves.
This view is not transcendent because it does not look down on the world of
humans from a viewpoint in the clouds—“objectively,” for example, like the
scientific view—but rather from the perspective of the vampyroteuthis who is
indeed here with us on earth; he is a co-being.
What is thus intended here is not science, but rather a fable. Human vertebrate
existence shall be criticized from the perspective of a mollusc. Like most fables,
this also appears to be about animals. De te fabula narrator. (VI 13)
This dive into the reflecting pool thus requires a shift in perspective, from an
anthropocentric point of view to a look at humans through the vampyroteuthis’ eyes. The
middle third of the scientific treatise is thus to be read from the animal’s perspective,
considering the vampyroteuthis instead of the human to be the most highly evolved
species on the evolutionary tree, perceiving all others as merely divergent from it,
incomplete or degenerate in comparison.
This very deliberate technique Flusser employs in order to pursue his goal of
creating that so-called reflective, yet not transcendent, game of understanding ourselves
as humans. Flusser’s science is not objective, because human beings could only
objectively contemplate being human if they were to first “transcend” themselves, that is,
step outside of their humanness. As mammals, for example, humans could more
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objectively investigate birds than tigers, he explains, because birds as non-mammals are
further removed from humans on the phylogenetic tree. Even more objectively can
humans study nonliving things, so that astronomy is a more objective science than
psychology, Flusser continues. In his attempt to “rescue objectivity,” Flusser decides that
the science of very nonhuman things is, however, less interesting and even more
disgusting to us (in the case of other life forms) the farther removed from humans the
object of contemplation may be. Therefore, to the detriment of pure objectivity, we as
humans need nevertheless to respond to a minimal level of humanness in things,
revealing hard science to be always at least partially subjective like those so-called softer
sciences, humanities and the arts. What results is more a method of going beyond
objectivity, rather than strictly rejecting or adhering to it:
Cephalopods are interesting insofar as we recognize ourselves in them, insofar as
they are a part of that same life-current that sweeps us along too. And science as a
whole is interesting insofar as it is an attempt to orient ourselves in the world. It
is a mammalian function—more precisely, a human function like digestion.
Insofar as it is “objective,” it becomes inhuman. It becomes not “pure,” but rather
an insanity. The present challenges us to forsake scientific objectivity on behalf
of new research methods, without necessarily having to relinquish our previouslyattained “objective” expertise. (VI 19)
It is this less-than- or more-than-objective science that studies the body, which in turn
reflects the vampyroteuthian visage to us as mirror, a recognition by way of metaphor
which begins from science and continues on after science. Tentacles and caecal sacs
point the way to human self-realization.
Passion Anatomy
A look into our mirror reflects the vampyroteuthis’ soft and strange physique.
The physiology of the species Vampyroteuthis infernalis has developed analogously to
that of humans, Flusser writes, evolving a parallel structure but in the opposite direction
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from Homo sapiens. As the head and foot of the animal merged to result in its status as
cephalopod (Kopffüßer) with tentacles protruding from the front of the body, Flusser
reports, the body’s axis twisted ninety degrees and the top of the head moved to the
bottom producing an upside-down orientation to ours. With our upright gait, after all, our
eyes were opened onto the horizon and our hands freed for work, he reasons. These same
sensory organs evolved downwards underwater, and “[t]he cephalopods are our
antipodes—elevated intelligent bellies, not elevated brains” (VI 20). As our antipodes,
vampyroteuthes make use of body parts analogous to ours which function similarly to
their human counterparts while having evolved from completely different parts, by which
Flusser means to hint at a threatening, latent irrationality. Their teeth, more dangerous
than ours, “are of a different origin than our teeth,” and their eyes have also evolved
similar functions to human eyes, so that the human and vampyroteuthian eyes can be said
to converge from different directions. Other body parts are homologous, evolving from
the same phylogenetic characteristics into two divergent paths—their digestive organs
serve far different purposes than ours do, including glands that secrete sepia ink, poison
to paralyze prey, and others that emit light as well as skin pigmentation and even gels to
make the skin translucent (VI 21). Flusser’s emphasis on the analogical and homological
development of the vampyroteuthis supports his treatment of the animal’s underwater
habitat as a reflecting pool for the study of the more dangerous side of human nature.
The uncanny vampyroteuthis is like and unlike the human, its foreignness and familiarity
one and the same, even the brain has homologous memory processes and analogous
thought processes. Understanding the violent monster as humans' mirror image, Flusser's
reader may be shocked to discover where “[o]ur existences converge” (VI 26). Thinking
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with its belly, brandishing sharper teeth and paralyzing poison, the vampyroteuthis would
be a terrifying human. Manipulating its skin coloration, it has communicative powers
beyond the human.
According to the treatise, vampyroteuthian perception involves sensory organs
convergent with ours in the case of photophores acting as eyes, some of which are located
on the tentacles. These organs are strange to us, the reader learns, in that they perceive
the same light that they project outward. The endless blackness of the oceans’ depths
require the animal to emit its own light in order to see objects in its immediate
environment, perceiving things as they reflect back to the photophores. The brain
controls these organs as well as the chromatophores, which alter the color of the animal’s
translucent skin according to internal stimuli. This expression of inner physical (and
mental, Flusser would insist) states between members of the same species receives a
unique interpretation in comparison to human culture: “The skin’s coloration is an
intraspecific code: Cephalopods “speak” by means of skin coloration. The gelatinsecreting gland allows the sender of the color message to remain “invisible” to the
receiver. A method of communication reminiscent of our present media” (VI 23).
Like others earlier in the text, this flash of interpretation is not continued until much
further into the treatise, but simply left dangling for the reader to perhaps contemplate
under a moment’s pause before absorbing more scientific facts in the “kaleidoscopically”
or “rhapsodically” structured text (Bozzi 13). But as the text progresses, the science
gives way more and more to flashes of the human condition. The treatment of
cephalopodic Dasein (Flusser's deliberate misuse of Heidegger) sums up with the
conclusion that the animals’ spirally-formed body gives them an inherent tendency to
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want to uncoil, invigorating them with a violent force and a “bloodthirstiness,” and
leading them to unwind as they evolved into their present state—the species
Vampyroteuthis infernalis, mirror to the human.
Mental Geology
The species itself has a mind that thinks analogically to the human, Flusser states
deliberately, always still an evolutionary product of random chance, never complete. In
that both species are the same in this way, Flusser notes, they nevertheless do not perfect
each other, but rather serve only to reflect the imperfections of the other (VI 27). Because
humans evolved (were “exiled”) from the primordial beaches of life’s beginnings onto
dry land and thus strive to “negate” this exile by standing on two legs and reaching for
the sky, while vampyroteuthes evolved oppositely into the oceans and attempt to the
negate their exile by striving for multidimensionality, both species are bilateral:
When we negate something, we do this dialectically—we contradict one side from
the standpoint of the other. Because we both negate our biological constraints
from opposing sides, we contradict each other. And precisely therein lies our
equivalence. We find one another as mirror in what we negate. In this admittedly
rather diabolical sense (diabolein = jumble) we can recognize each other and
perceive ourselves in the other. (VI 27-8)
Thus the analogical nature of our human and vampyroteuthian development justifies
Flusser in the remaining third of his treatise in diving headlong into a wildly abstract
interpretation of the animal’s physiology and behavior as a counter-model to
understanding human culture from a strangely reversed perspective.
Flusser builds his cultural analysis first on the assumption that the “mind” as it is
commonly understood to occur in humans is not unique to humans at all but rather simply
a matter of degree of complexity in organisms, where a sufficiently complex organism
can be said to have developed a mind regardless of the species to which it belongs. Thus,
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parallel to human embryology, the more highly developed an organism, the more
recognizable its mental capacity, even in the case of animals quite different from humans.
Once the possibility of a vampyroteuthian mind has been established, Flusser quickly
takes a psychological approach to the squid based on its biology. He applies the obscure
orgone theory of Wilhelm Reich, who located Freud’s unconscious tangibly in the
physical makeup of an organism, suggesting that “organisms are accumulations of
repressed pressures” so that their bodies are composed of “stratified memory built from
superimposed repressions, somewhat like geological formations” or “the tree trunk and
its rings” (VI 29).
The layers superficially enveloping the organism accumulate the external and
internal influences that the organism has repressed in the course of its life,
forming an armor. In humans these influences are for the most part cultural.
They are sublated into the musculature. It is a matter of a muscle cramp, of
individual deportment, of what is called the “personality.” The stiffer the cramp,
the stronger the personality, and a release of the cramp be it through accident or
deliberate massage (“individual psychoanalysis”), can lead to release and
dissolution of the personality. (VI 29)
Underneath this armor, however, is an even deeper accumulation of pressures from past
generations that influence the organism’s genotype, a kind of genetic memory that is
passed on not only from earlier manifestations of that particular species, but all the way
back from other ancestral species, backwards through the history of evolution to a time at
least as early as the most ancient single-celled organisms. These genetic memories
Flusser equates with a more encompassing version of Jung’s collective unconscious,
defining an organism thus as
the phenotypic manifestation of this genotypic repression, that is, a bomb loaded
with latent energy in which the sum of the pressures incurred throughout the
course of life and the whole of evolution are preserved. The organism is balledup life energy which explodes when the cramp which is the organism is
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released—Reich calls this explosion “orgasm,” and the energy he calls “orgone.”
(VI 30)
Further extrapolating from the Reichian model, Flusser writes that the orgone is
then to explode in either of two directions, depending on the species. In the case of
molluscs, whose evolution brought the mouth and anus closer together, the energy is
released in the direction of coitus, orgasm and love. This libidinous energy of the softbodied mollusc is “sacrificially female (eros)” in comparison to the orgone of insects,
whose armored exoskeleton allowed them to achieve a “warlike…fatally rigid
(thanatos)” personality/muscle cramp/posture as the mouth and anus grew farther away
from each other over the slow course of evolution (VI 30). The vampyroteuthis, it
follows, as the most highly developed of molluscs, “the being that devours his own anus,
the most warlike of all life-forms,” is perfectly suited to this model, as its ancestors were
ringed worms: “segmentation is inscribed into his collective unconscious” (VI 30).
Fusion of its buccal and anal segments can be considered the ultimate goal of life on
earth, Flusser continues, as the animal both devours itself and sacrifices itself to the
sexual partner in mating, opening itself up to death as the ultimate form of love, or of
permanent orgasm: “His sexualized mouth and his cerebralized sex lead him to
cannibalism and suicide” (VI 31). Not only because our genetics do not share the
collective memory of segmentation, but above all because we cannot possibly attain
death in love, this model cannot be applied to human beings in the slightest, Flusser
declares. We cannot achieve such a “loathsome horror,” the vampyroteuthis is an “antimodel” for us, a “negative utopia” far beyond us, and only by virtue of its unattainability
is it fascinating (VI 31). The sexual and violent embrace of death as love is exactly the
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opposite of Flusser's definition of humanity, whose entire negentropic culture serves only
to deny death.
Alien Earth
Studying the “mental” physiology of the vampyroteuthis is only one perspective
gained on the equally mysterious human being. For Flusser, the environmental niche that
a species inhabits plays an equally important role in this reflective investigation,
especially considering Flusser’s definition of “species.” All of a sudden, midway through
the encyclopedic treatise, Flusser rejects scientific categories and specifically the naturenurture debate, bringing out his better-known theories on human culture as outlined in the
first chapter. Defining “species” as not only the genetic and phenotypic traits of the
organism, but also the specific habitat that influences and interacts with the organism, he
explains that a species per se does not exist except as an abstraction, and that the
organism cannot really be separated from its environment except abstractly. This means
that following Flusser’s phenomenological approach, the vampyroteuthis’ environment
must be analyzed in as much depth as the organism’s physical and mental characteristics.
Readers familiar with just about any of Flusser’s other works will immediately recognize
the direct application of his theories of the “self” as an abstract concept. Parallel to the
inextricable connection between organism and environment is his theory that the “self”
cannot exist outside of its relations to other selves, so that subject and object do not exist
without the other. When he writes in the treatise that “there is no such thing as ‘the’
human or ‘the’ vampyroteuthis,” the reader may recognize that the human species is just
another word for the self—and that when he writes that only an organism’s experience of
the world is concrete, and that to separate organism and environment as two distinct
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entities is simply a matter of abstraction, the reader knows that he is talking about his
famous network of relations:
Concretely, the environment is basically that which we experience, and we are
points where the environment is experienced. It all has to do with a web of
concrete relations. The things of the environment are nothing more than nodes in
this web and we ourselves are such nodes. We are bound with these things; they
exist for us. And the things are bound with us; we exist for them. Both
environment and organism are abstract extrapolations from the concreteness of the
relations. The organism reflects the environment, the environment reflects the
organism, and when the relational field changes, both the environment and the
organism change as well. (VI 33)
And now the entire work’s premise of objective science is clearly drawn aside for
theoretical interpretation, even as Flusser continues to explore the underwater habitat of
the vampyroteuthis with an encyclopedic thoroughness. The aim of the text remains the
same, and the organism’s environment is scrutinized as thoroughly as its anatomy with
the intent always of shedding light on its antipode, the human.
Flusser emphasizes the differences between humans’ terrestrial environment and
the vampyroteuthis’ aquatic environment as if they were completely opposite worlds. In
his description of the marine world “we hardly recognize our own planet Earth,” so
foreign it becomes to the reader “more fantastic than Mars or Venus” (VI 33). Making
Earth unrecognizable to himself and his human readers is exactly the method of
examination found in all Flusser's writings and is meant to reveal things previously
inaccessible to us, imperceptible because we take them for granted, because we only
notice things out of the ordinary and not the ordinary things.
The keyword for this is “habit.” To us, his environment is uninhabitable and
therefore uncommon, so uncommon that we do not recognize our planet from his
perspective. The same is valid for him—our environment is uninhabitable,
uncommon. A conversation with the vampyroteuthis is a plunge into the
uncommon. And into the uncommon one must indeed plunge, if one even wants
to see the habitual at all. Habit is a cover, it covers over everything. Only from
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the uncommon does the habitual become visible and the attempt to change it
becomes possible. (VI 36-37)
Although his play on the words Gewohnheit, bewohnbar and gewöhnlich is lost in
translation, here Flusser explains relatively clearly the reason behind this fantastical
journey into the uncharted marine territories so unlike our own. Like so many of his
other texts, Flusser takes a fresh perspective on something quite inconspicuous in the
human habitat and looks at it as if through the eyes of a Martian or a Venusian. Once the
reader is re-seeing such a common and therefore invisible thing as if it were completely
uncommon and strange, then “the attempt to change it becomes possible”—in this case,
Flusser’s injunction to his readers to change their cultural habitat remains rather abstract
at first, the reader only begins to perceive the vampyroteuthis as a vague threat,
something still undefined and so utterly foreign as to be uncannily familiar.
Opposite our atmosphere, the treatise continues, the vampyroteuthis’ abode is a
suffocating darkness in which we could never survive. The animal, however, experiences
a different ocean than that which we know. Flusser’s science now becomes a poetry of
colors and images when he describes the aquatic paradise in as much fantastical detail as
he so systematically diagrammed the organism’s body cavities and family tree:
The eternal night of the vampyroteuthis is filled with rays of colors and sounds
emitted by living beings. An eternal play of color and sound, a son et lumière of
extraordinary richness. The ground is covered with red, white, violet stones; there
are dunes of blue and yellow sand; glass pearls and remains of molten meteorites
glitter in-between. Forests, meadows and fields of color-radiating, plantlike
animals sway with fan-shaped tentacles in the current. Amongst them wander
giant rainbow-colored snails and overhead whir swarms of silver, red and yellow
glowing crabs. A throbbing garden that the vampyroteuthis irradiates of his own
volition in order to enjoy the garden’s fruits in beauty.
To refresh our memory, let us turn again from his view to our own. We see a cold
black hole filled with teeth and jaws, all under a pressure that crushes everything.
Two models of existence for supposedly the same environment collide with one
another: paradise and hell. (VI 36)
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As irreconcilable as those two realms of land and water may be, something in Flusser’s
depiction confuses the dichotomy. His readers recognize a dream world that mirrors their
waking terrestrial life: dunes, forests, meadows and fields characterize the alien
landscape, and the vampyroteuthis itself even cultivates gardens with light almost like a
human horticulturist, although the plants in the garden really are not plants at all. It is an
insane world nevertheless understood by human beings, and only from the human
perspective does it exist. “Whatever occurs, occurs in the human world, even the
vampyroteuthis. He exists only in relation to me” (VI 39). This is how we understand
the abyssal realm of the alien creature, the comparison to our world allows us to make
sense of it; our metaphors serve to make the strange familiar, they bring the completely
foreign world into the normal human one for us to digest and ruminate. Yet the
comparison is also meant to help us escape our point of view by offering the perspective
of the vampyroteuthis.
The vampyroteuthis that we encounter is not vampyroteuthian existence, but
rather an object of our eyes and hands. And yet to a certain degree we can
recognize in this object our own existence. As far as we recognize ourselves and
thus as far as we also perceive differences, we can reconstruct his existence and
begin to see with his eyes and grasp with his arms. Indeed, this is thereby a
metaphorical undertaking—we attempt to pull ourselves out of our world and into
the vampyroteuthian one—but not a transcendental undertaking—we do not
attempt to overleap our world, but rather to change over into another world. It is
thus not about a theory, but rather a fable. It is about changing over out of the
actual world into a fabled world. (VI 39)
Analogous Perception
To jump into the alien world of the vampyroteuthis is to try to perceive the world
through the fabled creature’s sensory organs by means of metaphor, to which end Flusser
describes in detail how its perceptual mechanisms differ from the human. Following his
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tendency to contrast the human and vampyroteuthian animals as binary opposites, Flusser
distinguishes between the human active approach to life and the vampyroteuthis’ passive
absorption of the world. According to Flusser’s fundamental understanding of the world,
what an organism perceives is directly influenced by the relationship of the physical body
to its environment. For humans, he believes the most decisive factor in the structure of
our perceptions is the development of an upright gait which not only left the hands free to
manipulate and inform objects and the eyes free to view the horizon and contemplate
theory (things out of reach of our hands!) but also influenced the development of
language and the experience of space and time. “It is most likely possible to reduce all
estimations, values and measurements—that is, not only all epistemology, but also all
ethics and aesthetics—to the coordination of hands with eyes. That is, to the upright gate
of the human body” (VI 38). This specific structural relationship between the human
body and environment should then result in an active experience of the world, basically a
process of constantly moving towards objects, towards the future, traversing through the
present moment and encountering obstacles along the way which we then resolve with
our hands and our eyes.
Parallel to this is Flusser’s formulation of the vampyroteuthian experience of its
surroundings, its passive absorption of the world contrasted with our active forward
motion and object manipulation. The physical structure of a mouth surrounded by arms
which direct the ocean water to flow into the mouth in order to absorb nutrients and prey
permits only a more passive kind of perception, even impressionistic: “His tentacles,
analogous to our hands, are digestive organs. Our form of grasping is active—we
traverse a stationary and established world. His form of grasping is passive, passionate,
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violent—he ingests a world flowing towards him. We grasp what we encounter, he
grasps what encounters him. We have ‘problems,’ he has ‘impressions’” (VI 39-40). The
vampyroteuthis sucks in particles from its aqueous environment, primarily distinguishing
between digestible and indigestible substances. While humans change objects in their
environment (and therefore themselves) by manipulating them, vampyroteuthes change
objects by ingesting and digesting them. And since the organism and environment are
always in feedback with one another, the organism is likewise altered by the impressions
it receives and ingests. Its “culture” becomes a “critique of impressions,” a
“discriminatory-critical injection of the world into the subject’s interior,” while human
culture is a projection of the self out against nature’s obstacles (VI 40).
While the two models of experience should indeed be read as opposite one
another, the parallels between the two species still allow Flusser’s audience almost to
imagine an entirely different way of living in the world. Analogous extremities that
perform contrasting functions give the impression that other forms of experience might
also be possible for humans. The molluscan passivity, for example, leads to extreme
passion, not activity, with the animal’s increased predatory speed. In Flusser’s colorful
terminology, consequently, a “passionate devil” lies behind the world, as opposed to the
“active god” that humans discover when they seek transcendence (VI 41). Just as
reversed is the vamyproteuthis’ higher thought processes, its version of rationality being
something dark and repressed in contrast with its waking dreamlike state. This is to be of
course the opposite of human waking rationality which represses a darker irrationality:
It is not waking reason that perceives the vampyroteuthian world, but rather the
dream. Our common existence is thereby not radically different. As complex
beings equipped with complex brains, we are simultaneously both reasonable as
well as dreaming beings, yet the two levels of consciousness are stored backwards
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in us—our waking consciousness is the vampyroteuthian unconscious. This is
evident, phenomenally, in his attitude towards life: head down, belly up. His
critique of pure reason is our psychoanalysis. (VI 42)
Important is that this upside-down waking dreaming is proof for Flusser that humans and
vampyroteuthes are “not radically different.” He references Kant and Freud as if the
molluscan creature were rather erudite, but all in an effort to compare our rational and
irrational sides. We are to remember that both species are in possession of both modes of
consciousness, leaving the human reader with a curiosity as to whether standing on one’s
head could bring a dream world up to the surface of waking day.
In fact, it is important to remember that Flusser’s phenomenological approach to
the study of humans/vampyroteuthes is necessarily based on the body’s physical (and
relational) structure, making the case that the two species’ opposite locations on the
phylogenetic tree almost entirely explain their contrasting mentalities and cultures.
While this method is applied to virtually all aspects of the vampyroteuthis, nowhere is it
more striking than in Flusser’s treatment of the animal’s sexuality. The world is grasped,
in both senses of the word, by the creature’s sexual organs, he writes, resulting in a more
complete and simultaneous input of perceived stimuli. Because the gonads are located on
the tentacles along with the eyes, more sensory pathways are involved in processing and
interpreting incoming signals, and therefore all information perceived by the organism
has tactile, visual and sexual dimensions. This means that understanding concepts leads
it directly to orgasm:
The world excites the vampyroteuthis sexually—he grasps it with penis and
clitoris. His grasp leads him to orgasm, which is different from our sexually
neutral and therefore existentially dull concepts. The male has a different grasp of
the world than the female. Therefore for the vampyroteuthis there are masculine
and feminine laws of nature. His dialectic (in which he lives just as much as we
do, since we are both bilateria) has a basically gendered color. Not only
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“true/false,” “good/evil,” and “beautiful/ugly,” but also “positive/negative,”
“body/wave,” in short, “material/paterial” are sexual contradictions. Therefore he
cannot attempt to overcome this contradiction like we do, through cold logic
“syllogistically,” but rather through coitus. The resolution of contradictions is his
orgasm. (VI 42)
While Flusser’s description does not explain which halves of the aforementioned sexual
contradictions correspond to males and females, the gendered understanding of the world
is to be read as a way of experiencing the environment that is completely different to that
of humans. The reader may struggle to comprehend the vampyroteuthian approach, but
that is Flusser’s point. The treatise describes a foreign world that we humans can try to
enter only with difficulty, but in the process of abandoning the familiar grasp of things
we may succeed in encountering the creature’s violent dark energy, perhaps within
ourselves.
Bioluminescent Cognition
Flusser’s method of explaining cultural and immaterial phenomena by way of the
physical body takes a rather unpredictable route. He rejects defining mental processes by
means of neurobiology alone, rejects reducing the “soul” to specific neurons in the grey
matter. Just so does he refuse “the fruitless search” to locate the “seat of the soul” in
some mythical pineal gland or other place outside the brain (VI 44). In effect, Flusser’s
belief is that scientific advancements in neurobiology are reductive to the point of
absurdity, and his self-described phenomenological approach focuses not on the brain but
on the hands. The act of human contemplation Flusser explains as a process in which the
reasoning faculties cut apart perceived phenomena so that the clearly-defined “rations”
and the “gaps” between them may be observed and manipulated, that is, rationalized.
Flusser’s metaphor of the knife for human reason is extended further to the fingers after
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the “rations” have been dissected. Our fingers, he explains, trace the edges of the
dissected appearances, and these outlines are lifted up and separated from the
appearances, becoming concepts, “empty shells,” which we use as models for
experiencing the world. This means that we not only change our conceptions of the
world based on what we perceive, but we also trim and prune our perceptions with our
reasoning knife to fit them into our pre-existing shell-models. This process of feedback
between conceptual models and perception Flusser defines as contemplation. “All in all,
human contemplation is a knife-manipulation, and the stone knife of the Paleolithic era,
the oldest human instrument, is proof for exactly when we began to contemplate” (VI 45).
While the vampyroteuthian method of contemplation is, like all of the animal’s
relevant functions, a backwards and upside-down image of the human version, its
philosophy still rests on its corporeal limbs. The animal’s photophores on its arms,
Flusser claims, project cones of light onto objects in the environment that are thereby prerationalized before the perceptions of the objects’ reflected light are received by the eyes.
The tentacles then grasp the contours of the perceived objects, but because the arms are
also equipped with sexual organs, the vampyroteuthis naturally reasons with sexually
charged concepts. When a male or female, for example, then “rationally illuminates” the
mating partner in order to touch it, what occurs is “a male grasp of female concepts and a
female grasp of male concepts” (VI 46). Finally, during mating the concepts are
synthesized and only then can they be applied to phenomena as models of experience.
“Philosophizing for [the vampyroteuthis] is synonymous with copulating,” Flusser
summarizes (VI 46). The vampyroteuthis would then consider human culture to have lost
its entire female dimension due to the continued tradition of the physically larger male
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repressing the female and always fearing her uprising, so Flusser. In contrast to the
human psyche, the vampyroteuthian unconscious treated by its psychoanalysis is loaded
with repressed asexual concepts like pure mathematics and logic.
Chromatophore Communication
This provides the basis for Flusser’s treatment of the vampyroteuthis’ concept of
history: the intersubjective communication of information. Because its culture is created
in copulation, Flusser states, information is transmitted directly from one individual to
another without the intermediary objects that humans rely on like the memory crutches of
books, recordings and sculptures. Referencing some of his most fundamental ideas about
humans’ art and media as reviewed in the preceding chapter, Flusser first treats the
vampyroteuthis’ intersubjective history through the creature’s hypothetical critique of
human culture:
Humans are bathed in a gas mixture called “air.” Most inhabitants of air have
organs that can cause this gas to vibrate. In humans these vibrations are codified
and they convey intraspecific information, like for us is perhaps the case with
chromatophores. Consequently, the human possesses a memory in order to store
such conveyed information. Yet its memory seems to be rudimentary in
comparison to ours—the human finds itself obligated to grasp at memorycrutches. It channels the largest part of its communicative intentions away from
humans and in the direction of inanimate objects that are located on the relatively
infertile continents in large numbers. These now informed objects are supposed
to serve as memory aids.
Objectively stated, a strange result of this blunder is that human history, in
opposition to an authentic history like our own, is present in exactly these
informed objects. Not only we vampyroteuthes, but also a visitor from Mars can
reconstruct human history from these objects. Therefore, human history is not
actually intersubjective but it is absorbed by the object. A failure. (VI 48-49)
In contrast, the information history of the vampyroteuthis is intersubjective, mediated
only by the various types of glands on or near its skin controlled directly by the brain.
Succinctly, its cultural history of communicated information is “a glandular history, a
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history of secretions” (VI 49). Its chromatophores transmit a color language, Flusser
reports, codified information about the animal’s interior state, primarily aimed at mate
seduction. A second type of gland reportedly makes the animal’s skin translucent,
whereby it may camouflage the sender in order to elude predators as well as deceive
other vampyroteuthes with abstract messages. A third type secretes a nonfatal poison to
paralyze prey but also to rigidify incoming information, preserving it for later processing
and transmission. Finally, the diverticulum ejects sepia, forming the ink clouds that do
not merely confuse enemies, but are meant rather to deceive other individuals in the form
of fleeting images, self-portraits and other figures. Flusser's rather amusing description is
designed to portray the “deception” behind vampyroteuthian communication, the attempt
to confuse, seduce and ultimately devour the other, allowing it Flusser’s designation as
art in the most general sense of the word. The seduction of beauty, Flusser muses, veils
death ultimately in the cultures of both humans and vampyroteuthes.
Vampyroteuthian glandular communication is an open, circulating system of
information creation, storage and transmission that parallels quite obviously Flusser’s
vision of the human telematic society described previously. The squid version of his
intersubjective negentropic communication is visible in his rough summary of the
tenticular-neural pathways linking individual vampyroteuthes:
[An individual] sends light-cones into the world, seizes particles of information
from these cones with its tentacles and paralyzes it into data. Arriving at the
central nervous system, this data is processed, compared with the data already
stored and then sent on to further vampyroteuthes via intraspecific codes by
means of glands in order to be stored in their memories. In this way a dialogue
evolves between vampyroteuthes, thanks to which the sum of available
information continually increases. (VI 51)
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Paralleling almost exactly the dialogic pathways of human and artificial brain-to-brain
information transmission in the network of relations, vampyroteuthian intersubjectivity is
wired as a global nervous system. It is no accident that the animal’s brain and its
connecting neurons form the structural basis of the intersubjective dialogue of
information production; Flusser’s comparison of computer networks with the central
nervous system can be found throughout his body of work. This is, however, only a
small piece in the philosophical-fictive narration that explains the entire concept of
human culture by way of the mollusc’s soft body. The connection between the squishy
squid and the telematic society becomes more and more visible as Flusser turns from sex
to procreation and the birth of the baby vampyroteuthes.
Social Embryology
Vampyroteuthian young are conceived and born en masse, the report states,
hatching out of eggs that have been laid together in clusters and fertilized, then incubated
and nourished by both parents. The simultaneous birth of the young in cluster formation
is the sole determining factor for the species’ social organization, producing an
egalitarian order strictly conditioned by biology. Since such a structure benefits the
entire group at the expense of individual freedom, the vampyroteuthis has a tendency to
rebel against its biological constraints and strive for fraternal competition, and ultimately
cannibalism. Its social structure is explained by Flusser as a result of its evolution:
tracing back its origins on the phylogenetic tree, he reasons that
The vampyroteuthis descends from the same animals that evolved into ants, and
the tendency toward anthills is inscribed in his collective unconscious. Therefore
he feels more threatened by anthills, that is, by totalitarian socialization, than we
do and whenever he engages in politics he becomes antisocialist. His liberalism is
no utopia, but rather a negation of his biological conditions. (VI 57)
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According to Flusser, although the mollusc's inborn socialism predisposes the animal to a
“love” of its neighbor in mating rituals, monogamy and the care of its brood, the
vampyroteuthis “learns to hate” when it overcomes its natural conditions. It can also be
said that the vampyroteuthis strives for its opposite pole of anthropic selfish
individualism.
The human pole, of course, opposite of inborn communal love, is a biological
hierarchy founded on inequalities in birth order, Flusser writes. While most human
babies are naturally born months or years apart from their siblings, the inequality that
differentiates older from younger siblings is not only biological, but also culturally
produced, which means that humans can consider possible utopias where such a
hierarchy does not exist. Overcoming our human nature leads to loving the other, our
neighbor, and Flusser easily extends his analogies to the Jewish and Christian religions
by analyzing this love as the triumph of the “spirit” over nature, over sin,
vampyroteuthian spirit being the human equivalent of sin and vice versa.
Spirit—and with that, freedom—as sin. In this, let us not forget that the
vampyroteuthis stands on his head. His hell is our heaven, his heaven our hell.
His murderous and suicidal anarchy is a hellish society for us, but for him the
unattainable bliss of freedom. Love-ready socialist cooperation and cohabitation
are for us an unattainable heavenly utopia, a messianic situation—for the
vampyroteuthis, however, a hellish anthill. (VI 58)
It must not be forgotten that this oppositely-centered abyss of the vampyroteuthis is not to
be taken only figuratively. Not only is its natural habitat a suffocating watery hell for us,
but also it literally moves backward, so to speak, as its tentacles are supposed to project
out from the top of the head due to its twisted head-foot body morphology. In all ways,
the animal’s opposite biology determining its very opposite culture—except it is not only
opposite from us, but also the same. There is a spirit, Flusser decides, that is both human
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and vampyroteuthian, a spirit present in both our species. Both heaven and hell we have
inside us, we are reminded: although we cannot see both sides at once, when we seek to
understand the vampyroteuthis and succeed in recognizing its venom and its love, we see
the horrifying reflection of our own human nature.
The terminology employed here is deliberate, playing on centuries-old myths of
demonic sea monsters and aphrodisiacal many-armed, many-mouthed symbols of love
(Bozzi 2). More specifically, the vampire squid from hell is part of what Rainer Guldin
has called Flusser’s “diabolical principle” that can be traced back to his earliest texts
where “the devil as a manifestation of human aspirations” is contrasted with God as the
inexpressible empty abyss (1-2). If the vampyroteuthian anthill is hell, it is because the
monster represents to us our own human strivings for building up language and culture,
in particular scientific progress, to make sense out of the abyssal watery darkness, to
forget death. If God is further identified with the chaos and entropy of nature, so Guldin,
the devil persists in the form of “negentropic epicycle[s]” directed against the natural
decay of all things (5). Since all information created by humans over the course of their
history is negentropic, as Flusser sees it, the temptation to overreach the limits of human
control over nature in the name of rational progress turns to sin, and is in vain. The
cannibalistic toothed and suckered devil is diabolical in its voracity as well as a force of
libidinal energy that “rapes” its conversation partner and loves its neighbor, its biology a
blatant metaphor for possible human futures.
Artistic Inheritance
If human history is negentropic, then vampyroteuthian history is too, if also
exaggerated and extrapolated unchecked. The two species are similar enough, Flusser
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continues, that we can recognize in the vampyroteuthis a historical process similar to ours
in the transmission of acquired information from generation to generation by means of
memories. Flusser's reasoning explains that while all animals pass on their genetic
information to their offspring in gametes which can be considered almost immortal
memories because of the relative durability of their information, both humans and
vampyroteuthes attempt to store acquired information in the memories of future
generations just like that which is inherited. By doing so, deliberate intention is inserted
into nature’s automated “informing” of offspring, one of the central ideas in Flusser's
repertoire. Using conventional codes to transmit the acquired information to others’
memories, humans and vampyroteuthes can be said to effectively overcome their own
animal nature, so Flusser. Of course, the intermediate “memories” that humans use like
books, pictures and even buildings are artificial and do not last as long as the practically
immortal gametes; they are subject to the noticeable decay and dis-information of
nature’s entropy. To become intentionally immortal, that is, to preserve their acquired
information after their death, humans thus find themselves in a never-ending search for
better and better artificial memories, and this Flusser believes is the central problem of
their artistic endeavors.
Flusser explains art: Humans are always struggling against the imperfections of
the objects in which to store their acquired information. Their choice of material in
which to encode their particular experiences also influences which experiences they
perceive in the first place: the writer thinks in words, the painter in colors, and this
feedback between artist and media object is a weakness in the pursuit of informational
immortality. In struggling against the material of their artworks (artificial memories) like
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stone, paint, wood, alphabet and musical notes, Flusser explains, humans themselves are
changed by the material to become sculptor, painter, carpenter, writer or musician. The
obsession with the artistic material of the artificial memories leads to a preoccupation
with the artwork itself at the expense of information transmission to other human
memories. As the artists’ interest is absorbed by the object, he writes, they forget their
original purpose of interpersonal communication, and they tend “to make from the
objects not media of communication, but instead barriers to communication between
humans” (VI 61).
Enter the vampyroteuthian strategy: first seduce the mating partner to copulation,
then express the newly acquired information to the other as orgasmic release, stimulate
the other to orgasm in order for the new information to be incorporated into its memory,
and the message is passed on further and becomes part of the species’ cultural memory.
All this is achieved through the vampyroteuthis’ skin art, a color-coded secretion of
pigments on the skin which seduces and communicates, deceives, rapes and lies.
According to Flusser’s poetic science, vampyroteuthian skin art is a hateful beauty that
deceives in order to achieve immortality. Predictably, humans should recognize in this
critical components of our own communication arts: not only do we find deceptive
marketing part of our communication strategies, but we are also presently exploring new
territories of intersubjective communication, abandoning the object for a so-called
immaterial art, as introduced in the previous chapter. Flusser hints that computers may
be involved in this breakthrough but does not elaborate on the new forms of artificial
memories: “We have lost trust in material objects as artificial memories and are
beginning to create another type of artificial memory and to assemble immaterial and
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intersubjective mediations. Admittedly these are not photophores on our skin, but they
are indeed electromagnetic. A vampyroteuthian revolution is under way” (VI 63).
To explain our vampyroteuthian revolution, Flusser here reiterates his classic
history of human technology ubiquitous in practically all his works in one form or
another. Since the industrial revolution, he begins, machines took over the job of
informing (fighting the resistance of) objects, which was once the job of human
craftspeople. Because this work is now spared humans, they are free to concentrate on
the programs which instruct the machines, therefore on the information itself and not the
objects. Although the question is raised whether this information can in any way be
independent of the objects it must be imprinted on, Flusser’s point is also that some
intermediate objects can be spared in the circulation of information. His definition of
intersubjective communication thus focuses on the resistance of other brains to newly
created or altered information instead of on the resistance of objects. At least, this is the
struggle of the vampyroteuthis.
Human self-actualization is no longer the struggle against the insidious resistance
of inert objects, for this struggle can be left to the machines and apparatuses.
Human work becomes superfluous. Human self-actualization from now on is the
manipulation of new immaterial information, or what is known as “software
processing.” In this context, “soft” unquestionably refers to mollusks. (VI 64)
Here readers of Flusser’s other works will recognize his description of the approaching
immaterial, soft or foam-like cultural environment of concrete relationships between
human and artificial intelligences as described in the previous chapter. If software is
molluscan, the vampyroteuthis is a model of none other than the telematic society Flusser
foresees for humanity. While intersubjective, orgasmic, brain-to-brain communication
may have a utopian ring to it, this form of supposedly more immediate information
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exchange can not only be harmful, but is also already in our midst. Chromatophores
become pixels, and skin art becomes screen art in this philosophical fable. Particularly in
the form of mass media, new communication technology holds a power that can be used
for selfish purposes. No matter how wondrous and desirable this mysterious life of the
squid may be painted by Flusser, as in the rest of his texts his underlying pessimism
concerning the potential extent of individual freedom always comes through in the end.
Our interest in objects is beginning to wane; we are prepared to create media
through which we rape human brains and force them to store immaterial
information. We create chromatophores (television, video and computer monitors
transmitting synthetic images) with whose help the senders deceitfully seduce the
receivers—a strategy that will doubtless be called “art” (in case one does not
decide to give up this concept entirely). (VI 64-65)
Benthic Psychology
The real role the vampyroteuthis plays in Flusser’s critique of human culture is
explained by where the animal may be found. Flusser reports that while a few specimens
have been fished out of the South China Sea, others have themselves surfaced out of the
depths of the human unconscious. Both in the oceans’ abysses and in the repressed
depths of the human psyche, the vampyroteuthis lays in wait, compact under the intense
pressure of the benthic levels and of conscious rationality. Psychologists, biologists and
cultural critics alike, Flusser declares, have access to the monstrous mollusc and will
inevitably strike upon it at sufficient depths—regardless from which direction. “Down
below, all surface categories seem to want to bleed together and every division of depthresearch into distinct disciplines seems to become meaningless” (VI 66). The difference
is merely a matter of perspective: in accordance with Flusser’s definition of existence as
the relationship of mutual influences between the organism and its environment, what
from our individual perspective appears to be the depths of the South China Sea appears
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from underneath the water’s surface as the depths of the human psyche. Flusser
challenges us to accept a world where there is no underlying truth to be discovered but
only the depths of an absurd abyss and opposite sides from which to view the
vampyroteuthis. “He will be found at that point where submersion into the depths turns
to surfacing—in the antipodes,” the reader is advised (VI 67). Not only will a biological
excursion into the monster’s watery lair lead to a glimpse of the frightful vampyroteuthis,
but the animal itself can be seen to burst through the psyche’s repressed layers at
unexpected moments. “Of course that is meant metaphorically,” Flusser writes. “But
underneath the surface, one can only speak in metaphors” (VI 67).
This is because the vampyroteuthis, in the end, is a metaphor for something in the
darker repressed side of human nature. Flusser mentions in passing seemingly unrelated
things like Nazism, cybernetics, logic and theology that erupt from under the surface
where they ultimately explode in the thinner atmosphere of waking life. In fact, as
already mentioned, the cancerous explosion of scientific rationality unchecked by what
Flusser would call intuitive understanding is the devil behind the squid and behind the
human, a very real possibility in many aspects of life. For the most part, though,
Flusser's readers are forced to guess, to view our dark side only through the game of
reflective mirrors that Flusser presents to us, full of contradictions and mystery. His text
functions as a cunning attempt to view the Medusa through a labyrinth of distorted
mirrors—for approaching the vampyroteuthis is indeed dangerous, he believes. Attempts
to neutralize this ferocity in human nature Flusser decides are destined to fail, because
one cannot touch the slimy mollusc without contamination, without vampyroteuthizing.
Accordingly, when theologians elevate the diabolical over the divine, when
cyberneticists elevate automatic feedback over clear decisions, when logicians
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elevate the mechanical symbol game over truth tables, when Freudians elevate the
repressed over consciousness, that is because the vampyroteuthis for his part
attempts to sink us to his depths by the Nazis’ deeds or by the thermonuclear
apparatus. In attempting to release him from his pressure, we are crushed. (VI
68)
This text, then, was undertaken in the spirit of approaching the vampyroteuthis
without trying to “annihilate” it and without being “devoured.” Flusser offers the
possibility of reading the text in an effort to embrace both sides of the human spirit,
enlightened and libidinal, rational and intuitive. His purpose then would be to “actualize
suppressed potentialities which will free the human from its constraints and in order to
seek out the vampyroteuthis as one such suppressed human potentiality” (VI 69). The
animal is a model for the unrealized possibilities available to humanity that were passed
over during the course of our cultural evolution, exhibiting traits that were once possible
before we branched off from the “ancestral cell” away from the vampyroteuthis. The
biological model of evolution and metabolism is suitable for Flusser’s purposes because
vampyroteuthes and humans alike are admittedly the stuff of biology, and the model of
the ancestral cell suggests to us that some of our unrealized possibilities are incorporated
in the vampyroteuthis, therefore lying dormant in humanity as well. Biology is necessary
for this reason, as a means for orienting the human in “the darkness of the abyss,” Flusser
cautions, but in the spirit of embracing the vampyroteuthis completely, biology and
objective science as a whole must be used only as a stepping stone that must be
superseded by less objective, less traditionally rational methods like myths and fables. If
the scientific method protects us from being sucked in by the vampyroteuthis, the fable
lets us close enough to touch it.
What biologists, depth-researchers and mythologists speak of when they discuss
the vampyroteuthis is a corpse dissected according to the rules of science. For
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this reason, the nets with which the vampyroteuthis must be caught cannot be
woven from scientific texts. … In the tales to be spun, the sciences should serve
as photophores on the fabulous tentacles grasping for the vampyroteuthis. The
fables themselves must not be scientific—even when seen from the opinion that
the sciences tell nothing other than fables—but rather they should transcend
scientific objectivity. … In order to let the vampyroteuthis surface without being
devoured by him, probably some science is first necessary in order to factor it out
afterwards. (VI 69-70)
To approach the vampyroteuthis with the aim of incorporating both “light” and “dark”
sides of humanity into our consciousness, one must then already approach it not only
from an enlightened scientific place but from an obscurer subjective place as well.
Objectivity must be tempered by fiction and feeling, or the vampyroteuthis will either
tear apart the investigator or itself be cut to pieces by the knife of reason.
This is a call for ethics. The point of encountering the vampyroteuthis is to come
to terms with humanity’s hidden monsters without letting them loose unchecked. Deeply
affected by the uncontrolled eruption of humanity’s dark side in the form of Nazi science,
for example, Flusser demands that a balance be maintained, that the scientific
understanding of the world always be subject to ethical evaluation as part of a more fully
human experience of the world. Flusser writes just in time, for if the vampyroteuthis is a
future possibility for us among others couched in the ancestral cell of biological life,
technology will soon permit the realization of these possibilities through genetic
manipulation. Flusser casually foresees artificial vampyroteuthes and vampyroteuthishuman hybrids but is first and foremost concerned with the ethical perspective on these
genetic fabrications that could prioritize automated decision-making over human
contemplation. “If in the future a gene-technological revolution should take place that
lets all machines and instruments become life-forms and lets humans become living
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machines, to what extent is the vampyroteuthis involved in this revolution? A question
that understandably remains unanswered by the biology to be factored out” (VI 70).
So biology must be factored out in the process of the fable, and the vampyroteuthis
surfaces through metaphor. It surfaces also from aquaria, from dreams, and from
ideology, Flusser tells us, but his tale may prove the particular power of metaphor in its
ability to allow one to both observe and embrace the beast without annihilation of either
side. It is indeed a case of “mutually reflecting mirrors” (VI 71). In the chapters to come,
tempering science with metaphor will be explored as both the technical and the ethical
foundation of creating alternative worlds more human, or more vampyroteuthian.
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III: Spider Webs
The Spontaneous Evolution of Culture from Metaphor Machines

Metaphorically speaking, Flusser’s metaphors are more than watery mirrors to
alternate universes, they are also nets through which to filter the world for optimal
absorption through the pores. The function of his common metaphors of oceans, squids,
brains, fog and skin, among others, is complex. As layers upon layers of metaphors are
delicately peeled back at different scales, they reveal themselves at the core of his
thinking to be the most basic building blocks of human culture. They are absolutely
essential for constructing Flusser’s theoretical universe, creating and revealing
relationships between people, nature and technology. Further investigation of the
intricate workings of metaphor in his work leads us to nature, sheds light on our second
nature, awakens the intuitive creativity required of us in a free telematic future. Flusser's
work shall be used to show how metaphor builds language, and through language builds
the theories, literature and science out of which human culture emerges. Through
metaphor, information is filtered and strained out of chaos into an interconnected textual
scaffolding, into the cultural fabric. Without these linguistic and conceptual filters we
humans would be without orientation in the chaos of perceptions, simply lost in the sea of
information.
Out of context, information is simply noise. Without a structure into which new
information can be added, stored and integrated with old information, new information
does nothing to help the artificial or natural organism grow and adapt to its environment.
It bewilders and disorients; it increases entropy in the system. So too with the human
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organism: the mind or intellect must make sense of the world in order to survive in it.
Due to our highly developed cognitive processes, however, the human search for
meaning extends beyond the most basic survival instincts. Humans are plagued by the
joys of existential doubt, the search for truths larger than ourselves and a dependence on
an intact sense of reality. Whether our perceptions can be trusted to accurately reflect
reality determines our level of doubt, or as Flusser would have it, the other way around—
as our doubt progresses, our sense of reality is weakened (Vom Zweifel 9). Already in his
early Brazilian period, Flusser examined intellectual doubt as a reaction to the nihilism
and Bodenlosigkeit experienced in a world perceived to be absurd, a world where
mythical and scientific narratives break apart at the seams to expose not eternal truths but
simply our own handiwork. In particular, he explains how the current crisis of scientific
doubt introduced in the first chapter promotes a feeling of disorientation and requires a
new kind of conceptual map, stitched together from remnants of the old. Flusser takes on
the task of exploring the ways we construct our own meaning so that new orientations
can be created from the bottom up and connected into webs that support and structure our
changing reality.
To understand the webs we weave is to understand the role of metaphor in the
loom. In definition, a metaphor is a figure of speech that joins two unrelated things in
order to suggest a resemblance, originally a transfer or carrying over: an Über-setzen.
The figural quality of language thus comes into play as a system of translations between
images in the loosest sense—images visual and audible, linguistic and non-linguistic.
The synthesizing action of metaphor is important to understand in the attempt to
abstractly tease apart our realities to single strands. Metaphor in Flusser's philosophy
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shall be examined here at the minutest scale of perceptual neurons, past the abstract
conceptual level, through to the familiar scale of human experience and beyond to the
macroscopic scale of whole civilizations. Assisted by a reading of Nietzsche’s
metaphorical realities, examining Flusser’s theories of linguistic reality creation shall
prove the importance of metaphor for his vision of creativity in the telematic age.
Metaphors will be shown not only to translate perception into concepts, language, and
human culture at large, but to generate possible alternative worlds relying equally on both
art and science. Combining art and science, nature and culture, it will be argued that
Flusser’s second nature also allows for the compatibility of machines and metaphors as
tools. In support of this collaboration, the scientific principles of emergence will be
offered as one possible orientation for creating new second natures that directly connects
digital technology and the natural world. Thus, it will ultimately be revealed that
Flusser’s metaphors add an element of unpredictability to his prediction of a free creative
future.
Nietzsche's Spider Webs
Friedrich Nietzsche’s “Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne”
must be reconsidered here in support of Flusser's explanation of human reality-building
from the foundation. Rarely cited explicitly in Flusser's writing, Nietzsche was
nevertheless very influential on Flusser's philosophy, and the similarities between
Flusser’s language theory and this essay in particular cannot be overlooked. Beginning
with sensory stimuli to individual nerve endings and ending only at humans’ grandest
social schemes, Nietzsche breaks open human consciousness to show that it is full of only
metaphors. He writes that language which structures our thoughts does not accurately
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reflect an objective reality but is a process of subjective translation between “spheres”:
percepts, concepts, words are not truths, but illusions built on metaphor with no necessary
or unequivocal correlation between stimulus and representation:
Das „Ding an sich“ (das würde eben die reine folgenlose Wahrheit sein) ist auch
dem Sprachbildner ganz unfasslich und ganz und gar nicht erstrebenswerth. Er
bezeichnet nur die Relationen der Dinge zu den Menschen und nimmt zu deren
Ausdrucke die kühnsten Metaphern zu Hülfe. Ein Nervenreiz zuerst übertragen in
ein Bild! Erste Metapher. Das Bild wieder nachgeformt in einen Laut! Zweite
Metapher. Und jedesmal vollständiges Ueberspringen der Sphäre, mitten hinein in
eine ganz andere und neue. … Logisch geht es also jedenfalls nicht bei der
Entstehung der Sprache zu, und das ganze Material worin und womit später der
Mensch der Wahrheit, der Forscher, der Philosoph arbeitet und baut, stammt,
wenn nicht aus Wolkenkukuksheim, so doch jedenfalls nicht aus dem Wesen der
Dinge.8 (Nietzsche 1)
To function, human beings must forget the incompatibility between the chemical, visual
and linguistic spheres, Nietzsche admits, while at the same time they should not forget
the constructedness of their assumed truths. If Nietzsche is right, there must be as many
truths as there are words, and then some. “Was ist ein Wort? Die Abbildung eines
Nervenreizes in Lauten. Von dem Nervenreiz aber weiterzuschliessen auf eine Ursache
ausser uns, ist bereits das Resultat einer falschen und unberechtigten Anwendung des
Satzes vom Grunde“ (Nietzsche 1). Words create realities that are not objective.
Already recoded from neurasthenic stimuli and mental images, words become
concepts in another carrying-over, a generalization, an equation of unequal things: a
“Gleichsetzen des Nicht-Gleichen” (Nietzsche 1). Concepts, that is to say, are general
categories that ignore the differences between uniquely experienced individual objects,
grouping them together according to similarities, presumably in order to use them as
8 All outdated spellings have been preserved from the original.
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logical tools. So basic are conceptual categories to the human understanding of the
world that it is totally forgotten by thinking beings that “die Natur keine Formen und
Begriffe, also auch keine Gattungen kennt, sondern nur ein für uns unzugängliches und
undefinirbares X” (Nietzsche 1). This inaccessible and indefinable nebula, nature before
words and thoughts, may be cut apart and categorized by human beings via Flusser’s
knife of reason, but the multiplicity of the conceptual filters through which people
understand the world must prove that no one reality fits all or holds always true.
Remembering the lessons from the Vampyroteuthis, a Flusserian would also approve of a
species-less nature. For Flusser, the natural world contains all possible realities all at
once, therefore there are always more ways to conceptualize a human being’s relation to
the world, and the organism, the environment, and therefore the relations between the two
are also always changing (based substantially on the codes of communication, as chapter
one explained).
For Nietzsche, truths are constantly changing metaphors and anthropomorphisms,
a gelling of the relationships humans have with things, not of things themselves. The socalled truths have congealed so densely that people forget they are illusions and not
things. Even logic, or especially logic, is built on metaphor, “das Residuum einer
Metapher,” a product “der künstlerischen Uebertragung eines Nervenreizes in Bilder”
(Nietzsche 1, italics in original). The solidified illusions, because they have petrified
over the ages, seem real. Because they are illusions, however, they are not grounded
necessarily on steadfast truths in nature, but can be snapped off from the base to let a
different structure develop from the same roots. Unlike a plant that grows of itself
without what we would call deliberate intention, though, much of human world85

construction as Nietzsche understands it does not develop organically close to nature, but
instead is chosen brick by brick at will according to particular logics, Flusser's deliberate
negentropy. Human conceptual filters are rather built up on top of nature, Nietzsche
means to show, shaky but strong, with varying degrees of flexibility. His metaphor for
the human conceptual edifice is precise:
Man darf hier den Menschen wohl bewundern als ein gewaltiges Baugenie, dem
auf beweglichen Fundamenten und gleichsam auf fliessendem Wasser das
Aufthürmen eines unendlich complicirten Begriffsdomes gelingt; freilich, um auf
solchen Fundamenten Halt zu finden, muss es ein Bau, wie aus Spinnefäden sein,
so zart, um von der Welle mit fortgetragen, so fest, um nicht von dem Winde
auseinander geblasen zu werden. Als Baugenie erhebt sich solcher Massen der
Mensch weit über die Biene: diese baut aus Wachs, das sie aus der Natur
zusammenholt, er aus dem weit zarteren Stoffe der Begriffe, die er erst aus sich
fabriciren muss. (Nietzsche 1)
If humans spin their perceived realities from within themselves, then it is an artistic
endeavor, Nietzsche believes, one based not on causality but on an „ästhetisches
Verhalten“ (1, italics in original). What should not be forgotten, he decides, is that the
weaving of webs is supreme artistry, the spider’s creativity with a practical purpose as
well. Indeed, humans need their webs to filter information from the environment to make
sense of it in order to survive, prosper, reproduce, Nietzsche remembers. Accepting this
metaphor, if this web-weaving happens linguistically, it must mean that the webs can also
be torn down and rewoven differently. In any given version, what doesn’t get filtered
through is simply not perceived, which is necessary because otherwise chaos would
overload the senses. Following Nietzsche then, because human webs are made of
metaphors or words, we get caught in it ourselves when it fails to orient us in our
changing natural and cultural environment. When we forget that it must be reconstructed
when it no longer fulfills our needs, it can close in around us and suffocate. To use
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Flusser's terms, the networked structure around us which we climb to negentropic heights
of information processing and culture-building is truth only temporary, possible or
contingent.
The conceptual scaffolding familiar in Western culture was constructed by
language and continued by an empirical science that gradually phased out aesthetic
awareness, Nietzsche continues, and thus art is what can tear holes through it.
Jener Trieb zur Metapherbildung, jener Fundamentaltrieb des Menschen, (…) ist
dadurch, dass aus seinen verflüchtigten Erzeugnissen, den Begriffen, eine reguläre
und starre neue Welt als eine Zwingburg für ihn gebaut wird, in Wahrheit nicht
bezwungen und kaum gebändigt. Er sucht sich ein neues Bereich seines Wirkens
und ein anderes Flussbette und findet es im Mythus und überhaupt in der Kunst.
Fortwährend verwirrt er die Rubriken und Zellen der Begriffe dadurch dass er
neue Uebertragungen, Metaphern, Metonymien hinstellt (…) An sich ist ja der
wache Mensch nur durch das starre und regelmässige Begriffsgespinnst darüber
im Klaren, dass er wache, und kommt eben deshalb mitunter in den Glauben, er
träume, wenn jenes Begriffsgespinnst einmal durch die Kunst zerrissen wird.
(Nietzsche 2)
In the end it becomes clear that the function of art must not be to replace scientific
reason, but rather to complement it in order to create a balance of rational web
construction and irrational deconstruction. The web, like any spider’s, must be
constantly torn down and rebuilt in response to the environment. An artistic awareness is
still lacking, however, because it lies between, underneath or beyond words, outside of
the scientific, linguistic thinking-building process. Nietzsche believes the way back to
the nonverbal images of the uncategorized, not-yet-defined nature would require the
silence of intuition, a breaking apart of grammatical logics and a recombining of bits of
old metaphors. “Von diesen Intuitionen aus führt kein regelmässiger Weg in das Land
der gespenstischen Schemata, der Abstraktionen: für sie ist das Wort nicht gemacht, der
Mensch verstummt, wenn er sie sieht, oder redet in lauter verbotenen Metaphern und
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unerhörten Begriffsfügungen…” (Nietzsche 2). This task assigned to art to trawl the
depths of nature’s pre-linguistic, pre-conceptual ocean of chaos should then lead to new
metaphorical structures from the bottom up, shifting the human’s information filter into
new conceptual categories, creating new realities.
The need for paradigm-shifting art in the world of scientific progress seems so
dire because tearing the conceptual nets of reason has for the most part been avoided as a
frightening disorientation. Nietzsche’s view that this is due to our forgetting that our own
worlds are self-made can be compared to Flusser’s line of thought on the linguistic webs
we weave. Flusser does not go so far as to say that humans’ realities are mere illusions,
but he does believe that humans create their worlds by means of words, drawing out bits
of reality from pre-linguistic chaos and processing it into concepts. Nietzsche’s
metaphorical process of perception, conceptualization and later forgetting, parallels
Flusser’s view of human linguistic reality-building as a process of concretization and
progressive abstraction. Flusser gives all the power to language to construct the
conceptual scaffolding, and all the responsibility for tearing it down to begin anew.
Illusion, perhaps not, but for Flusser the crisis of scientific doubt has opened up the usual
structures leaving reality exposed to a groundless disorienting space that must be
reorganized into nets that still manage to catch us from falling into the maelstrom. Like
Nietzsche, Flusser wants to smash the rigid scientific compasses by means of art.
Flusser's Poetic Spiders
The fundamental error that underlies the confusion and upheaval resulting from
our crisis of doubt in reality Flusser determines to be first and foremost the belief that
human thought can somehow objectively reflect the external world around us (“Da
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Dúvida” 53). On the contrary, he believes, the structure of our thoughts does not reflect
some external reality but rather forms it by actualizing its latent potentialities. This is
possible because thoughts are made of words. Words are impossible to distinguish from
the concepts they represent, Flusser believes, and the intellect, as he terms it, or humans’
general cognitive capacity, is to be thought of as a field on which words are organized by
rules. Therefore the whole of our thoughts makes up language as we know it. Flusser
goes so far as to claim that the structure of sentences in any language is synonymous with
the relations between things in the perceivable world. According to his formulation,
reality’s dormant possibilities are realized in the sentence as the verb gives reality to the
subject and object of the sentence, links them and gives them context and meaning.
Language is, after all, a “field on which the search for meaning is played out” (“Da
Dúvida” 54). 9 Meaning occurs in the games of combination.
Language or discourse, chains of thoughts strung together, is for Flusser a reality
only ever partially realized. Total realization of all possibilities remains always
unattainable, he reasons, because subjects of sentences, “names” are always multiplying,
always infinite in number. The naming process is developed extensively in Flusser’s
early Brazilian work on language theory: naming describes how reality is created by
language. He explains it as a method where a human speaker focuses in on a
“quivering,” nameless particle in the swirling ocean of chaos in the environment,
bringing that noise vibration to the surface, giving it context and meaning to become new
information. This is a two-step process involving what he calls “proper names” and
9 All translations in this chapter from the Portuguese are my own.
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“derived names.” These names, grammatical building blocks of reality, are first born as
“proper names.” Used much differently from its normal context, the term is to describe
words or phrases that are spoken with inflection, with a forceful breath or with gestures,
to mean “look, over here!” (“Da Dúvida” 55). They are also to be seen as concepts that
are “concrete” because they refer only to themselves, they have no external meaning, no
significance outside themselves. Proper names in Flusser’s sense are “called” out of the
abyss of the inarticulable in an act of poetry, philosophy’s nearest access to the roots of
reality. Poetic verse in Flusser’s sense consists of sentences whose subjects name the
inarticulable, whose subjects are proper names. The roots of discourse, of language and
of reality, Flusser explains, originate in the inarticulable and each proper name is one
realized possibility called out from an infinitely inexhaustible supply of nameable
possibilities. In the calling or naming process, the “territory of the intellect is extended,”
the borders of the thinkable world wrestled back (“Da Dúvida” 56).
Only poetry can bring forth proper names, bring something concrete into
existence, but Flusser’s definition of poetry is broad, closer to the Greek poiesis. Music
and some forms of painting are also forms of poetry, if and when they are all material, all
vibration or sensory stimulation and not representative or referring to some other thing
outside the work itself. “Music is a proclaiming of proper names because it signifies
itself, and music is a linguistic activity because its primary material is spoken language
divested of external significance” (“Concreto-abstrato” 152). The more poetry points
inside itself and the less it refers to something external to it, the more concrete it is in
Flusser’s broad sense. Concrete poetry in the narrow sense as it was practiced as a
movement in Brazil during the 1960s when Flusser was writing his language theory
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based on the Portuguese language is indeed an influence on Flusser and one of his focal
points; he addresses work of specific concrete poets like Haroldo Campos. Poems by
these artists contain the sound and structure of language, but would make no sense in
conversation, like Campos’ word homemmoendahomemmoagem—“man-mill-mangrinding,” roughly—a “proper name” marked more by its sonorous “m” vibrations than
its communicative potential (“Concreto-abstrato” 152). The work of the concrete poets
(in both the broad and narrow sense) is to create the roots of reality, Flussers explains,
roots that sprout up from the ground of nothingness, a ground that “shakes under the
poet’s step” (“Concreto-abstrato” 152). In abandoning the terra firma of abstract
concepts and conversation, the poet dives into the mystery that is the “vir-a-ser,” the
chaos of the “going-to-be,” in order to bring back new proper names that are poems
(“Concreto-abstrato” 149). A poem is itself a proper name.
Proper names, inflected verse still stained by the inarticulable, are in a sense raw
and must be further processed, Flusser explains, before they can be integrated into
common discourse or conversation. For this second step in the naming process, an
homemmoendahomemmoagem must be generalized to an abstract concept which refers to
some thing or group of things outside itself. While the concrete concept “Haroldo
Campos” refers to one thing only, Flusser writes, the abstract concept “concrete poet” is a
category that refers to many similar things (“Concreto-abstrato” 147). After the proper
name is “called forth” a second time, it loses its force as it is further distilled into what
Flusser terms a “derived” name or abstract concept. It is “called” a second time, this time
to become conversation; it is integrated into discourse, it becomes classifiable. The
intellect, Flusser maintains, that field of progressive doubt that begins with poetry and
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ends with conversation, alienates itself in the distilling process from its inarticulable
origin. This process of abstraction happens not only with individual words and concepts,
but can also be traced over the course of history as a whole. Leaping between scales
large and small, Flusser defines civilization in its entirety as a “conversation” that
progressively substitutes proper names with derived names or concepts ever more
universal and abstract. The “field of significance” of concepts changes from small,
precise, and full of meaning to larger, universal but empty of meaning (“Concretoabstrato” 151). Just as Antiquity experienced the transition from myth to philosophy, and
the Middle Ages from faith to science, Flusser sums up, the Modern Age underwent a
similar phase of abstraction from classical physics to particle physics: a belief in the
concreteness of the senses was abstracted and lost its meaning. The time is thus ripe for
concrete poetry to try to open the world again to the concrete, he urges. Instead of a
return to some original Adamic language, the concrete world would each time construct a
different linguistic structure out of the inarticulable—each time a new Adam. The
concrete poets, however, are “only a beginning” (“Concreto-abstrato” 151). The many
ways toward the concrete we need only imagine.
The Brazilian concrete poets were also not the first. Flusser describes the sung
poems of the ancient Greeks as an example of how the sound and tactility of language
brought their world into existence, a sort of biofeedback loop creating nature out of myth.
He writes of how nature “sprouted out” of those singing poets, meaning that the so-called
laws of nature were created from harmonic vibrations between what was sung and what
was perceived. Because nature living and nonliving together “breathes rhythmically,” the
oral histories and myths of the Greeks vibrated in simpatia or harmony with nature,
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responding to perceptions and creating perceptions through language (“Do Poder” 167).
This same nature is “killed” by scientific language, alienating it from its speakers. So
long ago Pythagoras tried to formulate these laws of nature into magical numbers, Flusser
explains, and the long road to science was begun. While both are ruled by the same
linguistic laws, science’s nature is for Flusser an abstraction of the poets’ nature.
Biology’s intricately indexed species are not the only true laws of nature, he means to
say, but simply abstractions of the mythical beasts, to state one example. The centaur
was at one time just as real and true as, say, the White-naped Crane (Grus vipio) is to the
ornithologist, the crane a universalized “repetition of language” emptied of magic,
Flusser would say, while the centaur throbbed and “pulsed from out of the center of
language” (“Do Poder” 170).
Flusser defends his philosophy from critics like Anatol Rosenfeld, who in 1964
considered Flusser’s first book Língua e Realidade “masterly,” but disagreed with his
fuzzy ontology, insisting on the traditional distinctions “between the centaur, an
imaginary being, the mathematical triangle, an ideal being, and the tree, a real being”
(Krause 13). Flusser insists that Rosenfeld hadn’t understood the full meaning of the
term realização, of which the English “realize” makes better use. Referring both to
conceptual understanding and the actualization of possibilities, the term reflects the
making-real by the intellect by means of its linguistic process of comprehension. Here
Flusser means to address the “unease caused by the fluidity of reality” by explaining its
changeability as contingent on linguistic context (Krause 14). “What right do I have,”
Flusser retorts,
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to insist that a tree is not an imaginary being for ecology—to only recognize the
forest as real? What right do I have to affirm the ideality of the triangle, not
having plunged into the geometrical layer of conversation? What right do I have
to proclaim the centaur an imaginary fact for the Greeks of the 9th Century BC, if
not the right assigned to me by my own self-designated superiority? (qtd in
Krause 14).
A once fluid reality, a re-constructible net has, both Flusser and Nietzsche would say,
ossified to form supposed inalienable truths. This scaffolding of truths is for both
philosophers an abstraction from its source, one which orients the linguistic spiders quite
well for a time but promises a permanence it cannot guarantee. With the flow of time and
a fluid reality, webs are rebuilt and truths are redefined. Once again, Flusser decides, the
petrified webs of the Western world slowly crumble as doubt increases, and the resulting
disorientation should create space for a return to the source and a new orientation.
Now, when the concreteness of poetry feels again called to reverse the abstraction
process, language that centers on the senses in a general tactility will be able to create
something new. Especially suitable to the task as Flusser sees it is the Portuguese
language in particular, like Guimarães Rosa’s tale “As garças” (“The Cranes”) that
celebrates the “musical power of the Portuguese language” by permitting the reader to
“vibrate again like Pan’s flute” (“Do Poder” 167). In general, Flusser makes clear that
the roots of our linguistic world are too far away to be seen or remembered. His readers
are urged to return to the roots of reality through a “radical philosophy,” a doubting of
doubt itself, which would be to reflect the “profane” reality back on itself and strive for
its “sacred” source (“Da Dúvida” 60). As we attempt to approach the sacred
inarticulable, he writes, we should hope to experience a renewed sense of awe at its
nearness. Every verse is a new reflection of reality, an “original sin” (distantly linked to
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the vampyroteuthian devil) deviating from the infinite truth, its vibration linking it to the
inarticulable (“Da Dúvida” 58). From these same roots we are to create a new kind of
language. If we can invent a new grammar, following Flusser’s reasoning, we can create
a new reality, a new information filter.
One way to smash the pillars of the profane is to conceptually and linguistically
break through ossified names and logics instead of waiting for them to slowly crumble—
to willfully redefine concepts and realities. Flusser’s undated essay “On the Importance
of Art for Survival” examines the emptying of meaning in our culture of abstraction from
a different perspective, focusing on a single word. “Art” as a term has lost its traditional
meaning of making beautiful, good or useful things, he decides, the result of a long
process of abstraction in Western society in conjunction with the increased futility and
utter absurdity of traditionally meaningful concepts. Our culture is now merely a
problem of form, Flusser observes according to his structural awareness, in that our
nature and culture have lost their purpose and therefore their meaning. Once mythically,
once religiously full of purpose in the human world, the mysteries of the natural world
and the goals of industrial progress alike have become emptied of value and devolved to
mere aimless games to prevent boredom, Flusser feels. Now that we have lost our belief
in the utility of the world, nature becomes essentially absurd, and culture and art as well
are for us fundamentally absurd enterprises, in the sense of being efforts to render
useful and meaningful what is essentially futile. This attitude of ours toward
culture and art is entirely different from our forefathers’ attitude in that it does not
assume culture and art to be important for survival, but important as methods,
strategies, games, (or whatever the formalistic term we might choose), to pass the
time of surviving. (“On the Importance” 4)
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We are no longer able to explain human culture in terms of mechanistic, biological,
psychological or sociological theories, Flusser posits, but must instead “take recourse to
theories like those of games, of information, of cybernetics,” because our culture is now
“no longer an ontological or existential, but a formal problem” (“On the Importance” 4).
In this sense, art as a concept has changed from the creation of beautiful things, or of
good or useful things, to one of empty value, because beauty, goodness and utility are
also invalid.
Our word for ‘art’ is thus empty, and like our word for nature which we have also
had to redefine, art must be given a new meaning:
Now this is a rather unusual gesture: we hold a word in our hand which has
become “empty”, (devoid of meaning), and we look for something to “fill it”. The
gesture is unusual, because we are tempted to believe that everything around us
already has a name, and therefore that to look for something nameless to call it
“art” is slightly silly. But of course, this is not so. On the contrary: the moment
we look around us in search of something nameless, all the names covering our
world seem to evaporate, and leave a totally nameless soup within which we
swim, ourselves namelessly, and without any orientation. ... Naming is an activity
which solidifies, and thus “pro-duces” things out of the soup, but un-naming, or
dis-naming, is an activity which has no name, as yet. … Why not say: let “art”
mean that activity by which names are lifted from things so that they may be
discovered as things? (“On the Importance” 8-9)
Flusser sees the term “art” as a kind of empty form through which various meanings flow
with the passage of time, similar to the redefinition of countless other words that occurs
over centuries or decades. This changeability of meaning, though, is a process which
reflects Flusser’s new meaning of art in particular. Finding new names for things,
creating new meaning in the face of Bodenlosigkeit, could go through a backwards-facing
process from profane conversational language through poetic concretization towards the
sacred, unpronounceable, wordless soup. It is a method of redefinition that first lays bare
an undefined mass of countless potentialities to be realized, the wordless soup identical to
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the ocean of possibilities or the chaotic nature before it was second nature. In a way, it
also reflects Flusser’s own manner of writing about humans and their cultural products as
if seen for the first time. Un-naming would be an archeology of sorts, a search for the
roots of things, for what has been lost or covered up over eras of conceptualization and
abstraction. Anti-progress, it would be a digging, an enquiry into the meaning of
meaning, Flusser writes. It would be “anti-magic, (if by ‘magic’ we understand the
evocation and provocation of things through names in the possession of the magician)”
(“On the Importance” 9).
Stripping away the “names” for things, that is, tearing down the conceptual
webbing spun by generations of thinkers and speakers would be the place of art,
something for which Flusser gives few concrete examples. Once space for new
categories is exposed, however, new webs can be spun through poetry in the broad sense.
From there, the structure zooms out to another level beyond individual words and unwords, further to the level of the linguistic mind. Language as a whole, or the intellect as
Flusser defines it, consists of interlinked chains of words and concepts, so that if words
are concepts making up thoughts, then each thought is a sentence, and logic is a grammar.
These thought-nets are made of sentences and they give their netted structure then to the
reality they construct, very like the silk webs that spiders weave around themselves from
out of themselves, Flusser writes, the only difference being that the webs are “invisible”
(Vom Zweifel 27). The linguistic net catches the world, filters what becomes real from
what remains inexpressible and simply imperceptible. The borders of the net or intellect,
the field of doubt or critique, are proper names that make thinking really an act of
wondering—thinking is being outside a thing, not seeing it, and striving to see it, Flusser
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ponders. The action of the intellect is a wondering at the wholly other, and allegories are
necessary in order for the intellect to describe these proper names, he insists. Proper
names are close to the unpronounceable, and in thinking we celebrate our nearness to it,
one explanation legitimizing Flusser’s philosophy through metaphorical images, through
combining science with myth. Because the intellect will soon be sacrificed, he believes,
because it will be replaced by something yet unknown, we need to actively try to become
thinking beings again because it will keep us human.
Flusser teases apart the workings of the human intellect in Vom Zweifel, treating it
as a loom on which individual thought-threads are woven into a net or veil, or as a field
over which the thought-net is spread. Flusser describes a thought-net that covers over
reality while seeking to uncover it at the same time, a search for reality that
concomitantly builds reality out of itself similar to the ancient Greek ballads creating
instead of discovering the laws of nature. It is a fabric formed by interlinking chains of
thoughts, full of tension, desiring to overcome itself in the search for meaning,
constituting reality and the thinking subject. The process of thinking he thus describes as
one of self-completion or self-reproduction, a chain of thoughts that lead automatically to
new thoughts. This definition suggests an image of a fabric weaving itself, organically
sprouting new threads in reaction to the perceived world within and without the thinking
subject, energized by the never-satiated search for meaning. Flusser further describes the
search for meaning as an aesthetic process in search of form, for he believes that where
form is found it leads to meaning. Logic, so Flusser, would be one example of such
meaningful form, but not the only one. In an absurd world where meaning has left the
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old forms, then, human thinking can restructure its forms to create new meaning and a
new orientation.
One manifestation of the intellect is the literary work, a form of participation in
the general conversation that makes up the fabric of civilizations. According to Flusser,
individual works can be confronted by their readers as either answers or provocations. He
explains that to view the work as an answer is to analyze it in the spirit of critique, from
an attitude of curiosity. To view it as a provocation, the reader must enter into
conversation with it, in the spirit of speculation, from an attitude of sympathy. Flusser’s
word for this is the Portuguese simpatia, or sympathy in the Greek sense: “co-vibration”
(“Esperando” 70). Attuning oneself to the vibrations of a work is to match wavelengths
not only with the content and form of the work itself, he explains, but also with the
“climate” in which the work was produced, with the cultural and linguistic context, on the
level of the words and on the level of the work. To tune in to the writer’s chords is to
open one’s mind to the message that is sent to the reader, to open one’s mind to the text,
to the provocation of a conversation. Flusser's formulation gives a sense of organic life
to cultural production, even a sense of naturalness in the conversation between human
minds and the cultural environment.
How to Weave a Better Web?
Flusser addresses at length the mechanism by which humans weave together
meaningful, orientating realities with words—linguistic grids that map out relevant
information—only to waste away inside them as the webs slowly cut off vital circulation
from the threatening, inexpressible chaos outside. Like Nietzsche, Flusser believes the
first problem of humans' doubt in the absolute truth of their opaque, scientifically
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explained environments is that they have forgotten how they themselves created their
realities in the first place and that they could therefore purposefully recreate them to
better serve their changing needs for information synthesis and transmission. Reweaving the metaphor webs for a new orientation could be the task for a new art, Flusser
believes, which must break through the old webs and dip anew into the wordless
turbulent soup of pre-creation. Un-naming objects, art reaches backwards to the place
where things are not yet things, but vibrate with a tactile life. Naming things in a
different way is then the task of poetry in the broad sense, of artistic creation through
metaphor. From there, the intellect spins threads of words into sentences, weaves them
into texts, which in turn interweave with other texts and other intellects to form
networked cultures. Is this basic human creative act the first step in realizing Flusser's
envisioned reversal of abstraction from zero-dimensional points to re-synthesized
multidimensional realities? Although Flusser does not mention much in the way of
specific web orientations that may replace the old while preserving a sense of humanness,
do his metaphors generate possibilities that they do not describe? Is our metaphor-based
second nature really built from what comes through our pores? How do we alter our
skins to fit better? I would like to submit three possible responses to Flusser's version of
culture building in the telematic age by suggesting complementary thought structures that
could be applied to productively expand on tendencies in Flusser's work to describe
possible orientations and directions for creative world building.
Hypothesis #1: What Flusser is really calling for can be found in what he
specifically leaves out. Because he believes Western culture is by its very foundation
linguistically incompatible with that of the East, it is impossible for the occidental
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hemisphere to comprehend such foreign cultures, and can therefore not meaningfully
interact with their reality structures (Língua e Realidade 81). If it were possible to access
the other side, however, it might nevertheless produce fertile new combinations of
concepts that could complement or restructure archaic Western paradigms. Perhaps
exactly this incomprehensibility is required to shake the pillars of established
epistemological traditions. Thorsten Botz-Bornstein crosses one bridge by bringing the
very foreign concept of wen from traditional Chinese culture into the scientific discourse,
hybridizing the Chinese concept with principles of biological and cultural evolution for a
new perspective on nature, culture and science that could suggest a different orientation
fitting to Flusser’s provocation. The untranslatable wen Botz-Bornstein defines as a kind
of pattern or structure, but also as writing, literature, or civilization as a whole. Found in
both nature and culture, wen is a “pattern of interrelating structures that emerge out of
concrete situations and reflexively organize and regulate human life in the world” (BotzBornstein 168). Passed down and developed from generation to generation, wen can be
considered a kind of cultural genetic code transmitted through ideograms. Wen is also
intrinsically natural, however, discoverable as patterns in beautiful natural forms as well
as cultural. “It is neither nature nor culture nor a 'posthuman' creation that replaces
nature with culture, but a cultural genetic code as much as a natural one” (Botz-Bornstein
168). The process of culture-building is the process of transforming nature via human
minds, lifting up wen out of phenomena like bird tracks in the snow, making visible
patterns that were previously unrealized. The poets do not invent fictional worlds, BotzBornstein explains, but rather transmit wen.
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Because a wen-based culture has necessarily to do with nature, culture remains a
dynamic system always open to nature’s external flux. In the Chinese alphabet, a written
character has its own “genetic force;” language exists as an energy that builds up in it and
“buds forth,” so that Botz-Bornstein can wonder: “Should we say that through Chinese
writing nature appears as a paradise engendering concrete things, and not, as in Western
writing, as a factory producing mere metaphors?” (171-2). Although not in direct
reference to Nietzche or Flusser, Botz-Bornstein holds a complimentary perspective and
ponders whether modern science's version of evolution could have developed otherwise,
had it entered the discourse much earlier than it did. It could have “smash[ed] the static,
classificatory logic of Western thinking” (Botz-Bornstein 172). Just as Flusser and
Nietzsche assert that there are no species in nature, in wen-based cultures nature is less a
book to be read than a dynamic convergence of forces that generates writing. The
distinction lies between reducing nature's genetic code to a machine functioning
according to evolutionary principles (and that can be tampered with) and always allowing
the text to remain natural. Genetic engineering and transhuman cyborg problematics,
while appearing to blur the distinction between nature and culture, in effect confirm the
nature vs. human/artificial divide, so Botz-Bornstein. A wen-based genetics solves these
problems by treating genes as both nature and culture from the start.
Botz-Bornstein goes further to outline a wen-based “memetics” transcending
Richard Dawkins' concept of “memes” for cultural evolution, describing how the
Western world-as-machine metaphor is extended into the cultural sphere to a materialism
that describes “humans as 'meme machines' and human culture as a web of memes
produced by such machines” (Botz-Bornstein 174). In contrast to Dawkins' concept of
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memes, cultural “genes” that replicate over generations through imitation, a wen-based
memetics does not reduce human culture to calculable mimetic machines but unifies form
and content, aesthetics and significance. If molecular biology reduces the spatial
qualities of nature, whereby bodies and selves are replaced by genetic codes reminiscent
of Flusser's narration of the linear turn, traditional Chinese aesthetics described by BotzBornstein centers on the dynamic “living” power inherent in memes and genes not only
to encode information but to generate structure and aesthetic value. Literature, wen,
exists in the “aesthetic surplus” produced when reality is imitated by the poets, he writes.
It is not created ex nihilo, but evolves from nature itself just like the universe itself has no
created origin but only “evolved in the course of a natural process of polarization and
diversification” (Botz-Bornstein 178). In Chinese aesthetics, culture evolves not by the
replication of ideas through technical inventions that overcome nature, but by a process
of humans interacting directly with nature, lifting up patterns, rhythms and melodies of
universal significance and aesthetic value (Botz-Bornstein 179). Nature is no
metaphorical machine, but a living generative force.
Flusser's declared independence from Western thought structures due to his sense
of profound Bodenlosigkeit in fact led him to devote some of his early pre-publication
years to examining Eastern philosophical traditions. He acknowledged the poverty of
outdated Western paradigms that evolved strict divisions between nature and culture,
resolving that no manner of thinking can ever adequately orient a human being in a
reality always already inaccessible. Turning to methods he hoped would free himself
from all thought whatsoever, Flusser for his part examined yogic meditation from the
Indian tradition as a means to exercise strength of will over thought, as well as Buddhism
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to overcome the initial desire to think at all. Never able to integrate such foreign
perspectives into his linguistic conceptual structures, however, Flusser ultimately gave up
such attempts as simple mental gymnastics “in lächerliche Geschmacklosigkeit gebadet,”
rejecting “das ästhetisch Widerliche” that embarrassed him and brought him no further in
surviving an absurd world (Bodenlos 62). Although Flusser ultimately decided to remain
aesthetically within the Western tradition, the understanding of wen patterns as both
natural and cultural shows tempting similarities to Flusser's second nature, and the
processes by which such patterns spontaneously emerge out of concrete situations to
organize human life are promising for Flusser's search for alternative world creation and
more extensively treated below.
Hypothesis #2: In all practicality, the Western culture in which Flusser and most
of his readership live can only be restructured from within. It already contains all the
richness needed to refresh and renew itself, it must only dig back far enough to pick up
the lost threads of other potential cultural nets which were dropped along the way
towards the weaving of progress. Tracing back down the strands of time to before
rational scientific discourse forked from its artistic sister thread, a spider wanting to respin reality might find fresh material in the discard pile. While no backwards journey
through time to the highpoint of the Greeks' techné is possible, the attempt to reunite
science and art, in particular literature, could still prove a worthwhile direction in the
search for the new models of experience Flusser seeks in his philosophy. David Porush
argues for the importance of metaphor in both scientific and literary ways of knowing and
describing reality, proposing a stronger collaboration between science and literature in
the form of a broader postmodern discourse he calls Eudoxical discourse. Arguing that
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postmodernism's defining battle between mechanism and metaphor is tending now
towards a resolution, Porush sketches an outline of that resolution using science to prove
that literature is just as important in the new postmodern discourse. He examines
quantum mechanics, cybernetics, neurology, cognitive science, chaos theory and
irrational mathematics to elucidate the epistemological power of metaphor and its
superiority to logic-based models of reality that reduce the human sphere to pure
mechanism.
Porush challenges the central metaphor of cybernetics, the study of information
control and communication, which equates the human mind with a machine and assumes
that all minds, whether of neurons or silicon chips, function mechanically and
deterministically, meaning that the mind's future actions can be predicted given sufficient
knowledge of the starting conditions. Logically based upon a fiction, Porush states,
cybernetics mistakenly equates material physical entropy with informational entropy to
define information as an independent, measurable thing transported by a signal. Even
from within the science of cybernetics, however, this assumption is being challenged
which supports the first tenet of Porush's Eudoxical discourse that “information does not
exist sensibly, even when it is quantifiable, apart from the metaphorical assumptions that
create its context” (“Eudoxical” 44). There is no information without an observer, that is,
information only exists as the “relationship between an input and a receiving device” in a
formulation by Porush not dissimilar to Flusser’s telematic fields of concrete relations
(“Eudoxical” 44). Alternatives Porush mentions include different manifestations of what
are called second-order cybernetics, a critique focusing on autopoiesis, or how biology
organizes itself in such a way that self-aware structures, intelligences, emerge on their
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own. Even more productive in Porush's estimation, though, is literary critique in the form
of recent fictional works he names “cybernetic fictions” that both depict and perform the
struggle between algorithmic, mechanistic descriptions of human experience and the
richer literary discourse of “silence, metaphor, irony, ambiguity, paradox, polysemy,
symbolism, and nonsense, as well as dramatizations of deeper phenomenological
experiences of human freedom, spontaneity, selfhood, and creativity” (“Eudoxical” 45).
Cybernetic fictions or “soft machines” (as per his The Soft Machine) dramatize the
limitations of mechanism by adopting the guise of a cybernetic system and then selfdestructing under the system's own rules, revealing the human remainder that cannot fit
into an algorithm. These tend toward Porush's Eudoxical discourse, in that they “[adopt]
scientific metaphors [to] expose the limitations of reducing a metaphor to formal
algorithm” (“Eudoxical” 46).
Cybernetics in turn influenced neurology with its highly contagious metaphor of
the nerve as a telephone wire or binary on/off switch, able to convey quantifiable,
discreet packets of information. Responding to recent scientific developments, Porush
deconstructs these cybernetic metaphors for the nerve to highlight the nerve's newly
discovered non-deterministic, self-organizational abilities also definable as autopoietic.
Based on the new research regarding the human nerve cell's open “ecological system,” its
“intelligent,” nonlinear complexity and its structural self-malleability, Porush offers a
new metaphor for the nerve:
I would like to suggest that the best metaphor we have for the nerve is one that
would include or subsume all its mechanistic aspects or behaviors but preserves a
sense of contingency and self-modulation that we are beginning to suspect is true
of human communication at all levels, from the micro- to macroscopic. I suggest,
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then, that the best metaphor we have for the nerve is metaphor itself”
(“Eudoxical” 49, italics in original).
As the mediator between the physical world of experience and the mental world of
cognition, the nerve acts as a metaphor in the translation from perception to cognition,
consistent with Nietzsche’s formulations. Porush founds his entire Eudoxical discourse
on exactly this function of metaphor as the “best empirical model we have of any
phenomenon” valid on both the neuronal and cognitive levels (“Eudoxical” 50).
Metaphor-based literary discourse is proven to better reflect the unstable,
fluctuating evolution of human culture, Porush believes, by the new theories of chaos
showing how order emerges out of disorder and evolves into intricate, unpredictable
complexities. Chaos theory describes a biosphere which engenders human culture which
engenders literature, all according to the same non-deterministic laws of interaction,
feedback and randomness. Literature is not only on par with science in its ability to
describe the perceived world, but it opens up the world of the irrational to us, which
Porush shows to have been crucial to the fundamental mathematical principles underlying
scientific reality, but which science alone could never have allowed. He describes how
Eudoxos of Knidos invented hyperreality in the 4th century BC by manipulating the
Pythagoreans' metaphor of the number line which was applied to the measurable world.
While the geometers rejected any number that was not an integer on the number line or a
ratio between integers, that is, any number that could not be used to directly measure the
physical world, Eudoxos challenged the Pythagorean system of rational numbers by
turning the metaphor of the number line on its head, prioritizing the reality of the abstract
line over the reality of the material world. Thus any numbers that fell between the
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rational numbers on the line were allowed to exist even if they were incompatible with
the external world of objects. For Porush, Eudoxos' contribution was in providing a way
to think about √2 and other “nameless absurdit[ies]” that opened up whole branches of
mathematics; it was in creating “a rational theory of the irrational founded on the
inversion of a metaphor” (“Eudoxical” 56). Only metaphors were able to describe such a
world, where the map becomes more real than the territory, and metaphorical literary
devices achieve this self-reflexively, depicting and enacting their own discursive and
epistemological power. Ultimately, Porush concludes, science must take back the
metaphor as part of its method in order to delay its impending collapse and advance its
goals of “mapping the territory,” and literature must accept center stage in culture as it is
tasked with producing not only new interpretations that are easily replaced, but new
knowledge (“Eudoxical” 60). Flusser's own metaphorical science of the Vampyroteuthis
makes objectivity more humane, and the repercussions for his readers are unpredictable
but profound over the course of their slow self-recognition. The autopoietic potential of
metaphorical creativity highlighted here, however, may be even more productive seen as
a complement instead of pure antithesis to deterministic logical machines, as explored
below.
Hypothesis #3: The only way is forward, and Flusser's urge to insert more
human freedom into the spinning of webs should be redefined in the current cultural
context to include the influence of machines. Even though Flusser feared most the
subordination of human will to machines, technology must first be accepted and
integrated into any attempt to redirect the course of cultural evolution. Potentialities can
be realized through machine technologies because they are direct manifestations of our
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linguistic realities, Flusser would agree, and yet perhaps can draw out and actualize
potential worlds that otherwise our words would not hit upon. Like hypotheses 1 and 2,
this approach too is rooted in the natural world and its human filtration, like any webspinning manual would be. After all, in the cultural environment of our second nature,
the biosphere and the technosphere evolve entwined. Flusser's metaphors crossing
traditional nature-culture boundaries appear to support interpretations of his theories on
human linguistic-technological culture that he seems to suggest but did not foresee. For
an orientation with which to spin new, more human webs, perhaps nature, humans, art
and machines must all interlace to produce the second nature he predicts.
Flusser roots his cultural theories in natural metaphors to describe how humans
filter nature's chaos through their pores, like his early arboreal model for reality-building
in which all selves are trees (Língua e Realidade 46). In this model the tree-self is rooted
by the senses in the fertile loam of “raw data” or chaos of reality before that reality is
comprehended. The information that is filtered through the radical pores journeys up the
trunk or the intellect, enacting the Ursprung or crucial jump across the abyss that exists
between raw data and word-thoughts. Once this informational “sap” reaches the crown,
Flusser instructs us, it is integrated into the leaves, fruits and flowers of the mind, spirit or
intuition. While this image acknowledges correspondences between vegetal and human
cultural growth, it is not sufficiently developed to explain the translation process that is
the foundation of web-building. Not until the metaphorical jump between chaos and
concepts is illustrated further in his cellular metaphor do potential directions for realityweaving come to light.
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Flusser turns yet again to biology to show how the human intellect, even in all its
neural complexity, functions like a single-celled organism in a very specific way (Vom
Zweifel 38). His extended metaphor illustrates the aforementioned naming process by the
intellect in which poetry's proper names, concrete manifestations of the inarticulable
abyss, are called or abstracted into conversation. This linguistic process functions
similarly to the digestive system of the unicellular amoeba, Flusser posits, which takes in
nourishment from the environment and metabolizes it into usable energy to live and
replicate. According to Flusser's model, the single-celled animal engulfs foreign objects,
these proper names, in its vacuoles and digests them into the protoplasma of
conversation, that is, into common names, words and concepts. The conversational
digestion process analyzes, critiques and abstracts verse into prose. The amoeba model
implies that critical analysis breaks up a whole into more useful parts, invoking an image
of dissection that Flusser clearly connected with rational categories. While these pieces
of dead poetry are necessary to the amoeba's and the human's functioning, they can
accumulate if out of balance. The only solution Flusser suggests to cleanse the culturesphere of conceptual waste is to un-name things, to critique this process of critique, to
doubt this doubt—which would be an “anti-poetry” or a falling into the inarticulable
abyss. Indeed, starting again at the abyss to allow poetry another go at spinning threads
and rearranging our pores could lead anywhere without a trusty conceptual map, but I
believe there is another possible orientation latent in Flusser's metaphor of the amoeba.
One of the roles nature metaphors play in Flusser's work is to suggest that an
understanding of cultural phenomena is enriched by an understanding of the natural
phenomena that are so much a part of our environment, regardless of how little we
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recognize the full extent to which they surface at the cultural level. Whether patterns of
wen or dissipative structures, the metaphorical leap across the crumbling nature-culture
boundary creates new connections from which new paradigms can evolve over time.
This was possibly Flusser's intuition, the reason human culture only seemed to make
sense metaphorically linked to nature. He does not reflect on his use of metaphor per se
but the seeds are there for a growing, organic scientific-artistic culture that more
accurately fits with the changing times. His metaphors perform a kind of intuition upon
which whole cultural edifices can be built from the inside out.
Unicellular organisms, for example, are odd creatures. Some, like the amoeba,
have no definite shape and move by morphing their flexible, growable membranes in
search of food. Others, like the simple slime mold cell, can join with other slime mold
cells under the right conditions and move together as a single multicellular superorganism. I want to extend Flusser's cellular metaphor to make a leap from biology to
human culture in the telematic age in the search for a new orientation with which to
restructure a second nature that keeps a sense of the human intact. The amoeba digesting
chaos into conversation makes sense to a certain point, but humans, among other
differences, are not solo swimmers in the frothing ocean of pre-information but always
social beings. Humans, particularly in the telematic age as Flusser describes it, build
their culture through connections to other humans, weaving their realities from inherited
and collaborated theories and texts, some centuries old. The whole fabric of the telematic
reality is the structure of information flow. What if the amoebas communicated with
each other? What if they were able to build super-organisms like the slime mold? Would
this better illustrate Flusser’s telematic creativity?
111

The principles of emergence describing the phenomenon of self-organization in
living and non-living beings have been observed in nature and culture at many different
scales—in cities, anthills, software and brains, as well as slime mold. They model the
way extreme complexity can arise from very simple starting conditions, something that
cannot be predicted by looking at the individual pieces of the puzzle. The whole is much,
much more than the parts. Emergence, as described by Steven Johnson, models the
evolution of structure and patterns without a central authority dictating the moves. In
sufficient quantities, very simple entities following very simple rules can act as a group,
evolving and adapting to the environment as a single entity, organizing from the bottom
up. No one is observing from above and giving orders, but each individual following its
own goals, like a motorist trying to get to work, interacts with others of its kind to
unconsciously generate overarching organizational patterns, like traffic jams. Johnson
narrates the translation from the equations for slime mold aggregation calculated in the
1960s to more recent computer algorithms that can successfully simulate slime mold
behavior in pixels: tiny red dots leaving green trails of “pheromones” on the screen that
other “cells” would encounter randomly and accordingly alter their behavior to maximize
their access to “food”—just like on a rotting log in the forest. Following this kind of
unconscious, bottom-up organization, computer programs that act like slime mold superorganisms can learn and evolve on their own in fulfillment of some task. This emergence
of higher-level order, of meta-organisms or intelligences Johnson sees in nature and
culture alike: “We like to talk about life on earth evolving out of the primordial soup. We
could just as easily say that the most interesting digital life on our computer screens today
evolved out of the slime mold” (17). Emergent behavior has always been a part of
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complex systems in nature, whether tornadoes or anthills or our own bodies and brains,
but human culture is successfully creating artificial emergence in computerized systems
designed to exploit the phenomenon in order to read patterns in human behavior and
accomplish other tasks too large and complex for the human mind. “Up to now, the
philosophers of emergence have struggled to interpret the world. But they are now
starting to change it” (Johnson 21).
Flusser's point is that after we recognize how our cultures or second natures are
created by our own metaphor-based language, we have the responsibility to take an active
part in destroying toxic conceptual structures that no longer fit our needs and hold us
back from growing in new directions. I only submit that the understanding developed
here of the way human beings weave a textual reality from perceptions through
metaphors into language must be combined with an understanding of the way individual
textual realities interweave—always to some extent unconsciously—to spin the
interconnected webs of culture. Flusser's portrayal of the oncoming telematic future
supports a view of humans' second nature as an interconnected flow of information which
organically evolves according to the principles of emergence. Turbulence, itself
emergent pattern in chaos, has always been a hallmark of a messy, complex human
culture that applies equally well to Flusser's models of the chaotic roiling pre-linguistic
ocean of possibilities out of which emerge self-organized systems like living cells and
brains and the products of brains and super-aggregates of cells. Not individually, but
taken together Flusser's metaphors overlap nature with culture and overlap with each
other to illustrate his theories and his vision of reality's text and humans' role as weavers.
Interweaving Art and Science
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Cultural text production depends on how we understand information
contextualization, or how meaning congeals from the ocean of chaos. One aspect of
meaning creation that presents itself in the present examination is the compatibility of
scientific and artistic texts in their powers of representing our second nature. Another is
their combined power to perform as well as describe reality. This ends up not merely
illustrating, as it sometimes does, but in every case actively building cultural structure
and quality, as even representations themselves create and spread ideas. When Bernhard
Dotzler comments on the interplay of science and literature in weaving together networks
of knowledge or reality, and that both epistemological methods are themselves equally
historical and valid networks of reality, he agrees that “[a]lle Literatur ... 'transportiert
sehr viel Wissen' ... [u]nd sie transportiert es nicht nur, sondern sie prozessiert das
Wissen auch. Sie verändert es, statt es bloß widerzuspiegeln” (319). The “two cultures”
need not only describe reality in parallel, but can communicate to produce new
knowledge beyond the culture border. Theo Elm also emphasizes the importance of
reading fiction and poetry for scientists—literature’s references to technology in its forms
of montage, randomness, nonlinearity and fractal structures is very close to our
technological reality, and can even serve as a prognosis of the catastrophic potentials of
our culture (56, 63). As low-risk models of potential future states, literature can play out
scenarios that science safely cannot. Catastrophe this time marks a culture in transition,
however, not in decay. In an age of crises of faith and doubt in permanent truths, the
cultural fabric appears at first glance to undermine its status as reality and perform a
distraught disorientation that mirrors a disorienting reality, and that itself disorients.
Truly, as past decades of science and literature have shown, some trusted paradigms and
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traditional conceptual edifices have been demolished, some have eroded and some
continue to suffocate. But according to Flusser, catastrophe and disorientation are only a
few of the possibilities of any culture's present state at any given moment, regardless how
the turbulence might appear to any single observer within the system. I believe the
scientific and artistic literature, in blurring some boundaries, have redrawn other
blueprints for reality, this time ones with holes left open for randomness and emergent
patterns that must remain unpredictable.
Cultural text production has also always involved interaction with nature,
negative, unconscious or otherwise, the result of human beings filtering information from
the environment. Culture arising out of nature, minds arising out of matter, humans
create sense in order to survive and thrive in a world made of bodies and ecosystems.
From the perspective of cybernetic theory, David Porush reminds us, information must be
redundant enough to produce patterns, and input slow enough to be digested by Flusser’s
amoeba; only then is it meaningful. Texts are meant to be read and are a product of
reading—the act of reading creates meaning by filtering and slowing down the flow of
information so that it can be comprehended and woven into the fabric of the intellect, to
use Flusser's word. Every theory is just a linguistic filter through which to organize and
make sense of information from the noise around it, Porush claims, and every observation
presupposes a theory, as Goethe believed (Soft 67). Thus every instrument of technology,
built in accordance with observations through linguistic filters, is partly the embodiment
of a theory about how to “read” nature’s text (Porush, Soft 67). That is where science
(whether kabbalah and alchemy or structuralism and AI research) reflects on its linguistic
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structure, in the search for a universal scientific language of as much “orderliness” as
nature itself exhibited in its forms and processes (Porush, Soft 4).
Axel Goodbody examines how literature too pursued a translation between
nature’s language and human language much earlier in the work of writers like
Paracelsus, Jakob Böhme, Goethe and Novalis (30). Later also what he terms
Heidegger’s ecopoetics gave poetry the task of articulating the silent language of nature
that is actually latent in human language through the act of naming, of preserving by
giving form to what had not yet been expressed (Goodbody 136). Goodbody cites Kate
Rigby’s examination of poetic naming which must aim to de-center the human subject as
opposed to ordinary language which is used to control nature. Rigby’s poetic naming is
similar to Flusser’s naming process both in its task to first foreground the materiality of
language, its sounds, rhythms, metrical and phonetic patterns, and then to weave a web of
different meanings that serve to mimic the complex interactions found in natural systems,
eventually centering language upon the world outside of the text, the sounds, motions,
colors and forms of the earth. For Rigby, the ultimate goal of poetic naming is to
acknowledge in such an attempt that human language just cannot express all that exists in
the world, and in granting the imperfect correspondence between word and thing, the text
should prepare to fail to orient the reader, falling into the incoherence of form without
content (Goodbody 139-140). When the crisis of disorientation arises as old filters are
applied to a changing natural-cultural environment, it is for Flusser more productive to
look for alternative orientations legible and writable out of the ocean of chaos—new
orientations that will one day be replaced with newer. If science has discovered a
universal language that can be broken down or recombined to represent the complexity of
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the current nature-human ecology, it could be the coding of linguistic processes into
binary code. With its use in solving problems that resemble human thought, and in
creating whole artificial worlds that can almost be perceived as real, the binary code has
already begun to restructure human experience through its own filter. The grammar that
could craft the code into algorithms that allow for chaos and unpredictability would be
the principles of emergence.
Webs Emerging from Metaphor Machines
The concept of emergent properties effortlessly links digital computer technology
and turbulent nature in a manner that productively supports Flusser's second nature and
the metaphors that create it. Important for this natural-digital union is the understanding
of cultural text production that weaves together whole civilizations not only as rooted in
the natural world, but also as functioning according to semi-mechanistic cultural rules.
To this end, David Porush's reconceptualization of texts as “reality-describing machines”
presents a provocative model of literature as a process of meaning-making that in effect
coagulates and synthesizes information from the chaos of the cultural environment. As
machines, cultural texts are self-reflexive “illustration[s] or incarnation[s] of a rule set”
for creating meaning (Porush, Soft 15). As a representation of some internal state, as a
communication between authors, readers and societies, and as a coded model of the
techniques or methods that combined to create it, the text can be seen as an artificial
intelligence (AI) device, so Porush. The text, like language itself, is under his definition
a “soft” or vulnerable machine, both rigid and flexible like the human body—structured
by rules but open to the outside, open to change, and often unpredictable. In an open
feedback loop always adapting to the environment, the text could be viewed as a culture
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machine that runs on metaphors, an “anti-mechanistic technology” or a cybernetic device
that aims to demonstrate that human expression cannot be modeled deterministically or
algorithmically (“Dissipative” 275). Taking mechanism to its logical extremes,
cybernetic fiction running on structured language manages to create silence, canceling
out code by writing opposite codes over each other to “dismantle” the machine, babbling
in “cut-up” language or increasing the bandwidth—adding noise or randomness to
increase entropy in the system (Soft 103-110). These anti-mechanistic techniques throw a
wrench in the deterministic machine of scientific certainty in a manner similar to
Flusser's anti-linguistic process of un-naming. Just so can art join science and technology
in a way that supports Flusser's concept of a second nature and that also has the power to
reorganize our conceptual webs. Bringing the engine of language to a standstill, silence
in the machine clears space for new rhythms to emerge.
Much more than a machine that runs itself haywire, Porush's soft machine of
literature uses metaphors to create new meaningful structures, or rather new meaning is
generated through metaphor from the textual collisions of unrelated things. Initiating a
“positive feedback loop of exploding interpretation,” metaphors “crystallize meaning in
multiple directions,” feeding off themselves to expand into territories previously
uncharted by the old frameworks (Porush, Soft 128). In short, Porush's textual “chaos
machine” is both a cybernetic machine that creates meaning out of noise from the cultural
environment, and a naturalistic dissipative structure (Prigogine's concept from chaos
theory) in which an unstable flux of information spontaneously gives rise to meaning
(“Dissipative” 293). Grounding a new reality in machine processes should be considered
now not incompatible with the turbulent, organic life that rules nature as we know it. A
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new perspective on an interconnected nature-culture like that afforded by Flusser's
writings is first required to move ahead into the future telematic possibilities realizable in
anti-mechanistic technologies. Flusser's metaphors support this understanding of human
technological culture's roots in logical rules and anti-mechanistic chaos, and the equal
roles that science and art share in knowledge production.
The final step thus leads back to the vampyroteuthis. To fully correspond with
Flusser's vision of human creative freedom in the building of our second nature, we must
return to our vampyroteuthian side. This creature—myth, metaphor and science in one—
in whose collective memory remains the tendency toward anthills, is born in clusters of
countless siblings and carries within itself the struggle between individual freedom and
egalitarian cooperation. Flusser's typically numerous contradictions within the treatise on
the vampire squid blends a glorification of the animal's intersubjective communication
and a demonization of its “hellish anthill” socialism (Vampyroteuthis 58). Flusser's
telematic society, however, requires such an interdependence between individuals, as
without a receiver there is no sender of information, and things, organic and inorganic,
are only “knottings together” of relations (“The City” 235). The more interdependent,
the more interconnected and the longer information is protected from entropy in the
immaterial “knots” in the net. Embryonic squids, amoebas, or plankton in the ocean of
chaos, Flusser's metaphors together generate new blueprints for web-spinning in the
minds of his readers. At the microscopic scale, the textual fabric of human culture is
made up of perceptual and conceptual metaphors which make up the human/arachnid
nodes in the overlapping fields of relations, and the spiders in turn spin webs out of
metaphors at the scale of human experience. A macroscopic or universal view would see
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webs interweaving with webs, if they were visible at all, and the emergence of something
unpredictable and chaotic taking shape via countless engines of linguistic creation: a
second-nature super-organism.
Just as brains emerge from the communication between neurons, anthills from
interactions between individual ants, and tornadoes from interactions between distant air
currents, there is no predicting what direction the potential nature-culture super-organism
could take, what dangers lie dormant and what creative freedom is possible in the
emergent meta-webs. Flusser's metaphors are woven in the direction of interlocutors who
must take responsibility for understanding metaphor's methods and mechanisms and
consequently for redirecting the fabric towards a more human balance of forces. His own
writing, however, leads in paths even he could not foresee, for that is the work of
metaphor in a text. While Flusser calls for humans' individual freedom to decide and
create, his theories, language and metaphors suggest the possibility of something less
independent and more interdependent with machines and nature. If there is a sense of
resignation in Flusser's call to broadly fight the good fight for humanity, it need not be
read as an acceptance of the inevitable collapse of freedom under mechanism and chance.
Instead, through metaphor-based texts and technologies, larger systems may emerge
spontaneously from the chaos of Bodenlosigkeit in ways that require and produce a
greater degree of interconnectivity. Flusser's allusions to a united world memory or
global nervous system clarified in the previous chapters permit an understanding of
human culture as a potential super-organism of intersubjective communication. If
humans are still to insert their creative intention to the whole, we might not be able to
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predict and control the emergent structure of the webs we spin, but we can always
experiment with how we program the algorithms.
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IV: Sand
The Digital Connection in Nature, Technology and World Creation

Under the microscope, nature and culture at the molecular level both look the
same to the Flusserian eye. This perspective affords the kind of creativity Flusser
imagines for the immediate future of his telematic society. The first chapter of this study
examined through Flusser's metaphors how human culture re-synthesizes nature's bits and
pieces into a negentropic, purposefully directed second nature, a seamless nature-culture
blend. The second chapter explained that when the world is understood as both natural
and artificial, science and art can play equal roles in the creative synthesis. The third
chapter showed how this combined epistemology helps humans understand nature's bits
and laws enough to playfully nudge them into improbable configurations. Relying on
both metaphor and machine technology to allow these configurations to emerge brings
the creative impulse further by explaining the world as something we ourselves project
and can therefore change. These interconnected paradigm shifts Flusser so adamantly
urges work to effect a shift in how humans perceive the world; it makes us aware of our
porous skins. Flusser's method of merging opposite concepts like nature/culture and
art/science overlaps very different conceptual nets to create new information filters with
different-sized holes through which different-sized bits of information may flow. Once
we recognize that we can alter our filtration nets, and thus the world we perceive, once
we know the rules of the game and possess the tools—to use his terminology—all that is
needed are the parts, the playing pieces.
This final chapter examines closely the last stages of Flusser's media philosophy
from the late 1980s and early 1990s as it breaks down humans' entire second nature into
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its tiniest parts to reveal aspects of a digital structure in what are often considered nondigital phenomena. Seeing the same digital structure in nature as in computers means for
Flusser that humans can digitally manipulate and even re-create substances and life forms
of natural origin in fulfillment of human cultural desires and requirements. The digital
connection Flusser finds between computer technology and nature can be problematic if
it alienates or deceives human beings, he warns, or reduces living things to random piles
of isolated cells and genes, but he emphasizes rather that the relationships between
particles are the real meaning and substance of life. New patterns, objects and even life
forms can be created by manipulating pixels, cells and genes as part of an interconnected
whole, a system out of which unpredictable novelty can emerge through the interaction of
chaos and machines. Understanding the world as digital allows humans to recreate it
with their digital technology not against, but in cooperation with nature's laws. An
examination of Flusser's understanding of digitality in nature and its connection to digital
technology will be supported by additional theoretical approaches to the digital in nature
and ultimately applied to concrete examples of artistic practices Flusser could only
imagine. This analysis, then, will serve not only to further explain and support the
preceding sections of this study, but also to draw out future directions for human
creativity inherent to Flusser's metaphorical media philosophy.
Flusser's Digital Nature
At the most basic level, Flusser views natural and cultural phenomena alike as
clusters of particles that can be broken apart and rearranged into other relational
configurations. As explained in previous chapters, his metaphors describe the world as
watery clouds of trembling plankton particles or grains of sand that congeal into islands
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and dissolve again in an entropic cycle of random, temporary information creation, a
process humans want to harness to purposefully play chance against chance to conquer
entropic death. Many of his metaphors treated earlier in this study can be overlapped to
focus on the same referent, the world as tiny specks full of creative potential for human
beings. Flusser's call for art to take us back through the un-naming process to the preconceptual or pre-filtered wordless soup from chapter three parallels his call for a
conscious return to the bubbling broth of unrealized possibilities with the creative
Schöpflöffel from chapter one. Seeing the world's particulate nature, Flusser sees not
objects but objects that could be: the borders between objects dissolve and the eye might
easily arrange the particles into other configurations. Zooming in this close on reality
makes reality not disappear, Flusser would say, but a little less real, to the point where
other realities would be equally possible.
Seeing this particle mass is all a function of human rationality, which according to
Flusser's etymological analysis stems from the ability to cut things up into rations (“Das
Ende” 53). After scientific reason divided objects into atoms and individuals, “(Man
vergisst oft, dass 'Individuum' und 'Atom' synonym sind),” it later proved itself
“schneidiger:” the cutting turned eternal, atoms turned into neutrinos and quarks,
individuals into actomes and decidemes, and in the end they all started to lose their reality
(“Das Ende” 53). In this way, Flusser wants to see the whole world as a mixed-up cloud
of indistinguishable animal-vegetable-mineral particles. Of utmost importance here is
not to stop after this dissection into the unreal subjunctive cloud of isolated particles and
lose one's orientation in an absurd Bodenlosigkeit, but to reassemble them (or prompt
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them to reassemble themselves) into a networked ecosystem through a combination of
art, technology and nature's blind chance.
Ist ein Quark, dieses Atomteilchen, nicht eher so etwas wie eine Gleichung? Und
ist ein Aktom, dieses Teilchen einer individuellen Handlung, nicht eher eine
objektive Bewegung, wenn ich es in einen Roboter gefüttert habe? In diesem
Teilchengewimmel verschwimmen Atome und Individuen, Objekte und Subjekte,
subatomare Prozesse erweisen sich als von individueller Beobachtung abhängig,
und Maschinen beginnen, wenn mit Dezidemen gefüttert, Schach zu spielen, sich
zu entscheiden. So kommt die Vernunft, auf dem langen Umweg durch die
Wissenschaft, darauf, was die Worte schon immer wussten: Subjekt und Objekt
sind relative Begriffe, Atome und Individuen sind Fiktionen, und real ist das
Verhältnis, der Sachverhalt, die Subjekt-Objekt-Vernetzung. (“Das Ende” 53)
Here are the nuts and bolts behind his theories of intersubjective relational fields and
immaterial information exchange presented previously: it all comes down to the relations
between the tiniest particles, their abstract, calculable nature. The calculi are the playing
pieces in this game of second nature—what can calculate can create.
Even before our powers of abstraction and rationality, perceiving the world in
particle form is for Flusser always also a function of the physical human body. Flusser's
microscope examines the human brain and sensory organs as conglomerations of digitally
distinct calculi all working in the function of calculation—information that processes
information, natural beings creating culture naturally, digitally. Because the sensory
nervous system “empfängt punktförmige Stösse,” that is, “digital kodierte Reize” or
“Informationen,” perceiving an object as real just means that the central nervous system
has sufficiently “computed” or “processed” the incoming information bits (“Das Ende”
53). “[D]ank zum Teil schon durchblickter elektromagnetischer und chemischer
Methoden,” Flusser writes of the central nervous system—not of a machine—“[werden]
diese Reize, diese Informationen im System prozessiert, um verschiedenartige Komplexe
zu bilden, etwa Wahrnehmungen, Empfindungen, Gefühle oder Gedanken” (“Das Ende”
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53). Furthermore, the central nervous system itself Flusser reduces to a swarm of point
elements which receives and computes the similarly-shaped point elements of internal
and external stimuli. As both sides of the subject-object relation are of the same stuff,
Flusser would say, perception has really to do with an overlapping of multiple fields of
possibilities, to use his term—now more real, now less real: dreams differ from waking
life only in that they are more poorly processed by the central nervous system.
As bodies and environmental stimuli blur into one and the same “foaming” ocean
of possibilities, subjects and objects are only real to varying degrees, Flusser writes.
Everything, including humans, is so saturated with this ocean that from up close we are
all made of water:
Dieser Ozean von Möglichkeiten, worin wir schwimmen, durchdringt uns. (Wie
ja Tiefseeorganismen, wenn analysiert, sich als spezialisiertes Meerwasser
erweisen.) Das, was wir “ich” nennen, ist eine unter den Wellen des Ozeans der
Möglichkeiten. Die Wellen toben und schäumen, weil jede vom Drang erfüllt ist,
immer wahrscheinlicher zu werden, immer näher an diesen Grenzwert zu
dringen, den wir “Wirklichkeit” nennen. Dieses Drängen und Schäumen der
Wellen, dieser Drang der Möglichkeiten nach Realität, heisst “Zukunft” (“Das
Ende” 53).
Again the creatures of the deep come to our aid in observing our own kind, here the
human subject is a “floating island” in the ocean of possibilities that grows more real the
more “waves from the future” break upon our shores (“Das Ende” 54). Neither self nor
world ever reach reality's hazy horizon, remaining only temporary constellations of
points, “extrapolations” from the undulating ocean of possibilities, “Leichen, die aus dem
Toben der Virtualitäten herausgefischt wurden” (“Das Ende” 54). Because bodies and
minds are no longer Whats, but rather Hows—not things, but processes by which
“virtualities,” potentialities, are realized—technology need not focus on changing things
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in the world, Flusser insists, but can instead create whole other “real” worlds like
Aphrodite out of foam.
At Flusser's moment in human history, the realness continuum and the turbulent
waves of the possible must be digitized in order to be manipulated. Writing just at the
end of his life, in the last decade of the 20th century, Flusser already sees technology
creating digitally, so that he writes that quality must be converted into quantity, and the
world, Aphrodite's “schaumgeborene Schönheit,” must be recoded into numbers, blown
apart to its tiny bubbles (“Das Ende” 54). Reality is a function of probability, Flusser
explains, something that can indeed be quantified. The more improbable something is,
the more information it contains, the less entropy is present, and the closer together the
molecules are located—for, as Flusser defines it, “'real' sei eine Funktion der Dichte der
Streuung von Virtualitäten,” a function of the relative distance between atoms, molecules,
pixels or otherwise (“Das Ende” 54). When the stimuli are more densely distributed, or
as Flusser says, better defined, they will be processed in the central nervous system as
real, he explains, whereas a looser distribution will be registered as unreal. If a wooden
table is perceived as more real than a hologram of the same table, Flusser writes, it is
only because the technology of the holograph has defined the stimuli more poorly than
the central nervous system can process it, a circumstance that will change in the future.
Flusser imagines a future in which “unser Zentralnervensystem definiert aus den
Möglichkeiten eine Welt, die wir als real wahrnehmen, und andere Systeme definieren
andere, alternative, ebenso als real wahrgenommene Welten” (“Das Ende” 54). It is a
question of quantity, of density of distribution and condensation, by which Flusser means
to say it is a question of processing chance.
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Flusser's project for humanity rests in part on what he sees as science's return to
Democritean atomism, where all things are created by chance particle collisions.
According to Flusser's customary etymological analysis, Democritus believed that “alles
sei ein Produkt des Zufalls. Mit 'Zufall' meinte er, was das Wort sagt, nämlich das
Zufallen eines Teilchens auf ein anderes. Die wie Regentropfen parallel fallenden
Teilchen weichen ein wenig von ihren Bahnen ab, fallen zueinander, und so sind
überhaupt alle Sachen entstanden“ (Flusser, “Das Ende” 54). Further, the process by
which humans and their central nervous systems arose is for Flusser too improbable to be
explained by chance alone, although such explanations correspond to some of the most
recent scientific theories on the origin of life and the universe. Linking chance with
necessity, Flusser figures that all possibilities must necessarily come about when the
universe operates according to the laws of chance—it is only a matter of time before all
possible configurations of particles would randomly, and therefore necessarily, occur.
All possible worlds, so Flusser, must necessarily emerge randomly from the ocean of
possibilities over the course of a sufficiently long span of time. Contrary to negating all
value in purposeful human creation, however, this formulation actually fundamentally
supports Flusser's central emphasis on the importance of humans' artistic creative
freedom. Understanding the science behind nature's ways, as far as it is possible, makes
clear that intention is necessity inverted, that “'Absicht' meint jetzt den ausserordentlich
beschleunigten Zufall,” purposefully skipping steps in nature's random sequence of
particle collisions (“Das Ende” 55).
A direct consequence of humans' power to accelerate chance groupings of atoms
and molecules is Flusser's belief that living organisms can therefore just as easily be
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created as nonliving objects by inverting nature's laws—that the course of genetic
evolution can be manipulated in exactly this way with technology sufficiently advanced.
Creative computation turns necessity into intention, the uninterrupted slow progression of
random particle collisions into improbably accelerated chance. When biological
evolution is a dice game, Flusser reasons, when the playing pieces are genes and all
possible genotypes must necessarily and randomly arise, the evolutionary game “lässt
sich numerisieren, kodifizieren, und in Computer füttern” to be so processed that what
would take billions of years may pass by in a number of hours (“Das Ende” 55).
Previously unimaginable life forms should emerge from the ocean of possibilities with
the slightest tweak of an algorithm and its expression in genes expressed in phenotypes.
This, perhaps Flusser's most surprising, if not “somewhat Utopian” example, as he admits
himself, should eventually contribute to whole “alternative” ecosystems being born from
the frothing ocean of not-yet-realized potentialities (“Das Ende” 55). The same basic
process of accelerated computation of chance conditions underlies cyberspace, virtual
reality and other simulation capabilities Flusser mentions, that were just emerging when
these words were published in the year of his death. With these examples Flusser means
to herald a new form of creativity based on quantifying qualities, recoding experience
into theory, and calculating probabilities. Such game strategies will allow us to create
alternative worlds—“alternative Räume und Zeiten, mit alternativen Sachen und
Lebewesen, und (warum nicht?) alternative Menschen” and has already begun to free us
“von der Tyrannei einer angeblichen Realität” (“Das Ende” 55). Freed from reality's
unattainable horizon, the constraints of selves and objects dissolve into “lauter sich
häufende und überlagernde Seifenblasen,” and creating whole worlds from the foam of
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our particulate second nature evolves humans in turn to a homo ludens, “eine zweite
Menschwerdung” (“Das Ende” 55). Instead of despairing as our sense of reality
vanishes, we are freed for a life of the ultimate artistic creativity.
Regardless of what Aphroditean beauty we may birth from the semi-real foam,
however, Flusser cautions that no new worlds will be intrinsically any more meaningful
than the first one, and humans must not expect to become any less absurd. Such a view is
in fact the very precondition for our creative freedom. One of two strategies Flusser
presents for surviving worlds acknowledged as changeable yet absurd, the evolution to
homo ludens permits us to throw our button-pushing fingertips into the swirl of nature's
game of blind chance and speed it up to our delight, deliberately manipulating the playing
pieces simply to amuse ourselves. If “dumb nature” were to automatically realize all
possibilities contained within it regardless of human intervention, “[w]e can produce
wonders a little more intelligent than the idiotic wonder of nature (of which we ourselves
are a good example): a little more intelligent atoms, molecules, living organisms, human
beings” (“Wondering” 107). The artistic response is that of the homo ludens. The
second strategy for surviving a world perceived to be absurd is to confront it “by going it
one better:”
let us be deliberately absurd. Let us admit that science and technology are absurd
gestures, that “artificial” wonders are absurd wonders, and let us make these
gestures and produce these wonders precisely because they are absurd. This is a
familiar answer, aphorized long ago by credo quia absurdum: I believe it because
it is absurd. This is the answer given by homo religiosus. (“Wondering” 107)
Thus, all possible realities are open to us in our search to weave a cloak of humanness
over the abyss of Bodenlosigkeit. When one reality web randomly, entropically
disintegrates to its absurd parts, a more appropriate one can congeal that forms new

130

connections and new meanings, even if only temporary. What matters for Flusser are the
complex connections between selves/things, a rich intersubjective field of relations
processed at the microscopic level. Digitality, defined more extensively in the following
sections, pervades Flusser's nature as a mass of particles that interact dynamically, and
once understood, can be rearranged by humans into more meaningful relationships.
Computing Nature
Breaking apart the environment into bits, digits or atoms opens nature to direct
manipulation by computer technology. The particle nature of the raw materials combined
with the process of calculating the particles' collisions provides the fundamental tools
with which artists/scientists may intentionally accelerate the accidents of nature to
produce new, temporary, but perhaps more human worlds. When Flusser explains the
particulate universe in detail, he bases his description on the general big-bang and heatdeath theories from physics, narrating the process in his own terms as an expansion of a
“cloud of gas and dust particles” spreading out towards ever-increasing entropic heat
death, which despite the name, actually refers to a lack of heat and information where all
particles of matter/energy are uniformly distributed, that is to say, too far apart to cohere
into objects (“Wondering” 106). Random but necessary collisions create temporary
clusters of particles that synthesize information in the form of molecules, planets,
organisms and the like, only to subsequently degrade and dissipate again as entropy
gradually and inevitably gains the upper hand. The whole effect of Flusser's take on the
birth and death of the universe gives his reader a sense of a smooth flux of particles
alternating between density (things) and sparsity (nothingness).
We may call the particles “energy” and the clusters “matter” if we keep in mind
that these terms are relative to each other, for “matter” is closely packed energy,
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and “energy” is loosely distributed matter. The pattern followed by the spreading
cloud can be plotted as overlapping fields of particles, clusters, and emptiness.
We shall then find that we ourselves are clusters wherein several fields
intermingle. (“Wondering” 106)
Fitting together a smooth flux of time and distinct particle clusters into constantly
changing matter-energy fields, Flusser manages to emphasize the quantifiable nature of
life's mysteries.
Particles, human beings and planets, that is to say, can all be plotted as wavy field
grids at a level of definition only possible on electronic processors. Crucial for Flusser's
creative project is the access to computer technology that can calculate the algorithms
describing the actions of these particles. Such technology first allows humans to
visualize the translation from algorithm to universe in ways previously impossible.
Simply by typing the algorithms governing nature's physical laws “(Einstein's relativity
equation, and so forth)” into a computer programmed to carry out the mathematical tasks
would cause apparitions like “[w]irelike nets...to show the patterns of the fields” and
“baglike protuberances” in the nets to be actualized on the computer screen
(“Wondering” 106). The protuberances, Flusser explains, should be read as heavenly,
vegetal, animal and human bodies of varying degrees of complexity, all made up of the
same subatomic bits in different configurations. All these forms arise and dissolve on the
screen in a somewhat fluid motion that condenses millennia of galaxy formation into a
handful of minutes.
If we “animate” the image, we may watch these protuberances form and
complexify. Then, gradually they will grow shallower, until finally they fade back
into the regular grid of the nets. The spectacle will end when all the net's
irregularities have disappeared without trace, when the pattern stretches uniformly
(without form) in every direction. If we feel like it, we may call this happy (or
unhappy) end of our computer-generated video “thermic death.” (“Wondering”
106)
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Again writing very late into his career, Flusser finally finds in digital technology the
means to visualizing his earlier theories of nature's entropy (“heat death”) and culture's
negentropy as elaborated in the preceding chapters.
Not only are digital computers essential for making sense of nature's complexities,
visualizing its hidden order and chaos and reorganizing it into possible second natures,
but for Flusser this is because they also share at their most fundamental level some of the
same basic structures as nature itself. Beyond describing nature's particulate consistency
and the random collisions that build and destroy its molecules, organisms and solar
systems, Flusser goes so far as to equate the generative potency of nature's forces with
the information processing capabilities of digital technology. The clearest example of
this view is his metaphor translating wind turbulence into digital computation. The
calculi, or small pebbles used for counting, are in this case truly both inorganic mineral
compounds as well as abstract tools of calculation. Flusser's metaphor explains that the
wind “calculates” the physical world, grinding it up into grains of dirt or sand and
computing them like 1s and 0s into new combinations, “daß [der Wind] den faßbaren,
besitzbaren Grund in Körner zerreibt (kalkuliert), diese zerstreut (dispensiert), um sie
dann zu Dünen zu häufen (zu komputieren)“ (Von der Freiheit 61). Flusser's obvious
statement is that the chaotic natural world as it has existed since before human influence
relies on the same strategies of digital computation that also govern humans'
technological inventions. This further implies, however, that humans in coordination
with digital computer technology need only to comprehend and extend nature's particlecalculating power in order to create a second nature that really is natural as well as
cultural, a cultural extension of nature. To harness the turbulent winds of chance and
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necessity is to intentionally sweep sand into dunes that would have occurred anyway,
only much later.
Of course, from previous chapters it is clear that Flusser's crisis of science sees
humans now doubting the eternal truth of nature's laws, as he suggests that the human
scientific observer instead projects an invented order onto natural phenomena in order to
explain them. It cannot be argued that Flusser was not fundamentally influenced by the
burgeoning digital technology of his day before suddenly noticing everywhere the
digitality in the organic world around him. However, Flusser's theories have always been
above all a product of his own social and technological context, a fact he not only does
not deny, but on which he bases his most fundamental claims. What he never forgets is
that four-, three-, two-, one- and zero-dimensional codes are still always present in
culture simultaneously in different ratios at different times, and because the digital code
weighs in heaviest at this fleeting moment in the universe, it is digitally that we must
explore our creative potential and our changed relationship with nature, others and
ourselves. Smooth continua and analog processes must be converted or read through
digital lenses at this moment, because that is the type of tool most highly developed, and
their creative potential is far from exhausted. Humans' digital skin is but one way to
filter, process, conceptualize and manipulate information, one well enough understood to
inspire the imagination as well as be practically implemented.
Digitality Before Pixels
The digital logic of computer technology is by no means necessarily a natural
phenomenon, but it can, also for other thinkers besides Flusser, describe some of nature's
most basic structures and organization, and even that of some earlier technologies and
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communication media considered non- or pre-digital. Reduced to its basic elements, the
smallest building blocks used to create information, technology normally defined as
digital is founded on the countless variations created by juxtaposing two distinct bits of
information, Yes and No. It is regulated and produced according to programs which are
numerical algorithms written originally by humans in a basic binary code of 1s and 0s.
The discreet digits are either one or zero, yes or no, on or off – tertium non datur.
Because of this elemental opposition, these digits can be combined and rearranged in
innumerable ways to produce a wealth of information in spite of their initial simplicity.
This translates eventually into computer programs which users operate on a higher level,
that is, more removed from the binary code, which can be altered one piece at a time just
like the ones and zeros upon which the programs are based. Since the most basic digital
code is written into numerical algorithms which write the operational programs into a
higher alphanumerical computer language which in turn dictate the formation of an
interface between the human user and the machine readable in a commonly spoken
human language, the foundational binary code disappears in the higher levels of
programming to the users at the top. Eventually, someone who can neither read nor write
nor make any sense of a binary code or even algorithmic and computer programs can
productively use and manipulate text, images, sound and video files with relative ease.
It is true that without computers the binary code would not have all the
applications it does today, but neither code nor computation machines were invented
from scratch in Flusser's century. Digitality, if it may be called so, can be traced as a
concept much further back in time, even without Flusser, and can be understood much
more fundamentally in the distinction that Gregory Bateson makes between numbers that
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can be counted and quantities that can be measured. Discontinuous integers can be
accurately counted, avoiding the approximation inherent in measurements in general.
Distinct integers or elements, therefore, are responsible for the formation of regular
patterns and are the basis of digital computation. Continuous quantities, on the other
hand, add an element of unpredictability to any sequence and necessitate analogical and
probabilistic computation (Bateson 49). Bateson’s point is that a balance of both digital
and analog processes are necessary for the physical life of nature just as much as for the
cognitive life of the mind, two worlds he wants to prove are intertwined in structure and
function. In biological evolution, for example, all acquired somatic adaptations are
quantitative (in his sense, as opposed to numerical) or analogical, while the DNA and the
resulting embryological development it encodes for, the central nervous system included,
can be considered digital in nature (Bateson 181). Further, human cognition, which he
understands to begin with tautologies that develop into theorems, resembles the digitally
patterned unfolding of embryology while the learning process involves a creativity
similar to analogical biological adaptation (Bateson 221). Flusser might ignore the nondigital structure of human learning or creativity, but he also does not define nature as
only digital, merely emphasizing digital properties over others also present. As such, an
understanding of Flusser's view is well supported by Bateson's perspective which defines
and recognizes digital elements and their commonly opposed analogical elements in
natural processes far predating and much further beyond the phenomenon of electronic
computing technology.
A number of other highly developed theoretical and observational analyses of
digitality in the natural world existed many centuries before Bateson’s 1979 synthesis.
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Siegfried Zielinski undertakes an examination of some partially forgotten examples in his
“anarchaeology” or “variantology” of media technologies and their theoretical
foundations. He describes, for instance, how the theoretical physicist Erwin
Schroedinger stressed the ancient Greeks’ conceptualization of nature and emphasized
the importance of Democritus’ atomistic philosophy, all at about the same time that Alan
Turing was inventing the forerunner of the modern computer (Zielinski 42). Zielinski’s
anarchaeological exposition highlights the Greek philosopher Empedocles, firstly, who
thought of the natural world as an interaction between the forces of attraction and
repulsion which mixed the basic natural elements in a constant flow towards and away
from nothing in particular. All objects were then encased in porous skins which absorbed
or repelled the constant stream of elements according to how the shape of the pores
matched the form of the flowing elements. Democritus, considered by many to be the
father of atomistic philosophy, independently conceived of a flow similar to that of
Empedocles, with all matter, solid or otherwise, consisting of tiny imperceptible
indivisible particles or “atoms” which are in constant motion in the void which surrounds
them. Perception, however, was not immediate between the skins of objects/subjects
(both the perceiver and the perceived are interacting with each other reciprocally), but
rather the motion of the particles compressed the air between the objects/subjects to form
a kind of image or interface. Similarities between Flusser's theories and the philosophies
of both Empedocles and Democritus are obvious, the latter of which Flusser explicitly
cites, as seen above. The continuously moving flow of tiny particles, porous skins that
filter them and even the image between skins are not incompatible with Flusser's theories
of entropic cycles, particle clusters and translational (metaphorical) perception.
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Zielinski records that Democritean principles inspired Plato, Plotinus, the
Neoplatonic philosophers, as well as the later magical natural philosophers of the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (45). Later on, thinkers from the seventeenth century
like Anathasius Kircher, Ramon Lull and Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz, inspired by theories
of the particulate distribution of matter and energy, drew up complex combinatorial
diagrams describing the world as a network of relations between things that could be
calculated as well as rearranged (Zielinski 118,143,147). While Leibniz created a binary
system around 1700 transposing the alphabet into zeros and ones, influencing later
attempts at long-distance communication with on-off blinking lights and sounds,
Zielinski traces the actual beginnings of the binary code for human communication back
to Sir Francis Bacon, who in the early seventeenth century was working on a universal
language by transcribing all the letters of the alphabet into multiple permutations of just
the two letters “a” and “b” (Zielinski 185). The road to the modern day electronic
computer shares these deceptively simple origins, passing through manifestations in
diverse fields of research and praxis. One of the most important applications of binary
code, for example, were the holes punched onto cards for either “up” or “down”
directions on the textile loom in the eighteenth century by French mechanics including
Joseph Marie Jacquard, introducing the idea of programmable machines. Charles
Babbage, of course, used programmable cards for his computer prototype in the
nineteenth century, the Analytical Engine—the same kind of punch cards that were
adopted for mechanical writing by the firm that became IBM (Manovich 24, Zielinski
236). Any direct influence of binary on Flusser's theories of cultural production as textile
weaving described in the preceding chapter would have to be only conjectural, although
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his linguistic web weaving is not incompatible with his digital world creation, and as
shown below, he does believe that the binary code arose out of the linear alphabet. In
any case, the view that human culture was digital long before electronic computation is
exactly Flusser's point.
Flusser himself draws on human culture's binary history to find particles and the
intervals between them in pre-digital technology like his own typewriter which “stutters”
or “goes 'click'” because the whole world stutters in a Democritean numeration or
digitization (“Why Do Typewriters” 62). His theories reach much further back, however,
into past forms of human communication to locate the beginnings of digitality's evolution
from the written alphabet thousands of years ago. According to Flusser's history of code
switches, the digital or zero-dimensional point code arose out of the one-dimensional line
of the written alphabet when numbers were “freed” from the alphanumeric texts of
science and art (Die Schrift 29). Connecting the aforementioned concepts of the wordless
soup or ocean of possibilities and the spider webs of human culture, Flusser describes
these alphanumeric texts as “nets” that strain information from the “amorphous broth,”
creating describable and countable things (Die Schrift 28). With the development of
mathematics and the modern sciences, numbers were “lifted” out from the texts, Flusser
writes, out of their strictly linear order, and with a simple calculator the world becomes a
living, nonliving and social mosaic of interrelated and re-combinable calculi, genes,
atomic particles and individual human minds (Die Schrift 29). Simplified to the binary
code, Flusser explains, numbers can then be used by humans to realize the impossible or
visualize the invisible, like fractal algorithms unfolding on a pixellated screen or human
bodies altered to our own designs.
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In Flusser's theory, the alphabet origins of the digital code reveal a latent digitality
even in linear writing. Viewing letters, phonemes and morphemes as info-bits in their
own right (the world's “oldest culturemes”), Flusser's information theory views writing
itself as a process of creating new, improbable information out of language according to
orthographic rules (Die Schrift 33). Part of the intersubjective cultural spider web,
Flusser believes, the written text, a half-fabric waiting for its potential meanings to be
realized by its reader-weavers, consists only of horizontal threads open to the vertical
threads of meaning added by each individual reader. The reader, so Flusser, is to add
meaning through critique: plucking particles out of the pile like chickens pecking at
kernels of corn scattered in the sand. Seemingly different than his aforementioned
dialogical process of reading as simpatía or harmonic co-vibrations with the author and
his or her cultural environment, this critical reading process is scientific, a “rätselratendes
Lesen,” basically a conceptual rearranging of parts of linear sentences into a
multidimensional thought-image or concept (Die Schrift 78). However, the writer of such
a text first orders such concepts or images into lines to be later deciphered, Flusser
believes, occupying the other end of the conversation in a digital version of dialogue.
The consequence of the interchangeability of alphabet letters is then the precondition for
the change from a line-dominant code to a digital one. On the digital side, it is one of the
fundamental conditions for creative freedom in the sparser form of numbers, and finally
binary. According to Flusser's vision, Dichtung as a modulation of phonemes, a game of
multiple meanings, can in the future become the “opposite of imitation,” not just
reproducing situations already present, but creating entirely new models for how we
experience and perceive the environment (Die Schrift 74). Instead of authoring complete,
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intentionally designed texts, images and objects, the new Dichter will choose the best
permutations from among the end states of a randomized program combining numbers
and spontaneously realizing possibilities that emerge unpredictably.
Although Flusser breaks apart sentences into their component letters and
numbers, it is clear that digital creativity in a telematic society depends on a two-step
non-linearity. Not only must a line divide into its constituent points, but the points must
reorganize into different formations, following different methods. As the world
disintegrates into points, as it becomes calculable, Flusser writes, the points must be
brought back together again, that is, they must be computed. Computation for Flusser
means scattering, using chance to dictate the placement of points instead of planning out
lines beforehand. Instead of measuring rods, the computing agent rather follows the wind
(randomness, chaos) as it sweeps sand grains to dunes or blows plant seeds to fall and
sprout where they may. Deftly equating sedentary agricultural societies with the linear
written code, Flusser examines the building of cultures metaphorically as the sowing of
seeds. Examining Western culture's linearity born from agricultural developments in the
Roman Empire, Flusser describes how “setting” seeds into rows gives laws to nature,
making it legible: Gesetz. It is difficult but necessary, he writes, to transcend that Roman
farmer who is bound to our contemporary culture by the “zahlreichen Fäden” of our
science, art, religion and politics (“Pünktlich” 9). Breaking out of the old cultural webs
and spinning a new one in the gesture of Streuen, scattering seeds to create new
information and cultures plays with the laws of linear cultures, programming them to
follow the winds of chance, falling according to Zufall.
Wohin ein einzelner Samen fällt, ist Zufall, weil bei seinem Fallen zahlreiche,
(vielleicht zahllose), Gesetze gegen einander spielen, (das Gesetz des freien Falls,
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die Gesetze der Dynamik, des Elektromagnetismus, der Meteorologie, (von
anderen ganz zu schweigen). Der streuende Sämann ist legitimer als der
setzende...und daher wird seine Ernte desto reicher. (“Pünktlich” 12)
Scattering is collaboration with nature for the sake of a richer harvest, zooming in
on the borders between order and chaos (culture and nature, respectively) to the point
where they bleed together in a gray zone below the level of linear culture. Going back to
the amorphous broth of possibilities, deliberately playing with nature's laws instead of
only fighting against them should yield realities heretofore unimaginable. It is important
to remember from chapter one of this study that the freely creating mind in the telematic
environment itself arose by those laws of nature that it tries to control, the creative ladle
made out of soup, creating out of soup. Keeping with the agricultural metaphor, Flusser
postulates in his last unfinished book Menschwerdung that the science of the future shall
thus begin outside on the open field, knowing that the self, or the farmer's house, is
nothing but another random phenomenon growing out of the dirt. The mind, Flusser
writes, itself made of tiny grains scattered in electromagnetic fields, sows its cultural
seeds—spins its webs—in an intentionally random gesture of scattering, letting a second
nature grow out organically from the scattering hand. Instead of drawing lines separating
order from chaos, a digital creativity will compute natural and cultural particles alike into
new formations more appropriate to the changing telematic situation. “Es geht um eine
schöpferische Denkart: nicht mehr weiter im Feld Furchen graben, und damit immer
leerere Intervalle öffnen, sondern im Gegenteil aus dem gähnenden Nichts positive
Verhältnisse, (Komputationen), zu schöpfen” (“Pünktlich” 22).
Fragmentation, nonlinearity, a paradoxical interconnectivity of isolated
particles—some of the most basic aspects of digitality underlying Flusser's understanding
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of matter, energy, space and time in the telematic age have long natural and cultural
histories predating the so-called digital age of electronic computers, and may likewise be
found in non-digital cultural products of this digital age. Concrete examples in Flusser's
work are few, but I suggest artist Franz Ackermann's 1994-2002 installation
Condominium presents an abstracted model of a city that creates an almost Flusserian
experience for its visitors, one which is strikingly digital and interconnected despite its
analogue materials. Tall rectangular wall panels and a glass tower are covered by
circular photographs and circular holes, respectively, resembling skyscrapers covered in
windows around which visitors can physically walk. In this model of the city, times and
places have been broken up and repositioned in a disorienting chaos of unordered
photographic fragments spanning altogether about a century of Berlin's past, as well as
images of planned constructions, some of which were never realized. Mixing pasts and
futures, dispersing any narrative chronology, Ackermann further disorients the viewer by
avoiding any images with an eye-level perspective—the city scenes cannot be entered, no
road signs point toward a future. Maps to which a disoriented tourist would normally
turn fill up the glass tower, crumpled squares of fabric protruding teasingly from the
fenestration. The cartographic fragments of different Berlin maps serve merely to further
overwhelm and disorient the viewer, remnants of order chaotically juxtaposed. The
fragments are all different, but so similar that they seem to repeat and reflect themselves
in each other, creating a patterned multidimensional webbing of reflected spatial and
temporal trajectories through which to walk.
Flusser would, I suggest, console the confused viewer of Condominium with his
belief that the disintegration of linear space-time opens the future to new, free, creative
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re-orientations. The past and the future are both open, and Berlin, city of cuts and
bandages, connections and fragmentation, division and reunification, seems not to
crumble once its seams have worn thin. Rather, the connections, interactions and
reflections of places and times throughout Condominium’s overlapping circuitry
constantly morph and fluctuate with the viewer's movement through the fragmented city.
The viewer’s gaze ceaselessly reflects off of one impenetrable photographic fragment and
onto the next; around and in-between these movements, the images themselves are
reflected inside and off of the glass tower at many angles. Even without having ever read
one word by Flusser, however, the visitor walking through Condominium might perceive
the sensation that this new city model consists only of links without endpoints,
fluctuating relationships between the tiny window “particles.” The viewer’s gaze does
indeed travel without rest. The spaces and times of the installation’s elements have their
own movement and duration, as fractions of histories, repeated layers and reflections.
Without endpoints to the linkages, there are only changing patterns, open loops and
morphing relationships: new maps for our digitized, disorienting surroundings supporting
a Flusserian hope for a free telematic future.
Pixel Art
In Flusser's sense, the future's potential for new world creation expands with the
predominance of digital technology, where computers take over the task of fragmenting
and repositioning bits of reality into new formations more efficiently than ever before—
humans will have no more work, only free time to playfully create, or else suffer
boredom (“On Science” 371). Coaxing unexpected combinations of coded fragments to
emerge from randomized programs requires a light touch from the Dichter or
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programmer—artfully, electronically, randomly scattering the seeds of reality to fall
where they may, in Flusser's terms—finding ways to employ chaos in construction. The
transition to the digital code requires different tools for the same methods, recoding
analogue processes into interchangeable “zero-dimensional” points and the gaps between
them. The possibilities Flusser sees inherent in the digital medium to create neverbefore-seen combinations of particles surface not only at the micro-level of zeros and
ones but further up at higher levels in which whole molecules, images, texts, objects and
fragments thereof can be broken apart and rearranged randomly, intentionally or both.
The translational process defined as “digitalization—understood as the technological
process that reduces the text to something that can be easily fragmented, handled, linked
and distributed—[and] what allows networking, multimedia, collaborative and interactive
communication” applies to texts, images and objects alike, at different scales (Scolari
946). Lev Manovich's five principles of new media explain in depth the digital tools
available for alternative world creation. First, because the media exist as numerical
representations, just like Flusser emphasizes, their digital code can be described
mathematically and thus manipulated algorithmically. Second, the same digital structure
characterizes media at many different scales: “a new media object consists of
independent parts, each of which consists of smaller independent parts, and so on, down
to the level of the smallest ‘atoms’—pixels, 3-D points, or text characters” (Manovich
31). These parts remain distinct and can be deleted or substituted by different parts of
equal size and shape. Third, this allows for an automation of operations which allows
media users to manipulate digital objects on the surface without having to work on the
underlying algorithms or code which make up the object. Fourth, this also allows for
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variability of a media object, the fact that it has many other possible versions and can be
changed to another of these at any point in time, eliminating the notion of a single,
original version. Fifth, the new media are always part computer logic and part cultural
conventions, the two layers in direct feedback with each other, in a cycle of mutual
influence. While all of these aspects of digitality are promising for Flusser's world
creation, some have dangerous consequences, as seen below.
Flusser's call for a conscientious approach to recreating our world as examined
previously applies also in the age of digital technology. His fear of the consequences of
powerful automation making it not only easier to create, but easier not to think, is
noticeable throughout his work, specifically Für eine Philosophie der Fotografie. The
responsibility to evaluate each step in the synthesizing process moves from artist to
apparatus, the latter being Flusser's special term for both technological machines and the
social institutions which create and promote them. The economic apparatus, for example,
“programs” the scientific apparatus, which programs technological equipment, media,
and so forth, social programming hardly different than software programming. The
levels of programming are countless and sometimes imperceptible, but increasingly rigid
the more automatic they become. Apparatuses, especially technological ones, do the
work for humans, but take over the decision making process; they are “simplifizierte
Simulationen von menschlichen Denkprozessen, die, eben weil sie so stur sind,
menschliche Entscheidungen überflüssig und funktionell machen” (Philosophie 67). To
limit the amount of “help” from apparatuses, that is, to maintain a satisfying degree of
human freedom in the creative decision-making process while utilizing technology to
better realize possible worlds, Flusser urges that all human beings accept their place in a
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programmed world while always remaining engaged in disrupting the programs, forever
playing against the machine. Without aiming to win or lose, the give and take between
creative humans and programmed apparatuses should exist in a dynamic feedback loop,
machine systems open to anti-mechanistic chaos, ultimately absorbing human
unpredictabilities back into the programs and humans again fighting back. It is a highly
functional system composed of complimentary yet opposite forces, and with the right
balance, can serve to create whole new environments mixing culture and nature, art and
science, metaphor and machine—helping free humans deliberately weave a second nature
by reassembling information bits.
Digital creation in two dimensions has achieved levels of efficiency and density of
particle condensation, to use his terms, that Flusser only imagined. On the plane surface
of the computer screen, new second natures can already be created that never before
existed. Digital images can appear at higher resolution than analogue photographs, their
pixels dense enough to resemble snapshots of a world that could be real but never existed
outside the image. A Flusserian observer, however, would first remember (as explained
in the first chapter of this study) that digital photographs as “technical images” are no
closer to an original nature than analogue photographs, despite their superlative realness,
being rather one step further away from the trees and clouds of tangible life as their
analogue counterparts. As part of the translation process recoding the perceivable world
from four into three, two, one, and finally zero dimensions, linear science based on
alphabetic codes created analogue photographs just as digital computer codes created
pixelled images. The almost immaterial images fleeting across screens are then the
furthest level of abstraction from the physical world, lacking all their dimensions as
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clusters of points. Their enhanced realness or naturalness is as deceptive as older
products of linear and surface codes, all of which are abstracted from the idea of an
original nature. Flusserian viewers can lament humans' ever-increasing distance from the
four-dimensional code of experiencing the world, or they can see in digital technology an
increased freedom to move forward toward a nature-culture hybrid environment, the
potential to realize heretofore unthinkable possible worlds and create a deliberate second
nature from zero back up to four dimensions.
A mountain landscape in Joan Fontcuberta’s digital photograph Orogenesis:
Gainsborough (2004) illustrates Flusser’s struggle against the apparatus and captures
humans' confused relationship to nature precisely. Like Ackermann's Condominium,
Gainsborough provides no rest for the embodied eye. Treacherous mountain peaks
disappear into a shallow ocean viewed as if from an aerial perspective. This could at first
glance be a snapshot from anywhere on the globe, but something about it seems wrong.
There is no life, no foliage, birds, fish, lichens, and no history—the rocky islands are too
new, unworn. Without the small wisps of clouds fading out of the frame, these rocks
could be any size, even a few inches tall in a puddle, and still they are unapproachable.
Shadows from some lower-right-hand sun make sense, but the still water reflects none of
the light. It is a trick. This is not, never was water: it engulfs, and it is transparent, but it
does not reflect. This impossible landscape has no nature. Fontcuberta himself
introduces his images in speaking of this emptiness of his landscapes: “Landscape is the
expression of place; place as inhabited space…space appropriated by consciousness.
…How are we to represent the place when what prevails is the nonplace: when void and
dislocation come to occupy the territory? The crisis of the landscape today is bound up
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with a sense of the loss of natural space” (Fontcuberta 5). Referring to nature sacrificed
to strip-malls, factories and highways, this perceived loss of nature is caused by the
machine of human technological development. If his landscapes represent the absence of
natural space, they do so technologically, by representing layer upon layer of additional
representations until the referent cannot be recognized. These are landscapes of
landscapes, successive translations into different codes moving further and further away
from some lost nature: Flusser's technical images.
Fontcuberta uses computer programs originally developed for military or
scientific use to create “three-dimensional” landscapes out of flat two-dimensional maps
in ways unintended by the programs: instead of maps, he interprets other landscapes.
Gainsborough, for instance, is so named because he fed Thomas Gainsborough’s 1758 oil
painting of a “natural” forest glen in Cornard Wood, near Sudbury, Suffolk into the
program which read it and encoded it into the program’s own (quite limited) language,
translating leafy tree branches and dirt paths into inorganic rock formations and oceanic
puddles of uncertain scale. Fontcuberta calls the resulting images “products of a
deception,” in that the program “has been forced into a ‘transvestism’ of signs that ask to
be understood, and are likely to be read, as an illuminating gesture of subversion” (6).
Thus it happens that a simple absence of reflection in the water becomes a deliberate selfreflexivity in Gainsborough, calling forth the gap between the virtual and the real,
between autumnal trees, paintbrush strokes and lifeless digital projections, revealing the
loss of the natural and “that every image is a trap, but also that only fiction is now
possible, and that we live embedded inside it” (Fontcuberta 6).
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Seeing both nature and landscape as fiction is to see in these deceptive landscapes
the loss of the experience of physical space through many levels of remove between the
human and nature, a loss normally hidden in the technical images Flusser describes. The
levels of abstraction in Fontcuberta's landscape are extended from those already present
in traditional landscape images, as the physical world translates not only into the human
concept of nature as landscape, followed by its translation through human movement and
tactile materials into a painted image, but now is translated again into an even more
abstracted—reorganized or recoded—digital landscape. The final code of translation
here is the binary computer code, which visualizes mathematical equations producing the
fractal shapes which are the tools of Fontcuberta’s orogenetic software programs—the
algorithms dictate surface folding that mimics mountain formation. Fractals are the
visualization of equations involving chance combined with patterns which produce selfsimilarity regardless of scale, meaning that “the degree of their irregularity and/or
fragmentation is identical at all scales” from the large to the infinitely small (Mandelbrot
1). Here, the language of the fractal is the conceptual-mathematical step between the
painted and digital landscapes; it is a hidden level of remove, bringing the digital
landscape even further from a four-dimensional origin.
But there is more to the abstraction of fractals than just a computational tool, as
illustrated in the following example. Artist Arlene Stamp produced a fractal image
analogous to the fractal branching pattern of a tree simply by plotting out consecutive
binary numbers on a grid, black squares for zero, white for one. As the structure of the
binary code formed a fractal on its own, she “could see the inextricable link between
pictures of fractals generated by computers and simple binary numbers, which underlie
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the structure of the computer itself” (Peterson 90). The fractal as binary landscape can
thus be seen as both tool and medium in the formation of these digital landscapes, as
fractal forms become visible in the resulting images themselves. Surprisingly, the
inaccessible world of Gainsborough's rocky islands is itself reminiscent of a
mathematical pattern called fractal dust, an image created when a geometrical shape is
randomly fragmented piece-by-piece according to a particular fractal dimension. The
characteristic of fractals that they involve a degree of self-similarity regardless of scale is
a quality recognizable in the rock formations of Fontcuberta’s fictional landscape. The
bits of clouds—themselves formed fractally—are not enough to hide this uncertainty of
scale. The deception in this image is cleverly executed: fractal patterns are found almost
everywhere in the physical world, from tree-branching to mountain cleavage to coastlines
to clouds, and thus also found in the landscapes both before and after the digital
translation (in both Gainsborough’s and Fontcuberta’s images), tempting the observer to
see nature in the unreal image. On the contrary, the digital landscape is the farthest step
of remove from nature as we have traditionally conceived of it, and which is now
fictional itself. The digital landscapes are simply “sets of numerical data posing as
photographs” (Batchen 9). The work of the fractal here is technological deception.
Flusser’s critique of the deceptive technical image makes this more explicit. The
apparatus, in this case the camera or computer, creates technical images as it has been
programmed to do so by humans, but supersedes human intention by using the unwitting
humans again simply to further its own program. The human observer is deceived into
thinking the technical image is closer to reality or the physical world, when in fact the
image is farther away from nature than ever before, due to the mathematical nature of the
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apparatus. The program reorganizes images into its own code instead of copying them
from nature; it is too late to insert human intention into the process. “There is no place
for human freedom,” Flusser warns, “within the area of automated, programmed and
programming apparatuses” (Philosophy 81). To realize this fact is nevertheless the very
means to make possible a freedom which is “the strategy of making chance and necessity
subordinate to human intention” (Philosophy 80). Recognizing the programmed structure
of the automated game of chance, the human artist must try to deliberately bend the rules,
opening up the mechanistic system to highly improbable configurations of parts. The
results would be temporary before they too are reabsorbed into the program, but the
process of playing is the only goal. In this way, Fontcuberta exercises his freedom by
subverting the map-reading computer program intentionally making fun of the software’s
limited internal logic. In fact, he does this also in his earlier analogue photographs of
recombined plant life, making deceptive images which appear at first to be natural—
piecing together different plant parts into alien plantlike forms and photographing the
result. Flusser himself introduces Fontcuberta’s photo-book Herbarium, describing the
photographs of manipulated plants as a critique of the “blind” randomness of the internal
laws of natural selection. “Once we have discovered this stupid game of chance…we
may deliberately interfere with it in order to provoke desirable mutations,” Flusser writes,
just like the work of agriculturists and plant geneticists, although Fontcuberta’s nonuseful manipulations make fun of science, technology and nature out of a “tragic
disappointment” with it (Herbarium, n.p.).
Clearly, this struggle for the authenticity of human intention effectively equates
the programmed apparatus with the chance laws of nature, to the point of a conflation of
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nature and machine. Fontcuberta’s plants are independent of the laws of biological
evolution, his landscapes independent of the laws of geological evolution. Moreover,
they both subvert the laws of the technological apparatus. All these systems involve
patterns formed by internal laws mixed with chance, the fractal is one characteristic
among many others that exemplifies this ubiquitous paradox of random order. Nature
becomes a randomized version of a machine by virtue of its automatic program.
Elizabeth Neswald writes of Flusser’s philosophy, that “die maschinelle Funktion ist zum
Wesen der Natur geworden,” quoting him on his concept of a universe that functions
simply according to the laws of chance as “ein Automat. Es hat ein Programm…und das
Programm wird ablaufen, bis es erfüllt ist, und es gibt nichts idiotischeres als das”
(Neswald 57). Just as blind nature becomes blind machine, “so erscheinen Maschinen als
natürlich,” Neswald decides (57-8). The equation is much too simple, however. Nature's
automation runs on randomness in contrast to deterministic machines designed to
eliminate all chance events, and understanding nature and technology as one functional
unit means a second nature neither fully random nor deterministic. More an open system,
metaphor machine or dissipative structure as described previously, Flusser's second
nature allows order to emerge out of chaos in a delicate balance of blind chance, machine
logic and human unpredictability.
Free human creativity, following Flusser's logic, would then entail the deliberate,
unpredictable or “human” application and extension of nature's laws of particle collision
by means of digital technology. The very binary code of computation that abstracts the
human from the traditional concept of nature can, in fractal form and otherwise, model
new structures of experiencing the world, creating new perceptions. Paul Virilio, for
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instance, ascribes the current loss of physical space to the sphere of digitally-produced
images of mass-media and satellite surveillance which form an outer bubble that closes in
on us, erasing spatio-temporal dimensions at an ever-increasing rate. The virtual texture
of this constricting bubble we experience as a fractal surface: “Suddenly,” he writes, “we
possess this ease of passing without transition or delay from the perception of the
infinitesimally small to the perception of the infinitely large, from the immediate
proximity of the visible to the visibility of all that lingers beyond our field of vision”
(Virilio 32). Because digital images can now come to us from around the globe at an
instant, our location in physical space dissolves. We travel through virtual space at will
in the network of pixels, nomadic in Flusser’s eyes—which creates the new condition that
the nomadic “Lebensrhythmus...muß in fraktalen Algorithmen ausgedrückt werden”
(Flusser, Freiheit 61). As mentioned above, he believes that the wind is all that is left for
us as nomads to orient ourselves with, the wind that calculates the physical world,
grinding it up into pixels and computing them into new structures. Leaving the physical
experience of earth and wind step by step for an experience structured by computer
codes, the telematic human retains the “meteorologische, 'selbstähnliche', fraktale
Tatsache” of the workings of a digital world (Flusser, Freiheit 61).
Bio Art
The culmination of our quest for knowledge and technical mastery of processes
and tools for digital creation is the ability to reshape what comes through our pores so
that it may give us meaning in an absurd world. Moving up the dimensional spectrum
from points to lines to images to objects, human creativity in Flusser's telematic society
knows only technological bounds. The trajectory toward increasingly real creations is, in
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Flusser's view, the chance for humans to artistically, scientifically find freedom by
playing with chance and entropy and the complex order that can emerge in the process.
The secret to be gleaned from his strange metaphorical philosophy is that a rich,
meaningful second nature is brought about with a light touch indeed, a fragile balance of
forces instead of a battle to the death between culture and nature. Ultimately it is through
experimental play with nature's laws that inextricably blends culture and nature at the
particle level, collaborating with nature so that we may ultimately recreate ourselves as
both natural and cultural beings. Flusser's concern over the dangers of losing to the blind
automation of entropy and cultural programming is paralleled by his belief that humans'
creative freedom is limited only by our imagination. Achieving immortality and lasting
significance is, if not impossible, fully unimportant. The achievable goal is to keep
playing. Why not?
Why is it that dogs aren't yet blue with red spots, and that horses don't yet radiate
phosphorescent colors over the nocturnal meadows of the land? … Not only do
we have mountains of butter and ham, rivers of milk and wine, but we can now
make artificial living beings, living artworks. If we chose, these developments
could be brought together, and farming could be transferred from peasants, a class
almost defunct anyway, to artists, who breed like rabbits, and don't get enough to
eat. (“On Science” 371)
Imagining a film showing the entire course of human history, Flusser watches
complex patterns emerge over the globe, first nomadic peoples following migrating herds
over the steppe, then reorganizing around campfires in small forest clearings, then fields
of grain and animal pastures between cities. The film continues past Flusser's present day
to show him “a continent-sized Disneyland full of people working very short weeks
because of automation, and trying desperately to amuse themselves so as not to die of
boredom” (“On Science” 371). Flusser's Disneyland of the telematic future, however,

155

looks surprisingly like the hellish paradise of the Vampyroteuthis infernalis, as Flusser
states directly that the other-worldly colors and shapes of the ocean floor may one day be
programmable by molecular biology artists all over Earth's surface. In a simple “transfer
of genetic information,” Earth's creatures will be modified, bred or otherwise engineered
to resemble the “fields and forests of plantlike creatures whose red, blue, and yellow
tentacles sway with the currents, gigantic rainbow-colored snails trailing through the
scenery, and swarms of silvery, gold, and violet fish overflying it” (“On Science” 372).
One day being able to “program” such symbiotic oddities that would normally be a oncein-a-millenium random mutation or a “consequence of a complex evolutional chain of
feedbacks and adjustments,” the genetic artist would be able to “compose an enormous
color symphony, evolving spontaneously through endless variations (mutations) in which
the color of every living organism will complement the colors of every other organism,
and be mirrored by them” (“On Science” 372). An environment no longer traditionally
natural, Flusser counters his objectors, should not be a concern because humans turned
their environment artificial from the earliest days of forest clearing and crop planting.
Humans have always manipulated the life around them in order to survive. Even once
machines take over the work for survival, however, the rise in boredom alone should be
able to justify “art's role in the immediate future” (“On Science” 372).
Always with one eye on hell and the other on heaven, Flusser's vision is no
euphoria of bioinformatics that promotes “a dangerously reductive analogy between
discrete binary data and the more complex, environment-related field of genetics” (Kac
1). Science unchecked and programmed by the powerful elite can objectify humans and
other living things leading to gene patenting, genetic discrimination and damaging
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genetically-modified organisms. Flusser himself was already aware of the dark side of
human nature, and the many controversies that spring up around biotechnology are not
substantially different from the dangers of objectifying and controlling the masses
through technology that Flusser warns against in Vampyroteuthis infernalis or Für eine
Philosophie der Fotografie. The energy and optimism exuded by Flusser's philosophy
always takes this threat as its context, a hopeful creative vision back-lit by the blinding
abysses of entropy, blind chance and automatic programs. Play against the machine,
Flusser reasons, and the game is already won. Meaning out of Bodenlosigkeit is made by
creating as freely as possible, which means enlisting the powers of nature, technology
and humans' natural artistic creativity. Bio art expands this to three or more dimensions,
the manipulation of “biological materials at discrete levels (e.g., individual cells, proteins,
genes, nucleotides) and the actual creation of new life” (Kac 12). In this, subjects are
created instead of objects, living autonomous beings are “elements of a true art of
evolution” (Kac 14). More than objects, living art interacts with environment and artist
alike; like any art of a digital nature, bio art transforms isolated specks into a connected
ecosystem, only all the more evident in vascular masses of organ tissue, petals and
leaves, bone and skin. “Bio art emphasizes the dialogical and relational (e.g., crosspollination, social intercourse, cell interaction, interspecies communication) as much as
the material and formal qualities of art (the shape of frogs, the color of flowers,
bioluminescence, the patterns on butterfly wings)” (Kac 19-20). Emergent complexities
evolve as the bio artist nudges binary and biological particles to bend their own
programming into improbable states, reacting to each other in unpredictable ways.
Artists working with the tools of the biotechnology age grapple with the
complexity of life, that is, the interaction among genetics, organism and
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environment. They resist biological determinism and reductionism, and they
demonstrate the fragility of the objective edifice of science. They also invent
new entities and new relationships never seen before” (Kac 24).
Flusser's intuition is always on an ecological level; he envisions whole ecosystems
and worlds, whole fabrics, oceans and webs of realities that as a whole make up a second
nature full of human creativity, blind chance and entropy combined. In the
aforementioned telematic society where only relations between things and people are
concrete, selves and objects do not exist without the other selves and objects in their
environment. The new realities Flusser sees possible for the telematic future are not at all
built from those tiny points, pixels, proteins or even people, but from the connections
between them. Flusser's fundamental notion of the field of relations between immaterial
nodes can be applied to the various overlapping realms of human creativity. Barbara
Stafford's description of this “expanding creative metaverse” links the “post-anthropic
biology” of cells instead of selves with the “new aesthetic media” of back-linked weblogs
and electronic literature:
In both cases, we are confronted with an exitless maze of operations that are
unpredictable, discrete, nonlinear, and ever-responsive to the back and forth
clicking of multiple users. Pattern—whether on the monitor or in the petrie dish—
is emergent, deriving from an elastic database from which mutable excerpts or
fragments are selected to interact with a limited or vast number of options.
(Stafford 377)
On computer screens as in cell culture labs, emergent principles as introduced in the
previous chapter are fundamental to the organic structures that form from the interaction
of tiny particles. Flusser's metaphors translating sand grains into pixels and wind
turbulence into algorithms highlight the digital structures present in both nature and
computer technology that create an environment conducive to the spontaneous emergence
of new order. All of life can be defined in one sense as a shaky balance of chaotic forces,
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one which Flusser understands to consist of particles but which cannot exist without the
context of relationships connecting these particles into a whole larger than its parts. The
science is now just barely catching up: “Preserving a fragile ballet of randomness—made
up of little routines and a swirl of minutiae—is the opposite of the genetic logic of the
speck. … the genetic perspective [cloning, genetic splicing, etc.] interprets life as a
synthetic, detachable, arbitrary, and ahistorical ordering of reshuffleable components”
(Stafford 381). Thus free human creativity, while digital in nature, must ultimately strive
to create not objects, but whole worlds, including intersubjective human environments
suggestive of Flusser's anthill superorganisms. In other words, “each individual is a
complex ecology of interacting agents—heredity, selection, development, cultural
practices and values—not a mere aggregate of them … a complexly fracturing
environment” (Stafford 382). I believe Flusser breaks down nature, culture and
technology alike into a common digitality only for the purposes of understanding how the
parts may reconnect by means both natural and technological, including spontaneous,
fractal, non-deterministic emergence.
Biological artistry as a crucial step towards realizing Flusser's vision for human
creative freedom requires the entire ecosystem of our second nature, in which case new
creations are of course free of the same strict nature-culture divisions as the artistic
media. Eduardo Kac's 2000 transgenic bunny Alba can glow in the dark, in the 1980s
George Gessert can crossbreed himself with an iris, Alexander Fleming can paint a
human portrait as early as 1933 with pigmented bacteria grown in a petri dish, and again
in 2000 Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr can culture human tissue on a polymer scaffolding

159

outside of the supporting body.10 Bio art need not even restrict itself to the living; it
conjures up chimeras not fully alive in the traditional sense. In a parallel to Porush's soft
machine, a complex system both technology and anti-mechanistic chaos, Louis Bec,
illustrator and collaborator with Flusser for the Vampyroteuthis, focuses on semi-living
animal-technological hybrids, especially neuron-silicon chip fusions that combine
deterministic machines with living, learning beings. “Mediation between the living and
the technological machine … becomes a world in and of itself that gives rise to an
aesthetic of complex systems. … This aesthetic takes into account the significant
emergence of coherence and the robustness of the integrated functioning of the living and
the constructed machine” (Bec 89-90). Bec and other bio artists are able to put Flusser's
ideas into practice, rupturing whole animal and machine entities, mixing and recombining
them on the microscopic level.
Whether transgenic bunnies or flowers, bacteria paintings or wet clumps of tissue,
genetically mutated organisms, groupings of individual cells or semi-living hybrids, the
trajectories of bio art all lead to a future Flusser could only dream of. The wildest part
about his hypothetical visions is that they are already materializing. Perhaps all these
artistic/scientific strategies—installations, images, animals—combined will gradually
intermingle and overlap to weave piece by piece, pixel or gene an interconnected second
nature that does not objectify humans and other living things, but rather spontaneously
generates itself from the dynamic interactions between blind life, technology, choice and
chance. These strategies should ultimately create an intersubjective network of relations

10 Presented in Kac, Eduardo. Ed. Signs of Life: Bio Art and Beyond. Cambridge MA: MIT, 2007.
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beyond humans that in turn enriches human life as much as possible, all in the
atmosphere of absurdity, of Bodenlosigkeit. In the last existing chapter of what was to be
his unfinished last book Menschwerdung, Flusser insists that our “religious” belief in
science will have to change. In the future science will also be art, he writes, and
objective knowledge will be impossible. Space will be filled with intersecting relations,
dimensions will be measured according to our level of interest instead of distance, and
time will be no diachronic flow toward the future, but a “symphonic” ocean of
possibilities approaching us “algorithmically” from all sides. Progress will not be
discovery, but intersubjective dialogue, and encountering others will mean overlapping
your relational net with theirs. What is left to believe in after an awareness of
Bodenlosigkeit, Flusser offers, is dialogue with another, with others, a concrete
overcoming of death where we survive in their memories. This “new way of being
human” is to live a rich life and enjoy it, recreating our connections, environment and
ourselves to our liking, solving problems and helping others in dialogue. Our task
through art and science is ultimately “gemeinsam mit anderen dem Leben einen Sinn zu
geben” (“Was man wollen kann” 24).
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